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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, I integrate the published and newly available 
unpublished works of Bernard Suits to arrive at an original, holistic interpretation 
of his corpus. I identify, analyze, and resolve inconsistencies in his position which 
have not been previously critiqued in depth. Centrally, I provide a critical analysis 
of Suits’ relatively obscure utopian thesis: his argument that the ‘ideal of 
existence’ for humankind is a utopia of gameplay. 
More specifically, I demonstrate that Suits’ utopian thesis fails on its own 
grounds because his utopian vision—the thought experiment upon which his 
utopian thesis rests for its plausibility—requires that humanity enter a post-
instrumental phase of culture unimaginable from our current species-
perspective. The nature of utopian gameplay is obscured behind this cultural gap, 
and thus we pre-utopians have no rational reason to accept Suits’ assertion that 
it instantiates the ideal of existence. Finally, I sympathetically rehabilitate Suits’ 
utopian thesis along perfectionist lines as the utopian game design thesis, and 
show that its main value lies in its role as a regulative ideal, offering a unique set 
of normative recommendations for our current gaming practices. 
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Note on the Unpublished Works of Bernard Suits 
  
Throughout this dissertation, I reference the unpublished works of 
Bernard Suits (1925-2007). Suits taught for most of his professional life (from 
1966 to 1994) at the University of Waterloo’s Department of Philosophy. In 2013 
his widow, Cheryl Ballantine, donated many of his previously unseen typeset and 
manuscript writings to that university, with the intention that they become 
available for public inspection. 
All unpublished materials that I reference are contained in the Bernard 
Suits fonds (GA 251), currently held by the University of Waterloo Library’s 
Special Collections and Archives. There are 7 boxes, holding 105 files of material, 
which have been publicly accessible since 2014. To my knowledge, no published 
scholarly use has been made of the Suits fonds previously to this thesis. It is thus 
one of my chief aims to progress Suits scholarship by addressing this lacuna. 
The fonds materials are roughly organized according to theme, although 
this system is not altogether reliable. For example, different pages of a single 
document might be found spread between two or more files, each of which is 
tagged under a separate heading, with mismatching dates assigned to these 
headings. The dates given by the fonds catalogue are often not specific and, in 
some cases, are obviously inaccurate. Thus, I have given no specific dates to my 
bibliographic entries that are sourced from these materials, but have instead 
opted to leave the years as blanks, followed by letters that indicate the order in 
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which I believe the pieces were written (e.g., ‘19—a’), given contextual clues I 
gleaned from other fonds materials (such as ages and types of paper, fonts of 
particular typewriters or printers used for specific periods by the author, etc.). 
Unless otherwise specified, I reference only work that was typeset or 
bound for the purposes of eventual presentation, publication, or peer review, 
and can therefore be reasonably understood as a reliable indicator of Suits’ 
philosophical commitments. These often represent clarifications or refinements 
on positions identifiable in his published works, although there are also 
freestanding original contributions to his oeuvre. Of particular importance in this 
regard are Grasshopper Soup: Philosophic Essays on Games  (Suits 19--b) and 
Return of the Grasshopper: Games and the End of the Future (Suits 19--c), as each 
constitute two novel typeset and bound versions of Suits’ intended sequel to his 
only published book, The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia (Suits 2014 
[1978]). 
Many thanks go to Cheryl Ballantine who, as copyright holder of the 
fonds, granted me special permission to digitally replicate their contents for the 
purposes of my research over the course of two week-long library visits in 2016 
and 2017. She was also generous in answering many biographical questions I had 
about Suits, thereby creating a better context for understanding the relevance of 
the fonds materials. Her assistance and goodwill greatly facilitated this research. 
 
10 
 
Introduction: Bernard Suits, in Three Pieces 
  
 In this introduction, I give an exegesis and analysis of Bernard Suits’ 
corpus of work on the philosophy of games, both published and unpublished, and 
discuss to what extent we might be permitted to interpret it as a cohesive and 
coherent system of thought. I organize Suits’ corpus chronologically into three 
divided ‘pieces’ of interrelated academic output, but discuss individual works 
thematically within those sections as appropriate. In the course of this 
comprehensive introduction to Suits, the main conceptual pillars and fault lines of 
his philosophical oeuvre will become apparent. To begin, however, I must 
introduce some of the few theorists who were writing on games as a subject of 
scholarly interest before Suits, for they are worth mentioning in terms of their 
influence on his work. 
Johan Huizinga’s ground-breaking Homo Ludens (Huizinga 1955 [1938])1 
focuses on the history and prehistory of gaming, and its anthropological and 
sociological bases and functions. Huizinga sees play and, correspondingly, games 
literally everywhere: coded into ritualistic performances, the trading of goods, 
the production of art, and armed confrontations. Games, he says, can be playful 
or serious, purposeless or purposeful. While fascinating in its interpretation of 
                                                          
1 Huizinga’s book is edited by Karl Mannheim, whose Ideology and Utopia (Mannheim 1950) 
remains a milestone of utopian theory. 
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culture, the philosophical problem with Huizinga’s approach soon makes itself 
apparent: for if everything is a game, then nothing is a non-game, and thus the 
concept ‘game’ becomes vacuous—it cannot be meaningful if there is no non-
play kind of human activity to compare it to; for example, ‘work’. Suits sees and 
corrects this deficiency in The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia with the 
following distinction: “working is doing things you have to do and playing is doing 
things for the fun of it” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 17). He also borrows Huizinga’s use 
of ‘Ludens’ from the Latin ludus, meaning play in general (Huizinga 1955 [1938], 
p. 35), and adapts it to create the adjective ‘lusory’, meaning roughly ‘of, or 
pertaining to, a game’, for his own purposes (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 37). 
 In mainstream philosophy, it was Ludwig Wittgenstein who first mirrored 
the social scientific community’s interest in the phenomenon of gameplay; but it 
is precisely due to the richness and diversity of the field that Wittgenstein 
despaired of the quest for an adequate philosophical definition of it. Indeed, 
Wittgenstein uses ‘game’ as a paradigm case for his family resemblance thesis—
that most, if not all, concepts do not admit of analysis in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §§ 66-71). As well as generating a 
cottage industry of philosophical journal articles on this topic, Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations directly inspired Suits to write The Grasshopper as a 
defence of moderate definitionalism in philosophical analysis, specifically as it 
pertains to ‘gameplay’ (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 1-2). 
12 
 
Roger Callois, in Man, Play, and Games, produced an influential typology 
of games, including agon (competitive games of skill), alea (games of chance), 
mimesis (games of make-believe), and ilinx (games of sensation and emotion); as 
well as identifying a distinction between paidia (unstructured playfulness) and 
ludus (rule-bound games) (Callois 1961). However, Callois focuses more on play 
than games per se; he defines ‘play’ as being voluntary, unproductive, rule-
governed, imaginary, having an uncertain outcome, and separate—in the same 
sense as Huizinga’s ‘magic circle’ (Huizinga 1955 [1938], pp. 11, 57)—from 
mundane activities. Suits incorporates several of the elements of Callois’ 
definition of ‘play’ in his later definition of ‘game’, and implicitly employs Callois’ 
distinction between paidia and ludus when delineating his concepts of ‘open’ 
games’ and ‘closed games’ (Suits 2014 [1978], Chapter 12). 
Eric Berne, in his Games People Play, also believes that games are 
omnipresent, but he focuses instead upon the psychological motivations for their 
perpetuation: initiating and cooperating in social ‘transactions’ (Berne 1964). The 
reason, he says, for engaging in these transactions—which admit of game-
theoretical analysis—is to maximize the amount of ‘strokes’, i.e., the successful 
elicitation of desired reactions in others, that one can accomplish. Strokes 
validate and reinforce the self-image of the ‘player’, forming and cementing 
behavioural patterns. Even when transactions become disagreeable and are 
obviously manipulative, Berne holds that the players will keep iterating them 
13 
 
because they are the only games possible to play as themselves; i.e., to surrender 
one’s patterns of interaction with others often means surrendering one’s own 
identity, which is a patently undesirable outcome for rational agents attempting 
to maximize on their values and interests. For Berne, players are the sums of the 
games that they play. The intellectual debt that Suits owes Berne is largely a 
negative one, for Suits vehemently rejects Berne’s picture of games as being 
involuntary played for neurotic motivations. He writes that “Berne’s people play 
‘games’ in order to secure their psychological survival… Berne’s players (Berne is 
saying) would have no reason to play ‘games’ if they achieved a condition of 
psychological autonomy” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 165). A game that must be played, 
for any reason, cannot constitute an instantiation of gameplay for Suits. 
With the appropriate context thus set, it is time to put on Suits himself. 
For although his only published book, The Grasshopper, has received a good deal 
of recent philosophical attention, many of his lesser-known articles and 
unpublished works have languished in obscurity. In the following sections, I will 
show demonstrate how the incorporation of these ancillary works can further 
enrich our understanding of Suits’ schema. 
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First Piece: Suits’ Early Questions (1955-1970) 
 Bernard Suits launched his early academic career with a string of book 
reviews (Suits 1955, 1960, 1961b, 1962, 1964), an article on the metaphysics of 
John Dewey and Gerorge Santayana (Suits 1961a), and a piece responding to a 
literary criticism of Herman Melville’s Billy Budd (Suits 1963). Then, in April and 
June of 1967, Suits published his first two major articles on the philosophy of 
games—first “Is Life a Game We Are Playing?” in Ethics (Suits 1967a), followed 
shortly by “What Is a Game?” in Philosophy of Science (Suits 1967b)—both of 
which had very different, but related, questions they attempted to answer. Suits 
would spend the rest of his life trying to answer these, and became famous for 
uniting them in The Grasshopper. 
“What Is a Game?” lays the foundation for much of Suits’ subsequent 
work. It contains what I call the ‘definitionist thesis’—the contention that the 
concept ‘game’ admits of concise philosophical definition, contra Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s famous assertion to the contrary in Philosophical Investigations—
and provides an early version of his definition of gameplay, which would bring 
popular attention to his work with the publication of The Grasshopper a little over 
a decade later: “to play a game is to engage in an activity directed towards 
bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by specific 
rules, where the means permitted by the rules are more limited in scope than 
they would be in the absence of the rules, and where the sole reason for 
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accepting such limitation is to make possible such activity” (Suits 1967b, p. 156).  
The slightly cleaner, more precise version of this definition emerged with labels 
for each of these nested clauses:2  
To play a game is to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means 
permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in 
favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just 
because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude]” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 43).  
 
This latter definition has become universally accepted as authoritative, and is the 
one I will refer to throughout this dissertation. 
The article also outlines what William Morgan later dubbed the ‘logical 
incompatibility thesis’ (Morgan 1987), Suits’ idea that cheaters cannot by 
definition be playing a game if and when they break that game’s rules. For, as 
Suits writes, “if the rules are broken the original end becomes impossible of 
attainment, since one cannot (really) win the game unless he plays it, and one 
cannot (really) play the game unless he obeys the rules of the game” (Suits 
1967b, p. 150). The apparent implausibility of the incompatibility thesis, in light of 
apparent contradictions such as those generated by intentional fouls in various 
sports, has become one of the main arguments against formalism, the position 
                                                          
2 Thomas Hurka was the first to formally recognize the ‘nestedness’, or network of logical 
dependencies, within Suits’ definition: “Its third element, the lusory attitude, is defined in terms 
of its second, the constitutive rules, since it involves an attitude to those rules, namely one of 
accepting them. And its second element is defined in terms of its first, since the rules restrict how 
you may pursue the prelusory goal. The elements of the analysis are therefore nested, the first 
inside the second and the second inside the third, and the resulting unity is part of its 
philosophical power” (Hurka 2014, p. xiii). 
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Fred D’Agostino identifies as the claim that “game-derivative notions are defined 
solely in terms of the formal rules of a game” (D'Agostino 1981, p. 7). 
Nevertheless, Suits adequately addresses this critique when he directly states, 
regarding “rules whose violations results in a fixed penalty” such as those 
regarding intentional fouls, that: “these rules and the lusory consequences of 
their violation are established by their constitutive rules and are simply 
extensions of them” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 40). If a foul is penalized by a formal 
game rule, then fouling is formally part of that game. 
“Is Life a Game We Are Playing?” is a much more speculative and 
enigmatic piece, which has received far less academic attention. Here, Suits aims 
to convince his readers that “life may be a game” (Suits 1967a, p. 209, emphasis 
mine), and that if it is, “a philosophy based on that discovery might provide for 
mankind consolation equal to that provided by an Epicurus or an Epictetus; or 
more sanguinely, it might accomplish a renascence of man’s reflection upon 
himself comparable to that accomplished by a Socrates or a Freud” (Suits 1967a, 
p. 213).3 The appeal of this more grandiose claim—which we might properly 
regard as the embryonic presentation of what Doug McLaughlin calls Suits’ 
‘utopian thesis’ (McLaughlin 2008); the idea that a life consisting entirely of 
                                                          
3 Suits articulated such a philosophy, in the form of a slogan, in that same article: “Life is a game. 
Live accordingly.” (Suits 1967a, p. 213) 
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gameplay is the “ideal of existence” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182)—is only now 
beginning to be discussed widely by writers of secondary literature on Suits. 
Nevertheless, the article is a repository of themes and concepts that Suits 
will spend the rest of his academic career attempting to advance. There is a 
foreshadowing of the ‘capacity thesis’, later given in “The Elements of Sport”, in 
the following form: “people play games so that they can realize in themselves 
capacities not realizable (or not readily so) in the pursuit of their ordinary 
activities” (Suits 2007 [1973], p. 12). Suits’ early version is distinct enough to 
warrant its own title, the ‘revelation thesis’, given thus: “the discovery that life is 
a game might disclose unimagined sources of human action and stimulate 
unexpected feats of human invention” (Suits 1967a, p. 213). In the capacity 
thesis, people play games in order to develop their latent capacities; in the 
revelation thesis, people develop their latent capacities due to the realization that 
they are already playing a game, and as a result of this emancipating discovery, 
human culture may begin to radically transform—possibly, into a utopia of 
gameplay. 
A thread left dangling here is picked up in Suits’ 1970 article, also phrased 
in the form of a question: “Can You Play a Game Without Knowing It?” As Suits 
recognizes that “if life is a game we are playing, it must be a game which most of 
us, at any rate, do not know we are playing” (Suits 1967a, p. 209), the plausibility 
of his thesis that “life may be a game” directly depends upon the possibility of 
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our being able to play a game unconsciously. In his early defence of this idea, he 
wrote that “a person could fail to know he was playing a game… if he were doing 
all of these things [i.e., the four necessary conditions of his definition of 
gameplay] but did not know that he was doing one or more of them. (In the same 
way, a person might not know that X was a bachelor because he did not know 
that X was an adult, or unmarried, or a male.)” (Suits 1967a, p. 210, square 
brackets mine) Ignorance of fulfilling the conditions of Suits’ definition of 
gameplay does not exempt one’s actions from fitting that definition. 
When Suits returns for a more extended defence of this position, he 
embroiders it with a thought experiment involving a character called J.B. 
Lovegold, a businessman who—upon due reflection—realizes that he has been 
voluntarily, albeit unconsciously, keeping his weaker competitor, N. Croach, in 
business just so he can enjoy competing against him. The Lovegold character 
discovers that 
I evidently prefer to have the fun of making as much money as I can with competition, 
even though this reduces my profits, rather than to make money exclusively as a means 
for serving my other interests… Well, well, to think that I have been playing a game for 
over a year without knowing it. Live and learn. (Suits 1970, pp. 132-133) 
 
This hypothetical example is plausible enough, and is strengthened with the 
further possibilities that ‘imbeciles’, the logically ignorant, and those suffering 
from ‘logical aphasia’ due to psychological interference (such as Oedipus’ initial 
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refusal to recognize the full extent of his tragic condition in Sophocles’ Oedipus 
Rex) could also be unconscious game players (Suits 1970, pp. 136-137). 
Suits holds that logical aphasia may be the reason that most of us do not 
ordinarily entertain the possibility that life is a game, because 
We believe that life is serious, or hard, or capable of nobility, or demanding of sacrifice. 
We believe it is significant. But we believe there is something essentially trifling and 
insignificant about games (Suits 1967a, p. 210). 
 
Thus stated, the idea that life is a game entails that life is both significant and not 
significant—a logical contradiction. There are two methods, however, for 
resolving this apparent contradiction: to accept that (1) life is insignificant, or (2) 
games are significant. If (1) is true, then it is entirely appropriate and logical to (a) 
make an insignificant game out of an insignificant life; or to (b) make a significant 
game out of an insignificant life. If (2) is true, then to (c) make a significant game 
out of a significant life is a logically defensible strategy, in a way that making an 
insignificant game out of a significant life is not. Suits touches on this when he 
writes that “the discovery that one is playing a game would be likely to result in 
either chagrin or delight, depending on the player’s attitude toward games and 
toward the proper conduct of his life. The first response would probably be to 
stop playing, the second to play better” (Suits 1970, p. 138). This choice—
between suicide (ceasing play), and a utopia of gameplay (playing better)—is 
reformulated in the ‘utopian suicide thesis’ in the final chapter of The 
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Grasshopper (Suits 2014 [1978], Chapter 15), and in “Games and Utopia: 
Posthumous Reflections” (Suits 1984b, p. 8). This conclusion is also explicitly 
spelled out in “Is Life a Game We Are Playing?”, wherein Suits writes: “A man 
who discovered that to live is to play a game might choose to terminate his 
participation in life… And Homo ludens, who if life were a game would be the only 
verus homo, would find in that fact his supreme justification.” (Suits 1967a, p. 
213) 
 
Second Piece: Suits’ Middle Answers (1971-1989) 
 The mature precipitate of these early musings is contained in The 
Grasshopper, which stands as Suits’ masterwork and the most cohesive defence 
of his bifurcate project. The main character of the book, the Grasshopper of 
Aesop’s fable, “does two things. He advances a definition of games, and he 
argues that the ideal of existence—that is, Utopia—must consist fundamentally, 
if not exclusively, in the playing of games” (Suits 1984b, p. 8). Interestingly, Suits 
conducts his entire inquiry in the form of a Socratic-style dialogue between the 
Grasshopper character and his disciples, Skepticus and Prudence, but breaks the 
narrative form to directly ensure his readers that “the expression of my argument 
is of paramount importance to me, and if there should arise, in the writing of it, a 
conflict between the presentation of that argument and the narrative form in 
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which I have chosen to express it, then it is the form that must give way”4 (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 174). A review of the central passages contained in Suits’ book, 
and the constellation of related articles on the philosophy of games that 
appeared in the period surrounding its publication, will be necessary to ground 
the reader for what follows in this dissertation. 
 Suits sets up his utopian thought experiment by considering the possibility 
that scarcity and hardship might conceivably be forever conquered by unspecified 
“advances in technology”, and that under such conditions an ‘ant’ life with its 
meaning grounded in instrumental activity would be absurd (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
10). He defines ‘prudence’ as “the disposition 1/ to sacrifice something good 
(e.g., leisure) if and only if such sacrifice is necessary for obtaining something 
better (e.g., survival), and 2/ to reduce the number of good things requiring 
sacrifice—ideally, at least—to zero” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 10). Prudential actions 
include work, as we generally work not for work’s own sake, but so that we can 
enjoy the good of play. He defines ‘work’ as instrumental activity, “doing things 
we value for the sake of something else”; and ‘play’ as autotelic activity, “doing 
things we value for their own sake” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 17). Work is reviled as 
“a kind of necessary evil which we accept because it makes it possible for us to do 
                                                          
4 This passage alone should be enough to establish Suits’ serious philosophical intentions, and 
contradict Scott Kretchmar’s reading of the book as the transcript of a one-player game that Suits 
was playing while writing (Kretchmar 2008, p. 142). To be playful in one’s writing style does not 
imply that one is literally playing a game by writing. 
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things we think of as being good in themselves” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 17). Thus, 
on Suits’ model, work is tolerable only insofar as it enables autotelic pursuits:  
work is good because it provides us with leisure as well as the means to enjoy that 
leisure. Work is good chiefly because it is good for something much better. The things for 
which it is finally good are goods in themselves. They are intrinsic goods.5 (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 14) 
 
Therefore a life consisting solely of instrumental activity, with no autotelic 
activity as a payoff, would be of extremely low value for Suits—perhaps of no 
value whatever. Indeed, if we imagine a person with a very low level of physical 
and cognitive function, whose entire existence revolves around their execution of 
extremely unpleasant, purely instrumental tasks geared solely towards ensuring 
their bare survival, we can begin to see the intuitive basis of Suits’ position. 
Bringing in the spectre of suicide once again, albeit from a different angle, Suits 
muses that “since the life whose preservation requires continuous toil is just that 
toil itself, the toiler must well wonder whether the game is worth the candle” 
(Suits 2007 [1973], p. 14). Less dramatically, he revisits this idea in “Games and 
Utopia: Posthumous Reflections”: “We work so that we won’t have to work; 
nothing else makes any sense to me.” (Suits 1984b, p. 10) Here Suits directly 
echoes Aristotle, who writes: “the whole of life is further divided into two parts, 
                                                          
5 In one quote, we have the conflation of the final, intrinsic, and autotelic senses of value for 
which Suits (and latter-day Suitsians) comes under much fire. I inherit this terminological usage 
from Suits, but will endeavour to disambiguate whenever these value terms threaten a clear 
interpretation of his position.  
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business and leisure… there must be… business for the sake of leisure, things 
useful and necessary for the sake of things honourable… what is honourable is 
better”6 (Aristotle 2000 [c. 350 B.C.E.], §§ 1333a-1333b, emphasis mine). By the 
same logic, a life consisting entirely of autotelic activity is held by Suits to be the 
“ideal of existence” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182). 
Play, in contrast to work, is broadly construed as “leisure activities”, and 
gameplay is just one of the many possible kinds of it (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 17). In 
“Words on Play”, Suits goes on to clarify that not all autotelic activities—
"activities which are ends in themselves” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 217)—are play, 
but “all instances of play are instances of autotelic activity” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
220). This distinction stands because one can imagine serious autotelic activities, 
such as “Aristotle contemplating the Unmoved Mover” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
217), while all play is non-serious by definition. The ‘serious’ attitude also applies 
to all instrumental activities, that is, work, which explains why play is defined as 
work’s “inherent opposite” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 222). 
Further, Suits claims that games are not a subspecies of play, because 
“there is no logical relation whatever between playing and playing games” (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 220). This follows from his more formal definition of ‘play’: “x is 
playing if and only if x has made a temporary reallocation to autotelic activities of 
                                                          
6 Many thanks to Kevin Krein for bringing this passage to my attention, and for crafting a context 
for it. 
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resources primarily committed to instrumental purposes” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
225). So professional athletes, for Suits, might well be playing games without 
thereby ‘playing’ in the autotelic sense: there is no reallocation of resources 
being made in their instance, since they are working (pursuing an instrumental 
end—typically, making money) when they play their games. 
Suits has come under significant criticism for this Schopenhauer-derived 
account of ‘play’ (Morgan 2008, Royce 2011), and indeed for tying play to 
autotelic activity more generally (Schmid 2009, 2011). Critics claim that Suits’ 
definition of ‘play’ is flawed on the grounds of being too inclusive in some regards 
(it looks as if art and contemplation get dragged into the concept if the 
reallocation of resources is the only relevant criterion), and too exclusive in 
others (there seems, for instance, to be no good reason why the reallocation of 
the resources in question must be temporary, when a host of play activities made 
possible by permanent reallocations of resources could also plausibly qualify). He 
attempts to redress these perceived flaws in “Tricky Triad: Games, Play, and 
Sport” (Suits 1988a), wherein he systematically revises his views on play and, 
indeed, sport. 
Earlier, in the “Elements of Sport”, Suits had defined ‘sport’ as a game 
with the following necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: “(1) that the game 
be a game of skill, (2) that the skill be physical, (3) that the game have a wide 
following, and (4) that the following achieve a certain level of stability” (Suits 
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2007 [1973], p. 11). The skill clause separates sports from “games of pure 
chance”, because unlike Russian Roulette, sports require the development of 
novel human capacities that are worthy of admiration (Suits 2007 [1973], p. 12). 
The physicality clause separates sports (which require physical skill) from non-
physical games of skill such as chess and bridge (Suits 2007 [1973], pp. 12-13). 
The wide following clause pre-empts games played, invented, or known of by 
only one person (we might call these idiogames), or only one isolated small group 
of people7 from consideration as sports (Suits 2007 [1973], p. 13). The stability 
clause introduces an element of temporal durability to the definition of sports to 
distinguish them from fads (such as playing with a Hula Hoop); and an 
institutional element to ensure that the activity is sustained, regulated, and 
refined by teachers, coaches, and researchers (Suits 2007 [1973], p. 13). Later, 
Suits make a further distinction between two different kinds of sport, ‘judged’ 
versus ‘refereed’ sports, on the basis that 
One is a performance and so requires judges. The other is not a performance but a rule-
governed interplay of participants, and so requires not judges but law-enforcement 
officers, that is, referees. Performances require rehearsal, games require practice (Suits 
1988a, p. 2). 
 
                                                          
7 The ‘wide following’ clause is prone to a variety of the Sorites paradox: for, if we keep adding 
individuals who play a given prospective sport, what number of people will constitute the tipping 
point wherein we might fairly proclaim that it has attained a wide following (as opposed to a 
narrow one), and has therefore become a ‘sport’ in the full sense of the term? The answer to this 
question is not at all clear, and to my knowledge Suits offers no answer to it in his corpus. 
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As a result, Suits wants to claim that there are non-game sports such as diving 
and gymnastics, in contrast to game sports such as baseball and hockey (Suits 
1988a, p. 3). Without taking the discussion too far afield, it should be noted that 
critics of Suits have generated reasonable objections to his position on this 
matter (Meier 1988, Hurka 2015), and that he has formally responded to some of 
these criticisms in print (Suits 1989). 
In “Tricky Triad”, Suits aims to make a distinction between sports that are 
played autotelically, that is non-instrumentally (which we would typically call 
amateur sports), and sports that are worked instrumentally (which we would 
typically call professional sports) (Suits 1988a, p. 8). This same distinction is 
applied to non-sport games, as amateurs of those games are considered to be 
‘playing’ as well, in a sense that professionals are not. The overlapping 
constellation of the ‘sport’, ‘game’, and ‘play’ concepts yields the following 
categories (numbered according to their appearance on Suits’ Venn diagram in 
the article): [3] non-played non-sport games (like pro poker); [6] non-played sport 
games (like pro hockey); [7] non-played non-game sports (like pro figure skating); 
and on the other hand [4] played non-game sports (like amateur gymnastics) and 
[5] played sport games (like amateur baseball). With the introduction of a further 
distinction between primitive (unskilled, undirected) [1] non-sport non-game play 
(like a baby splashing water around) and sophisticated (skilled, directed) [2] non-
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sport game play (like Monopoly or Hearts), Suits completes his typology (Suits 
1988a, p. 2). 
For both amateurs and professionals, in Suits’ schema games can “be the 
object of an ultimate, or unqualified, commitment” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 31); 
despite the consideration that in the typical case “games are in some sense non-
serious undertakings” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 29), and that “supreme dedication to 
a game… may be repugnant to nearly everyone’s moral sense” (Suits 2014 [1978], 
p. 30). Suits’ claim here regarding games jars somewhat with his later statement, 
in “Sticky Wickedness: Games and Morality”, that “game playing is a bad guide 
for moral conduct… to treat life as a game by regarding our goals as goals in 
games is to trivialize our goals… In life goals are valued; in games, I suggest, they 
are exploited” (Suits 1982, p. 757). For if Suits’ later attitude toward the goals of 
gameplay is considered authoritative, then it would appear to contradict both (a) 
his earlier revelation thesis, that realizing that life is a game (whose ruleset would 
obviously command ultimate allegiance) would be potentially ennobling and 
emancipatory for humankind (Suits 1967a, p. 213); and also (b) his utopian thesis, 
wherein utopian life is portrayed as being both normatively desirable and as an 
endless string of games being played (Suits 2014 [1978], Chapter 15).8 If a life 
entirely consisting of gameplay is, of necessity, morally bankrupt, then neither 
                                                          
8 Suits more precisely describes utopian society as “a series—indeed a network—of interlocking 
games” in Return of the Grasshopper (Suits 19--c, p. 78). 
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thesis (a) nor (b) are viable. Therefore, due to the centrality of both thesis (a) and 
(b) to Suits’ overall schema, I argue that we must take his outlier position in 
“Sticky Wickedness” to be non-authoritative. 
Regarding the relationship of game players and their attitudes toward the 
games they play, Suits introduces the concept of ‘institutions’ of games, “which 
can be distinguished from any individual game” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 49). He is 
explicit when correcting his critics (Schneider and Butcher 1997) that his concept 
of ‘institution’ should by no means be confused with something like “a kind of 
Platonic ideal chess game such that the chess games people play in everyday life 
are related to it in the same way that instances are related to a universal” (Suits 
2006, p. 2). The relevant distinction, for Suits, is rather brought out with the 
example of a ‘descriptive’ checkmate versus a ‘prescriptive’ checkmate in chess. 
In the descriptive case, a board position illustrating a hypothetical checkmate can 
be demonstrated without any chess game occurring, and Suits claims such a 
demonstration relies solely on the institution of chess for it to make sense. In the 
prescriptive case, however, the state of checkmate can only be brought about by 
lusory means explicitly in line with the game’s ruleset (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 48-
49). The descriptive case requires knowledge of chess rules as an institution; the 
prescriptive case requires active obedience to those rules for a game to be 
played. 
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For Suits, “while players acknowledge the claims of both the game and its 
institution, triflers and cheats acknowledge only institutional claims, and 
spoilsports acknowledge neither” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 51, emphases mine) This 
is because triflers do not seek to achieve the prescribed prelusory goal of a game; 
they rather seek goals of their own invention or preference within the rules of 
that game, which demonstrates disobedience to the intended lusory goal of 
winning specified by the constitutive rules, although surface obedience to these 
these must be exhibited in order for other players to continue to allow their 
trifling (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 50). For the cheat, on the other hand, “continuing to 
operate in terms of the institution is a necessary condition of his exploitation of 
the game and of his opponent”, because although cheating requires direct 
disobedience of the rules, good knowledge of them must be demonstrated in 
order to ‘sell’ the cheat as a felicitous move (or part of a series of felicitous 
moves) in the game to other players (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 50). Finally, a 
spoilsport is someone who has no genuine intention to play a particular game 
(pursue its prelusory goal) or display general knowledge of its rules, and thus 
acknowledges neither the game nor its institution (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 51). 
These archetypes of pseudo-players reappear in Suits’ unpublished work 
as the worst possible villains in his utopia of gameplay. For Suits’ utopians must 
play an endless series of games to defeat the boredom of having nothing 
instrumental left to do, and to give non-neurotic vent to their competitive urges. 
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Indeed, the only scarce goods which remain in utopia are artificially created by 
game rules. Everything extralusory can be had in excess there, without effort; but 
intralusory resources (whether these are game pieces, positions on a board, or a 
history of accrued wins) require effort to acquire.9 This is partly why Suits insists 
that “Cheating in a game is a special kind of theft… For it amounts to decreasing 
the opportunities of the other players below the level to which they have title by 
playing whatever game it is they are playing—by, if you like, having mixed their 
labor (their time and effort) with the game” (Suits 19--c, p. 120). Cheating is thus 
the only intelligible form of theft that can remain in Suits’ post-instrumental 
utopia, since games are the only occasions utopians have to earn anything 
remotely like what we would consider in pre-utopian society as private 
property.10 But it is the spoilsports who are, surprisingly, singled out by Suits as 
especially pernicious utopian criminals, because 
in our lusory Utopia spoilsports would be guilty of a greater immorality than would 
cheats. For while cheats are lusory thieves, spoilsports are lusory murderers. And since 
                                                          
9 If it turns out to be the case that utopian lifespans are infinitely extensible, however, then 
presumably even this scarcity is trivial. For, given an unlimited amount of time, utopians could 
play an infinitude of games, and even with a win rate as low as 25%, that would be a ¼ infinity of 
wins: a non-scarce amount, by any measure. In our world of limited lifespans, the opportunities 
for acquiring the intralusory good of a win are much more circumscribed: it would have to be 
calculated by our mean skill levels multiplied by the number of games we play, modified by the 
influence of said skills on the outcomes of our chosen games. 
 
10 Although cheating might never occur in utopia either, since immoral desires and behaviour are 
ruled out there a priori by Suits (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 185) So a desire for another’s possessions or 
intralusory resources should never occur to a utopian, and thus should never be acted on by their 
wish-granting supercomputers. Even without this stipulation, it would be exceptionally perverse 
in a world of infinite plenitude to desire your neighbour’s car over a car like your neighbour’s in 
every conceivable regard that you can acquire simply by pressing a button. 
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playing games is, to borrow an Aristotelian locution, the proper ergon of humanity, 
spoilsports commit an offense against humanity itself (Suits 19--c, p. 122). 
 
In this passage, we see the deforming effects of trying to understand post-
utopian morality with our pre-utopian outlook. Suits asks us to imagine what life 
would look like if there was no extralusory point of moral reference with which to 
potentially override our “supreme dedication to a game” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
30), and in this instance it is a deeply disturbing picture, wherein spoilsports can 
be found guilty of crimes against humanity for no greater offence than refusing to 
play games. 
Foreshadowing the topic of scarcity in utopian games, Suits offers a 
definition of ‘efficiency’ as “the least expenditure of a limited resource necessary 
to achieve a given goal” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 57). Resources that are pertinent 
to, and limited in, ludic activities include (but are not exhausted by): time, moves, 
pieces, information, and skills. For Suits, “time, or any other potential resource, 
should not be called an actual resource unless it is viewed in relation to some 
goal, and it should not be called a limited resource unless it sets a limit, or limits, 
to the kind and number of my goals” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 58, emphases mine). If 
time is not being employed to realize some purpose, it can be a liability (as in 
Suits’ examples of bored and tortured people) or count for nothing at all; and if 
one’s goals are extremely modest then time is, for Suits’ intents and purposes, a 
resource that will always be sufficiently available and thus not ‘limited’, in the 
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sense of being scarce (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 58). If any resource is unlimited, then 
no considerations of efficiency or inefficiency regarding its use can be brought to 
bear11 (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 57), meaning that it be cannot employed as a 
strategic consideration in any game’s ‘rule of skill’. 
Rules of skill advise the maximally efficient and skilful use of lusory means 
to achieve prelusory goals, and are typically instantiated by “injunctions to keep 
your eye on the ball, to refrain from trumping your partner’s ace, and the like” 
(Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 39-40). Whereas the constitutive rules of a game 
necessarily dictate inefficiency in the selection of lusory means, rules of skill 
necessarily dictate efficiency in the use of the lusory means thereby selected. 
Thus it is that if I elect to accept the constitutive rules implicit in entering a 
labyrinth “my purpose is not just to be outside (as it might be if Ariadne were 
waiting for me to emerge), but to get out of the labyrinth, so to speak, 
labyrinthically” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 34); and the rules of skill would non-
paradoxically dictate that “once committed to that end, moreover, I would strive 
to accomplish it as efficiently as possible” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 25). The game 
rules dictate the lusory means, and thereby the skills that can be felicitously 
employed to overcome obstacles to achieving the prelusory goal; but the skills 
thereby selected can be deployed with the utmost efficiency in gameplay. 
                                                          
11 A comment which has direct bearing on projections of life in his utopia of material 
superabundance. 
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Suit’s attachment to the logical primacy of game rulesets is such that he 
believes that human capacities can be optimized (and arguably even created) by 
their use. Let us call this the capacity thesis: “if no one had ever used his feet 
before the invention of foot racing, then foot racing would require the inventions 
of running, and so pacing, sprinting, and passing would be as much instituted 
moves as are the moves in chess” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 51). Against an 
essentialist account of sport such as Jon Pike’s (Pike 2018), which would insist 
that foot racing is the way it is because we naturally have the kinds of bodies we 
do, Suits counters with a formalist view—it is game rules that dictate how bodies 
move in a game; how bodies move outwith a game does not dictate game rules. 
On his account, it is merely accidental that foot racing happens to emulate a 
naturally-occurrent form of locomotion. In “The Elements of Sport”, Suits put the 
matter like this: 
Some kinds of games—such as racing games—have this rather obvious affinity with 
actions performed aside from games. But most games do not have such a clear 
counterpart in ordinary life… there is nothing in life which much resembles baseball or 
football or golf in toto… Thus, with the invention of games far removed from the pursuits 
of  ordinary life, quite new capacities emerge, and hitherto unknown skills are developed 
(Suits 2007 [1973], p. 12). 
 
It is crucial to dog-ear this quotation in order to arrive at a more nuanced reading 
of Suits’ utopian vision. For, if any human desire whatsoever is granted in Suits’ 
utopia by his “automated machines which are activated solely by mental 
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telepathy”12 (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182), and it seems that they are; and if the 
desire for a ludically-optimized augmented or transmogrified body is an 
intelligible utopian desire, and it seems that it is; then playing utopian games 
aided by the wish-granting machinery will literally reshape the body in real time 
according to the players’ whims. Thus it appears that flying sports, deep-sea 
swimming sports, and outer-space sports are all on the menu in the utopian 
game room.13 However, it could plausibly be countered that unbounded fluidity 
in the human form would make sport impossible in utopia, since well-designed 
sports are well-designed specifically because they account for the average 
powers of the human body in their rulesets, thus creating the dramatic tensions 
                                                          
12 I’ve had many occasions to wonder what Suits’ term ‘mental telepathy’ is meant to be specified 
in opposition to. Physical telepathy? As that seems implausible, I take the phrase to be 
redundant. 
 
13 Seemingly counter to this intuition, Suits writes elsewhere that in a life “worth living… death 
would be incorporated into such a life as one of its necessary conditions” (Suits 19--c, p. 52). 
Moreover, “If one’s life could be made into a game… [and] if a game is the kind of thing that 
necessarily ends, then by intending to play my excellent game I would necessarily intend it to end, 
win or lose. And since playing the game would be the same as living my life, I would intend both 
to live that attractive life and I would also intend it to end” (Suits 19--c, p. 53). So it appears that 
mortality is accepted by Suits as an unalterable condition of life, utopian or otherwise. He says as 
much in The Grasshopper when he states that “it is true that time is, alas, for all of us a finite 
quantity” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 58). This means that there is at least one type of non-lusory 
scarcity which exists in Suits’ utopia: temporal scarcity. But if temporal scarcity existed in Suits’ 
utopia, then an instrumental need for more time would exist too, and so presumably the 
telepathically-controlled utopian supercomputers could be used to effect an indefinite extension 
of one’s lifespan. Ironically, time is exactly that resource whose reallocation from instrumental 
purposes permits the possibility of non-game play in Suits’ “Words on Play” (Suits 1977). So: if 
mortality is a feature of Suits’ utopia, then this implies that not all instrumental activities can be 
eliminated therein, for there will always be room for instrumental activities geared toward 
extending one’s lifespan (attempting to overcome temporal scarcity); alternately, if Suits’ 
utopians are instead immortal, then time would be an unlimited resource in utopia, and therefore 
it could not be reallocated to non-game play, since it would already be permanently allocated to 
gameplay. 
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that they do.14 This subject will be explored more fully in the final chapter of this 
dissertation. 
Finally, Suits advances a stronger version of the themes introduced in “Is 
Life a Game We Are Playing?”, suggesting that “everyone alive is in fact engaged 
in playing elaborate games, while at the same time believing themselves to be 
going about their ordinary affairs. Carpenters… politicians, philosophers, lovers, 
murderers, thieves, and saints. Whatever occupation or activity you can think of, 
it is in reality a game”15 (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 11). However, those that become 
conscious of the unconscious games they are playing via the Grasshopper’s 
discursive persuasion cease to exist completely (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 12), a 
return to the idea that a life consisting entirely of gameplay must either compel 
one to commit suicide or accept a new ideology which embraces gameplay as the 
moral ideal of existence—and neither of these binary options preserves the 
status quo. As this suggestion is left unelaborated and undefended in the text, 
very few have directly commented on Suits’ mysterious musing: “Is the carpenter 
                                                          
14 Many thanks to Jon Pike for sharing this line of insight. 
 
15 Murderers and thieves at least, and perhaps lovers as well, are prima facie poor candidates for 
what we might call unconscious gameplay. But as we have seen, Suits is not merely playing it 
loose with his prose here—he is graphically illustrating his earlier logical point, that anyone could 
discover at any time that they had been unconsciously playing a game all along; regardless of how 
horrific its prelusory goal turned out to be. 
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on his roof-top simply hammering nails, or is he making some move in an ancient 
game whose rules he has forgotten?” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 12) 
 My interpretation of this quotation is that he is referencing the subject 
matter of an earlier unpublished typeset fragment, also likely written in this same 
period, entitled “Myth for a Moral Cosmogony”. In this piece, Suits describes a 
Golden Age, a paradise wherein 
the inhabitants… were bored to distraction… What is needed is already at hand, and so 
not needed at all. Between wish and act no shadow falls. There is literally nothing to do. 
(Suits 19--a, p. 1) 
 
The proto-utopians in this piece go on to save themselves from their condition of 
existentially meaningless material superabundance by constraining themselves to 
unnecessary rules governing their activities; in other words, they reintroduce 
scarcity by turning their lives into a series of games, and thus rescue themselves 
from their condition of endless paradisal boredom. However, time passes, 
generation follows generation, and the proto-utopians forget the origin of their 
striving games—that they chose to play them—and come to think that scarcity 
and the striving required to address it is necessary, rather than simply desirable 
from the point of view of the paradisal condition. Achieving a condition wherein 
striving is completely unnecessary becomes the new social ideal once the actual 
lived conditions of the original Golden Age are completely forgotten. When these 
proto-utopians eventually succeed in (re)realizing their paradisal condition 
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through their hard work, they soon (re)experience the torments of perpetual 
boredom, necessitating the (re)introduction of striving games, thus completing 
the cycle. 
Suits’ underlying model of human history, in other words, is an eternally 
swinging pendulum, alternating between stultifying material superabundance 
brought on by adopting a prudential attitude toward eliminating work, and a 
completely absorbing (albeit distressing) material scarcity brought on by adopting 
a lusory attitude toward life. He reasserts this conviction in his unpublished but 
completed sequel to The Grasshopper, entitled The Return of the Grasshopper: 
“whenever ant industry abolishes the need for that industry and ants find 
themselves possessed of the dreadful freedom of grasshoppers, their ant 
obsessiveness reasserts itself, and so Utopia is found only to be thrown away 
again and again” 16 (Suits 19--c, p. 82). 
 
Third Piece: Suits’ Late Refinements (2004-2006) 
After a long period wherein Suits did no academic publishing (1990-2003), 
he reappeared with two articles on the philosophy of sport, “Venn and the Art of 
Category Maintenance” (Suits 2004) and “Games and their Institutions in the 
                                                          
16 This cosmological reading of Suits somewhat vindicates recent quasi-ecclesiastical 
interpretations of his utopian thesis, such as that of Deborah Vossen’s, who identifies Suits’ utopia 
as ‘Heaven’ (Vossen 2016). 
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Grasshopper” (Suits 2006), just before his death in early 2007. The first of these 
articles constitutes a sustained defence of his earlier work in “Tricky Triad” (Suits 
1988a) from the criticisms of Angela Schneider (Schneider 2001); the second 
constitutes a sustained defence of his earlier work in The Grasshopper (Suits 2014 
[1978]) from the criticisms of Angela Schneider and Robert Butcher (Schneider 
and Butcher 1997). In both cases, the contents functioned as refinements on his 
earlier positions, rather than providing major reformulations, or new positions 
altogether. 
From our preceding discussion, I believe it is fair to conclude that Suits’ 
‘middle’ period provides us with both the bulk of his published and unpublished 
corpus, and also the most philosophically rich pieces. During that period, he 
ambitiously extended his moderate definitionist thesis across multiple areas of 
philosophical inquiry, and while providing consistently illuminating analysis, 
internal inconsistencies often appear when we attempt to analyse his work 
holistically. On the topic of morality in games, he tells us that games are a 
corrupting metaphor for our moral lives; and yet the realization that our lives are 
games is also said to be emancipating in the present—and the ‘ideal of existence’ 
in the future. In some pieces, he claims that professionals count as ‘game players’ 
in the sense of being in full obedience to the rules; in others, he excludes 
professionals from the set of ‘game players’ on the basis that they lack purely 
autotelic motivations. Paradox also seems just around the corner in his 
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discussions of his utopian vision: wherein natural scarcity is completely banished, 
but artificial scarcity is recreated at the beginning of every game; wherein 
utopians are free to do whatever they want, but all utopians will want to do is 
play games; wherein the finest human capacities will be realized, but there is 
seemingly no further point in realizing them. 
Nevertheless, Suits’ work leaves us with a repository of many valuable 
insights, and questions for our further consideration. Does Suits get the best of 
Wittgenstein in his definitionist attack on the family resemblance thesis? Is usage 
of the telepathically-controlled machinery that enables his utopian vision 
conceptually problematic in the same sense that usage of Robert Nozick’s 
experience machine is thought to be? Is it possible to exhibit virtue in a utopia of 
gameplay? Can boredom-induced suicide be avoided in a materially 
superabundant, post-instrumental utopia? What are utopian games, and how are 
they different from the games we play in the present? Can we make apparently 
meaningless activities meaningful through an act of will, by gaming them up? Is 
there a possible alternate reading of Suits’ utopian thesis, such that some of the 
notable inconsistencies in his account can be adequately addressed? In the 
following chapters, I offer answers to each of these questions, and go deeper on 
relevant points of interest in the work of Suits, his critics, and thinkers working in 
related fields. 
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In Chapter 1, I ground Suits’ position of moderate definitionalism in 
theoretical opposition to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s family resemblance thesis. I 
conclude, with Colin McGinn, Thomas Hurka, and others that Suits gets the better 
of Wittgenstein on this issue. Then I turn to examine issues generated by the 
combination of Suits’ definition of ‘gameplay’ with his utopian thesis: the 
argument that the ‘ideal of existence’ for humankind is a utopia of gameplay. I 
argue that Suits’ utopia is vulnerable to a parallel critique to that posed against 
Robert Nozick’s experience machine, but in Chapter 2 I demonstrate that those 
objections are ultimately unconvincing. In Chapter 3 I hold that—appearances to 
the contrary—virtuous behaviour is a live possibility for his utopians. The crisis of 
leisure in Suits’ utopia that he refers to as the ‘Alexandrian condition’ draws into 
question whether a life consisting exclusively of gameplay is sufficiently 
meaningful to overcome utopian ennui and suicidal urges—a dilemma I resolve in 
Chapter 4 by developing a typology of two different types of utopians, and two 
functionally different types of utopian games they might play. In Chapter 5, I 
argue that utopian games-by-design are outside of our contemporary ability to 
adequately conceptualize, because there is an unbridgeable cultural gap between 
utopians and ourselves. Suits’ assertion that we have a ‘duty to design’ these 
games therefore falls flat. Further, in Chapter 6 I give an account of what 
constitutes good games and explain how the technique of ludic alchemy can 
gamify and infuse meaning into otherwise mundane activities. Finally, in Chapter 
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7 I rehabilitate Suits’ utopian thesis along perfectionist lines, and show that its 
main value lies in its role as a regulative ideal, offering unique normative 
recommendations for our current gaming practices. 
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Chapter 1: ‘A Longer and More Penetrating Look’: Suits’ Definitions 
of ‘Gameplay’ and ‘Utopia’ 
 
Wittgenstein, one of the most forceful spokesmen… for the anti-definitional attitude, is 
famous for having singled out the attempt to define games as illustrating par excellence 
the futility of attempting to define anything whatever. ‘Don’t say,’ Wittgenstein 
admonishes us, ‘“there must be something common or they would not be called 
‘games’”—but look and see whether there is anything common to all. This is 
unexceptional advice. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein himself did not follow it. He looked, to 
be sure, but because he had decided beforehand that games are undefinable, his look 
was fleeting, and he saw very little. So I invite the reader to join me in a longer and more 
penetrating look at games, and to defer judgment as to whether all games have 
something in common pending completion of such an inspection (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 
1-2). 
 
In attempting to define the concept ‘game’ in The Grasshopper: Games, 
Life, and Utopia, Bernard Suits mounts a limited defence of moderate 
definitionalism: the position that some (but not necessarily all) concepts admit of 
being analysed into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. In doing this, 
Suits places himself in theoretical opposition to Ludwig Wittgenstein, who 
claimed in Philosophical Investigations that the concept ‘game’, and most others, 
were not suitable candidates for definition. Rather, Wittgenstein holds that 
particular instances of games can only be connected to each other through a 
fuzzy family resemblance relationship at best. That is, they do not have 
universally shared necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather “a complicated 
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities, sometimes similarities in detail” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], § 66). 
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In this chapter I use the contrast between Wittgenstein’s family 
resemblance thesis and Suits’ moderate definitionalist effort—to arrive at a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept ‘game’—as a natural entry 
point for discussion of Suits’ intellectual project more generally, and to analyse its 
metaphilosophical stakes. For if Suits is correct, then Wittgenstein was wrong, 
and anti-definitionalist philosophy is misguided. I conclude, with Colin McGinn 
and Thomas Hurka, that Suits’ definition of ‘game’ as “the voluntary attempt to 
overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 43) is compelling—acting 
as a persuasive refutation of Wittgenstein, and a redemption of limited 
definitionalism. 
However, I criticise Suits’ later attempt to define the concept of ‘utopia’ as 
being unconvincing and less useful than that offered by J.C. Davis. For Suits’ 
definition of ‘utopia’ as a state of affairs wherein “all of the instrumental 
activities of human beings have been eliminated” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182), 
resulting in a state of logically necessitated perpetual gameplay for utopians, 
produces a seeming contradiction with his earlier definition of ‘game’. For games 
in his utopia would therefore be non-voluntary attempts to overcome necessary 
obstacles. Utopian games would thus be anti-games, or work. I will attempt to 
remedy this apparent contradiction, and to provide a more consistent 
explanation of how Suits’ concept of ‘game’ is related to his concept of ‘utopia’. 
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1.1 Wittgenstein’s ‘Family Resemblances’ Thesis 
In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that many 
concepts, including the concept ‘game’, are necessarily vague and do not admit 
of precise definition. For Wittgenstein, the way to understand what ‘game’ 
means is via a process of “seeing what is common” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], 
§72) among the suspected members of a set, which is to say correctly identifying 
“the various resemblances between members of a family” (Wittgenstein 2001 
[1958], §67). So it is that Wittgenstein can look and find resemblances between 
board games (like Monopoly) and card games (like Hearts) in that both employ 
pieces of cardstock; in card games (like contract bridge) and ball games (like 
doubles tennis) in that both must be played with a partner; in ball games (like 
snooker) and track and field events (like pole vaulting) in that both require the 
skilful manipulation of long pieces of wood; and so on and so forth until “we see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes 
overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], 
§66). This ‘family resemblance’ thesis constitutes an attack on strong 
definitionalism, the position that all concepts must admit of clearly-delineated 
boundaries, cashed out as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, to be 
meaningful. Wittgenstein asks that we, instead: 
Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to 
card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many 
common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much 
that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they all ‘amusing’? Compare chess 
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with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between 
players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child 
throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the 
parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in 
tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, 
but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through 
the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up 
and disappear (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §66). 
 
To better understand what Wittgenstein means by his family resemblance 
thesis, let’s consider a concrete example. Imagine a literal family where the 
mother’s hair is curly [C] and the father’s is straight [S]; and the father has buck 
teeth [B], while the mother has an underbite [U]. For Wittgenstein, it is the 
daughter of these two parents, with her curly hair and buck teeth, that properly 
connects these three in the same family group. It is only necessary that each of 
the members of a set share at least one trait with one other member of the set; 
so the fact that the father [SB] and the mother [CU] share no notable qualities is 
not an issue, as long as both have a sufficient overlap of similarities with the 
daughter [CB]. Just as one must become acquainted with a family before one can 
assert their linking traits, Wittgenstein holds that the process of defining a 
concept a priori is futile, because first we must “look and see… don’t think, but 
look!” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §66) Stipulating a concept in advance, on 
Wittgenstein’s account, would make us blind to the world as it actually is: this is 
the professional vice of the archetypal philosopher, which Wittgenstein’s anti-
philosophical therapy is aimed at ameliorating. His metaphilosophical aim is 
rather to “shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], 
46 
 
§309) by arriving at a method by which “philosophical problems should 
completely disappear” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §133). 
 
1.2 Objections to Wittgenstein 
As influential as Wittgenstein’s family resemblance thesis has proven to 
be, his account is objectionable on multiple grounds. From one perspective, the 
thesis seems to be too inclusive, in that it provides no reliable criteria for 
excluding unwanted members from a resemblance set, for the web of 
resemblances is indefinitely extensible. As Wittgenstein asserts, “the extension of 
the concept is not closed by a frontier” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §68). From 
another perspective, the theory seems too exclusive in that it provides no reliable 
criteria for including desired members in a resemblance set, for any reason that is 
distinct from considerations of resemblance (such as purpose or function). Lastly, 
it appears that some form of conceptual analysis such as Suits’ definitionism may 
be the most efficient and accurate means for parsing a large set of concepts—
including Wittgenstein’s chosen example of ‘game’. 
Mary Midgely takes Wittgenstein to task for mistaking surface 
resemblances for deeper conceptual connections. She offers the following 
reductio ad absurdum of his theory: “Elliots need not have the Elliot Countenance 
at all; they may be quite untypical, and plausible looking Tichborne Claimants 
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need not be Tichbornes” (Midgley 1974, p. 232). In other words, things that 
merely look like members of a family might not belong to that family, and things 
that do not look like they do belong there, actually might; for there are possible 
non-family resemblances, and family non-resemblances as well as family 
resemblances and non-family non-resemblances. Midgely’s point is this: the lack 
of a family resemblance relation does not endanger the objective status of a 
familial relationship on a deeper (in this case biological) level, nor does the 
presence of resemblance necessarily confer any relation on a deeper level. 
Maurice Mandelbaum makes a similar point against Wittgenstein’s family 
resemblance thesis when he argues that there would be no way to distinguish 
fortune-telling from playing a solitaire variant on the resemblance model, due to 
the strong physical resemblance between the two activities. Nevertheless, it is 
evident that “ordinary usage would not… sanction our describing fortune-telling 
as an example of playing a game, no matter how striking may be the 
resemblances between the ways in which cards are handled in playing solitaire 
and in telling fortunes” (Mandelbaum 1965, p. 220). As one of the main professed 
virtues of Wittgenstein’s family resemblance thesis is its conformity with ordinary 
language usage—whose inexactitude does not worry him as regards the task of 
explanation (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §69)—Mandelbaum’s underscoring of the 
potential disconnect between the loose and subjective technique of “seeing what 
is common” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §72) in a family resemblance, and the 
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relatively calcified conventions which govern ordinary language usage, 
constitutes a site of potential tension in Wittgenstein’s account. 
As Mandelbaum claims, it does seem as if Wittgenstein concentrates 
mostly on the superficial physical or behaviouristic components of games when 
grouping them together as a family. Using the Wittgensteinian mode of inquiry, 
we might look at a small set of games such as chess, which uses pieces and a 
board; Scrabble, which uses a board and tiles; and Mahjong, which uses tiles and 
dice, and conclude that in terms of family resemblance, Scrabble ‘resembles’ 
chess because both use boards, and Scrabble ‘resembles’ Mahjong because both 
use tiles. So far, so intuitive. But this chain of connections has no definite end for 
Wittgenstein:  
For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no 
longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been 
drawn (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §68). 
 
And so, if the chain of resemblances is indeed as indefinitely extensible as 
Wittgenstein claims they are, then this will lead his family resemblance thesis into 
murky waters as we proceed to actually extend them. For Scrabble also 
resembles repairing a roof, because both use boards; and Scrabble also 
resembles tiling a bathroom floor, because both use tiles. And although builders 
repairing roofs and tiling floors do not consider themselves to be game players, if 
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we look only to resemblance to guide our conceptual understanding, then they 
can be insinuated into the ‘gamer’ family, like it or not.17 
This problem is paralleled, as Colin McGinn rightly observes, “with other 
concepts: the concept gold is not the same as the concept resembles gold and the 
concept husband is not the same as the concept resembles husbands… it is not 
sufficient for being an F that an object looks like an F” (McGinn 2012, p. 18). On 
these intuitively plausible grounds, I am compelled to agree with McGinn, 
Midgely, and Mandelbaum that Wittgenstein’s family resemblance thesis makes 
the concept ‘game’—and, indeed, every other concept akin to it that we accept 
as possessing “blurred edges” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §72)—unnecessarily 
vague and inclusive. 
Wittgenstein could possibly defend against this objection by reference to 
his concern with adherence to ordinary language usage, replying that his target is 
only “the proceedings that we call ‘games’” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §66, 
emphasis mine), and since we don’t call roof-repairing and floor-tiling games, 
they are therefore not fair candidates for family resemblance relationships with 
games. However, deference to ordinary language usage does not explain why it is 
that we call Scrabble a game, and other superficially-relatable activities, like 
                                                          
17 Imagine an intelligent alien coming to Earth, armed only with Wittgenstein’s family 
resemblance model of concepts: to the alien, the floor-tiler might very well look to be playing a 
solitaire version of Mahjong, flipping tiles and placing them in patterned sets according to their 
colours. 
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tiling, non-games; nor how the first game could emerge, with neither pre-existing 
linguistic conventions nor possible comparisons in terms of family resemblance to 
render it intelligible (McGinn 2012, p. 33, n. 5). In the face of these 
considerations, it seems like we must have something like an intuitive (at least 
tentative) working definition in mind before we begin to call certain activities 
‘games’, regardless of whether or not we are fully cognizant of it. Without such a 
working definition—as noted—mere resemblance has the potential to endlessly 
hypertrophy the concept ‘game’ until all human activities could be called games-
by-resemblance. Midgley raises a parallel concern regarding the concept ‘chair’: 
“before we could usefully look at those candidates for chairhood, we had to do 
some sort of thinking” (Midgley 1974, p. 244). If the concept ‘game’ precedes the 
labelling of particular activities as games (as seems must be the case), then the 
family resemblance relation as stated does no explanatory work: “seeing what is 
common” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §72) is actually just our projection of our 
implicit pre-existing conceptual frameworks upon the world. Therefore, as 
McGinn asserts, “we should not be empiricists about the concept of a game” 
(McGinn 2012, p. 27), but rather attempt to arrive at a greater degree of clarity 
through our analysis of concepts. 
McGinn demonstrates how Wittgenstein’s family resemblance thesis is 
internally incoherent as regards the concept ‘game’ because the parameters for 
inclusion are “hopelessly weak”; letting in numerous non-game activities such as 
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“running for buses, swimming to save a life, working at a computer… throwing 
spears at buffalo, planning a battle on a board, reading a map, gambling, walking” 
(McGinn 2012, p. 29). Moreover, McGinn takes the family resemblance thesis to 
be inconsistent, in that it implicitly affirms what it holds to be impossible; by 
asserting “a necessary condition for being a game: [namely,] having a family 
resemblance to things called ‘games’” (McGinn 2012, p. 18), which also turns out 
to be a sufficient condition on Wittgenstein’s account. Since the family 
resemblance thesis draws its justification from its supposed power to address 
perceived deficiencies in definitional strategies of providing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for concepts, because the search for a “disjunction of… 
common properties” is presumed by Wittgenstein to be futile (Wittgenstein 2001 
[1958], §67), this amounts to a contradiction. Indeed, the identification of any 
‘common property’ across the set of games will constitute a refutation of 
Wittgenstein on this point; and McGinn offers an embarrassment of 
unobjectionable necessary conditions for the concept ‘game’: 
All games are surely activities (not substances), and presumably they are all intentional 
activities, and as such goal-directed (even if the goal is just to have some fun). If so, all 
games involve intention and will, which themselves involve belief and desire, which 
involve the idea of a rational agent: these are all necessary conditions of playing a 
game… all games are necessarily rule-governed intentional activities (McGinn 2012, pp. 
19-20). 
 
Having highlighted some of the more serious defects of Wittgenstein’s 
family resemblance thesis, let us now turn to its theoretical competition, Suits’ 
52 
 
moderate definitionism, as exemplified by his positive definition of ‘gameplay’; 
that “playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary 
obstacles” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 43). The metaphilosophical significance of Suits’ 
definition is that it refutes Wittgenstein’s negative antiphilosophy, which focuses 
on what cannot be said, in favour of the positive position that “the nature of 
philosophy turns on the question of whether illuminating definition is attainable” 
(McGinn 2012, p. 22); which thereby valorises analytic conceptual inquiry. 
Thomas Hurka recognizes that for Suits, “in giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a game he’s doing exactly what Wittgenstein says can’t be done, 
and doing it about Wittgenstein’s own example” (Hurka 2014, p. xiv). To fully 
understand Suits’ refutation of Wittgenstein’s position, we must conduct a closer 
analysis of Suits’ moderate definitionist thesis. 
 
1.3 Suits’ Moderate Definitionist Thesis 
Suits explicitly defines ‘gameplay’ (in its longer formulation) in the 
following passage, reproduced here for ease of reference:  
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using 
only means permitted by the rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more 
efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are 
accepted just because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude]. I also offer the 
following simpler and, so to speak, more portable version of the above: playing a game is 
a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 43). 
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Let us consider each component of Suits’ definition separately. The ‘prelusory 
goal’ is agreed to prior to the game and can be described separately from it. Such 
goals are unrestricted in scope and can range in type from getting a ball through 
a hoop (in basketball), to manoeuvring a certain game piece (say, an opponent’s 
king in chess) into a certain position (checkmate), to climbing Mount Everest. To 
achieve a prelusory goal through lusory means is also to achieve the lusory goal 
of winning a game (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 38-39). A game with a conceptually 
unrealisable prelusory goal (like drawing a squared circle) is essentially a ‘bad’ 
(poorly-designed) game, while a game with a practically unrealisable prelusory 
goal (like shooting a basketball through a 500-meter-high hoop, or a form of 
chess with a million unique pieces per side) is only a contingently bad game 
(under different circumstances they could be good; these might be games whose 
time has not yet come, and will not come until reliably functional rocket boots 
and super-effective neural enhancement biomodifications become commercially 
available). 
The ‘constitutive rules’ proscribe players from taking the most direct and 
efficient route to achieving the game’s prelusory goal (such forbidden routes to 
victory might include using one’s fingers to secure an egg to a spoon in an egg-
and-spoon race, for example, or discharging a firearm to ‘knock out’ one’s boxing 
opponent): let us call this the inefficiency principle. Constitutive rules also 
prescribe the acceptable inefficient routes to victory (balancing an egg on a spoon 
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whilst traversing a pre-specified distance on foot to a finish line; or hitting an 
opponent with your gloved fist more times than you are hit by your opponent’s 
gloved fist for a pre-specified amount of time), which Suits calls ‘lusory means’. 
These elements are bound together by the ‘lusory attitude’, the presence of 
which signifies a willingness to play on the part of the player: their tacit or explicit 
acceptance of the constitutive rules as contractually binding them, and the other 
players, to adhering to lusory means for achieving prelusory goals, for the 
activity’s own sake. 
Taken in the negative, this definition stipulates that any activity with no 
clear goal, unconstrained by rules, or lacking the proper volitional intent in its 
would-be players, should not be called a ‘game’, regardless of its outward 
resemblances to other games. The lack of a prelusory goal explains why, on Suits’ 
account, that “Ring Around the Rosie and the like are not games, for they are… 
scripted undertakings; that is, activities whose execution is prescribed 
beforehand, as in a theatrical performance or ceremonial ritual” 18 (Suits 2014 
[1978], pp. 97-98). Similarly, an abandonment of lusory means explains why 
shooting your opponent in the head is an unacceptable strategy in boxing (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 39); an abandonment of constitutive rules explains why cutting 
across the infield is not participating in a footrace (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 41); and 
                                                          
18 Here, too, Suits is at odds with Wittgenstein—remember that “ring-a-ring-a-roses” is one of the 
activities that Wittgenstein unreflectively includes in his core set of sample games (Wittgenstein 
2001 [1958], §66); Suits excludes it on principle. 
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an abandonment of the lusory attitude explains why psychologically compulsive 
activity does not count as a ‘game’ in the literal sense of the term (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 165).  
Let us recall Hurka’s sympathetic finesse on Suits’ framework, wherein he 
refers to the definition as consisting of three ‘nested’ components (he considers 
lusory means to be indistinguishable from constitutive rules, as the former is 
completely determined by the latter): 
Its third element, the lusory attitude, is defined in terms of its second, the constitutive 
rules, since it involves an attitude to those rules, namely one of accepting them. And its 
second element is defined in terms of its first, since the rules restrict how you may 
pursue the prelusory goal (Hurka 2014, p. xiii). 
 
For Hurka, noting the nestedness of the definition’s clauses is not merely a matter 
of cleaning up Suits’ prose, as “the resulting unity is part of its philosophical 
power” (Hurka 2014, p. xiii). Nor does the definition’s imperfect fit with ordinary 
language usage (including mountain-climbing in the set of games (Suits 2014 
[1978], pp. 90-92), while excluding Ring Around the Rosie) count as a demerit 
against Suits, as such ‘minor mismatches’ need not be “serious objections to… a 
conceptual analysis if the analysis picks out a phenomenon that’s unified, close to 
what’s meant by ‘game’, and philosophically important” (Hurka 2014, p. xiii)—as 
Suits’ analysis does. Thus, in Hurka’s eyes, Suits’ moderate definitionalist effort 
“shows up the superficiality of Wittgenstein’s discussion” (Hurka 2014, p. xiv) and 
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puts philosophy back on the tracks toward positive conceptual analysis; away 
from the epistemically pessimistic fuzziness of family resemblance. 
While Suits’ definitional efforts have indeed been widely lauded, forming 
the theoretical backbone of much contemporary work in the philosophy of sport, 
his work has also generated a wide breadth of critiques of varying 
persuasiveness. In the next section, I discuss some of the most popular 
arguments marshalled against Suits’ definition and address the most troubling of 
these from the point of view of the ultimate aim of this dissertation, which is a 
critical analysis of Suits’ utopia of gameplay. For I, like Hurka, believe that what 
constitutes the main philosophical significance of Suits’ work is not simply his 
definition of ‘gameplay’ as a concept, but also that he identifies gameplay as a 
“key human good, and… explains why game-playing is good” (Hurka 2014, p. xiii) 
via his utopian vision at the conclusion of The Grasshopper. 
 
1.4 Objections to Suits 
As noted, the neatness of Suits’ definition has not been met with universal 
approbation, and has been the object of several axes of critique. Let us discuss 
the most pressing of these issues for Suits’ thesis, and see if they can be ironed 
out, beginning with the criticism that Suits’ definition of ‘game’ is overly-inclusive. 
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Although Suits does not shackle his definition to ordinary language usage, 
he does concede that “usage must not be ignored in definitional inquiry” (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 97). To ignore ordinary language usage completely would result in 
philosophical “Humpty-Dumptyism” wherein terms mean solely what we 
stipulate them to be, to the detriment of both usage and common sense more 
generally (Suits 1977, pp. 118-119). Indeed, this Humpty-Dumptyism is what 
Wittgenstein takes aim at when he describes “the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §109). This 
objection makes it reasonable to reject Suits’ definition if any questionable set 
inclusion it ostensibly justifies strongly challenges our intuitions on what 
constitutes a game. 
Frank McBride objects that Suits’ definition is too inclusive because 
mountain-climbing, for instance—which is not generally thought of as a game—
fits within Suits’ definition (McBride 1979, pp. 62-63). Suits can, however, 
convincingly defend this inclusion because the activity implicitly demonstrates a 
“limitation in principle” on lusory means—the dedicated mountain-climber climbs 
mountains, after all, and would refuse to use escalators or helicopters to reach 
mountain peaks; thus the inefficiency principle is respected in the implicit 
constitutive rules of mountain-climbing (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 90-92). By 
contrast, activities exhibiting no limitations on means, such as unregulated duels 
to the death, cannot count as Suitsian games because they are essentially 
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instrumental activities that seek to achieve their goals as efficiently as possible 
(Suits 2014 [1978], Chapter 6). 
Perhaps more troublingly, John Tasioulas has submitted that activities 
such as “the justified punishment of offenders” and prosecuting “a war… in 
accordance with humanitarian law” could count as games for Suits; and that each 
of these rule-governed activities would clearly constitute an undesirable set 
inclusion (Tasioulas 2006, p. 238). This is because punishment could be more 
efficiently meted out if the legal system did not require a justificatory process for 
its dispensation of penalties, and wars could be concluded more swiftly if such 
“potentially efficient means as the torture of enemy soldiers and the terror 
bombing of civilians” were employed; thus these activities satisfy the inefficiency 
principle (Tasioulas 2006, p. 238). But such inclusions, while in violation of 
ordinary language usage, may not internally trouble Suits’ account overmuch. 
Suits does not explicitly state in his definition that prelusory goals need to be 
trivial, and in fact is very succinct that any “specific achievable state of affairs” 
would qualify as a valid goal (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 38). Moreover, since “a 
readiness to lose the race rather than kill a child is not what makes the race a 
game; it is the refusal to, inter alia, cut across the infield in order to get ahead of 
the other contestants” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 31), it is clear that the stakes of 
Suitsian games can remain conceptually unrestricted in a manner that their lusory 
means cannot. The violence done here to ordinary language usage is noted, and it 
59 
 
is a pill that Suits may have to swallow, perhaps in exchange for the goods of 
illuminating new perspectives on war and justice. But more damaging than this is 
the violence done to the internal logic of Suits’ position by Suits himself in a later 
piece, wherein he claims that “the trivializing of their goals is an essential 
element of games” (Suits 1982, p. 759), in direct contradiction to his earlier 
definition. However, since our interest in this section is the objections raised by 
Suits’ critics, and not instances of Suits’ self-sabotage, I merely raise the point 
here for future Suits scholars to investigate, and move on. 
Finally, Scott Kretchmar observes that according to Suits’ definition, 
“anyone who intentionally pursues a goal under artificial constraints may be 
participating in a game” (Kretchmar 2008, p. 144), which “allows him to suggest 
that we are all grasshoppers in disguise and that we may have unwittingly turned 
our workday lives, or at least parts of them, into games” (Kretchmar 2008, p. 
145). Kretchmar’s specific concern of over-inclusivity ties into the theme of an 
early paper of Suits’, which outlines the possibility that all of “life is an 
unconscious game” (Suits 1967a, p. 209) and “all moral rules are game rules in 
disguise” (Suits 1967a, p. 211). Suits returns to this theme in his ‘recurring dream’ 
at the beginning of The Grasshopper, wherein he muses: “Is the carpenter on his 
roof-top simply hammering nails, or is he making some move in an ancient game 
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whose rules he has forgotten?” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 12)19 For Suits, the 
possibility of unconscious gameplay “removes the chief obstacle to taking 
seriously the possibility that life is a game in which all of us are players” (Suits 
1970, p. 138) and opens up the possibility of a utopia wherein “although all of the 
apparently productive activities of man were games, they were not believed to be 
games” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 195). Thus the apparent defect that Kretchmar 
picks up on here is actually a necessary feature of Suits’ definition, if it is meant—
as I believe it is—to serve as the grounding for his utopian thesis: the idea that a 
life consisting entirely of gameplay is “the ideal of existence” for humankind (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 182). 
On the other hand, Kretchmar also criticizes Suits’ definition of ‘game’ for 
being overly-exclusive: not for excluding unregulated duels to the death, but 
because “he clearly opposed the inclusion of performance. He ignored games of 
chance. He said nothing about ambiguous games and the process of gaming up 
antecedently existing activities” (Kretchmar 2008, p. 153). It is true that Suits 
excludes Ring Around the Rosie, which is often thought of as a performative 
children’s game, from the set of activities corresponding to his definition of 
‘game’. He does, however, include children’s ‘make-believe’ role-governed 
                                                          
19 Suits repeatedly entertains the logical possibility that “everyone alive is in fact engaged in 
playing elaborate games, while at the same time believing themselves to be going about their 
ordinary affairs… Whatever occupation or activity you can think of, it is in reality a game” (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 11). 
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activities like Cops and Robbers in his set of games, which are also performative 
but do not have a fixed or scripted ending to them—because a rudimentary 
prelusory goal can be identified in their participants’ trying to occupy dramatic 
roles as fully as they can, for as long as they desire (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 96-99). 
So the exclusion of Ring Around the Rosie from the set of games appears to be 
convincingly defensible, on the grounds that it lacks a proper prelusory goal and 
has a fixed sequence of moves, which makes it more akin to a balletic or musical 
performance than a game. As for what Suits ignored—although omission seems 
to be a less compelling axis of criticism than an explicit and problematic set 
exclusion—it could be claimed, contra Kretchmar, that ‘gaming up antecedingly 
existing activities’ is exactly what Suits’ utopians spend much of their existences 
doing. Since a defence of Suits, or at least an explanation of the full implications 
of his definition of ‘game’, hinges on a discussion of his utopian thesis, let us turn 
now to Suits’ definition of ‘utopia’.  
 
1.5 Suits versus Davis on the Definition of ‘Utopia’ 
As noted, Suits’ most influential publication, The Grasshopper, “does two 
things… advances a definition of games and… argues that the ideal of human 
existence—that is, Utopia—must consist fundamentally, if not exclusively, in the 
playing of games” (Suits 1984b, p. 8). The first of these two targets, Suits’ 
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conceptually tight definition of ‘game’, has been rightly lauded in philosophical 
circles. The second aim, his attempt to articulate his utopian thesis that a life of 
gameplay is the ideal of human existence, has been met with significantly less 
enthusiasm. This may be partly because his utopian vision—stipulated as a post-
instrumental condition wherein “all of the things ordinarily called work are now 
done by wholly automated machines which are activated solely by mental 
telepathy” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182), “all possible interpersonal problems have 
been solved by appropriate methods” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 183), utopians “have 
acquired all the knowledge there is” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 186), “there is no need 
for government” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 184), “no evil can befall anyone” (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 185), “art would not exist” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 184), and 
wherein gameplay would constitute “the only remaining candidate for Utopian 
occupation” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 188)—is comparatively ambitious, and less well 
defended. Moreover, the description of Suits’ utopia runs against the grain of 
better established pre-existing definitions in the field of utopian studies, such as 
that proposed by J.C. Davis. 
Davis, by contrast to Suits, holds that ‘Utopia’20 is a sober installation of 
new state apparatuses, and the restructuring of old ones, to accomplish the best 
                                                          
20 In most instances in this text, I use a lower case ‘u’ in ‘utopia’ to refer to the generic concept of 
an ideal socio-political order. However, here I have used a capital ‘U’ for ‘Utopia’ since it picks out 
the definite strand of ideal society that Davis typologizes. In most of Suits’ work, he (incorrectly, 
by my reckoning) uses a capital ‘U’ for what ought to be a lower case ‘utopia’, despite the fact 
that his utopia is not a state, a place, or a nation (and thus not a proper noun), but a rather 
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life possible in this world for its citizens, while retaining our familiar laws of 
physics, and built in line with established psychological and sociological facts and 
principles (Davis 2003 [1981], pp. 36-40). Davis’ definition of Utopia, as an ideal 
society “which accepts deficiencies in men and nature and strives to constrain 
and condition them through organizational controls and sanctions” (Davis 2003 
[1981], p. 370) simply does not fit with Suits’ descriptions of psychologically 
perfected utopians and a mysteriously materially superabundant universe. Thus, 
if Davis’ conceptual distinction is considered authoritative, then Suits’ use of 
terminology not only constitutes a deviation from ordinary language usage, but is 
also inapt and misleading. 
A potential way to diffuse this definitional conflict would be to claim that 
Suits is not describing a Utopia in the usual sense, but another form of ideal 
society typologized by Davis: the ‘Cockaygne’. According to Davis, a Cockaygne is 
a type of ideal society characterized chiefly by a supernatural abundance of 
material goods: rivers of whiskey, cooked geese flying into desirous mouths, self-
roasting pigs, gumdrops growing on trees, and so forth (Davis 2003 [1981], pp. 
20-22). Suits seems comfortable with his conflation, as he explicitly blurs the line 
between the Cockaygne tradition and his utopia in the following passage: “The 
                                                          
amorphous idea that his characters continually refine and revise via their dialogue. In a 
parenthetical comment contained in a later unpublished writing, Suits displays cognizance of this 
typographical-conceptual error and takes pains to correct it: “It was suggested to me by the 
Grasshopper that if our conversation were put into print, then it would be appropriate to render 
the word utopia with a lower case ‘u’, until Utopia had been identified” (Suits 19--c, p. 18). 
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Grasshopper’s inquiry into Utopia may be regarded as an updating of ‘The Land of 
Cockaygne’” (Suits 19--c, pp. 3-4). However, contrary to the Cockaygnian 
tradition, Suits attempts to ground his utopia in physical reality by asserting that: 
“All Cockaygne lacks is the silicon chip. But we have the chip, and so while 
Cockaygne may have been a charming joke to its contemporary audience, it need 
not be merely that for us” (Suits 1984a, p. 197). Thus, in line with Suits’ own 
reasoning, his ‘utopia’ is better described as a techno-Cockaygne, a Cockaygne 
enabled by as-yet-unknown technological advances—rather than by a wholesale 
supernatural reorganization of the principles of physics. 
Suits implicitly acknowledges the terminological issue that Davis’ position 
poses for him, couched in his complaint that: “For some writers… Cockaygne is 
too utopian to qualify as a genuine utopia, on the ground that its author has 
given no indication whatever as to how such avian and porcine altruism can be 
brought about” (Suits 1984a, p. 197). Suits apparently does not concern himself 
with the presentation of a rationally compelling utopian vision, a blueprint utopia 
that demonstrates the viability of utopian life, nor is he necessarily interested in 
its function as a regulative political ideal.21 Instead, he insists that “the Utopia I 
                                                          
21 Elsewhere, Suits coins the terms ‘utoponous’ and ‘utopotech’ to indicate two different types of 
utopian thinkers. Utoponous thinkers engage, broadly, in “conceptual analysis or speculation” 
using utopias as thought-experimental tools, while utopotech thinkers regard utopias in terms of 
“blueprints for social change, or at least as being importantly relevant to such blueprints”(Suits 
19--d, p. 5). Suits places himself in the utoponous camp, but that in itself does not shackle him to 
any specific commitments to the contents of any given utopia—only the manner in which he 
intends to employ the source material of utopias more generally. 
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envisage is not a state of affairs that is ideally desirable; it is simply a state of 
affairs that is logically inevitable” (Suits 1984b, p. 15). 22 If Suits were presenting a 
blueprint utopia, then he would be prudent to provide some sort of rationale or 
programme for explaining to readers how to get from the world of today to the 
utopia of tomorrow23—but he claims that he is not, and on that basis considers 
himself entitled to dismiss Davis’ typology. 
Suits, however, needlessly contradicts himself here. For he also calls his 
utopia “the ideal of existence” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182) which must, ipso facto, 
be normatively desirable. Simply placing utopia as a conceptual endpoint for the 
termination of all instrumental activities24 is something entirely separate from—
and not something that necessarily stands in logical opposition to—its status as 
an ideal for humankind. He could have had ‘utopia’ imply both things, but instead 
seemingly chose to abandon the value-laden sense of the term for the merely 
stipulative one. Nevertheless, given that he writes elsewhere about the role of 
                                                          
22 Suits describes his utopia as ‘logically inevitable’ because the goal of all work is its own extinction 
and, given infinite time, all work will be completed (Suits 1984b, p. 19). What is left at the end of 
that hypothetical historical process is, by his definition, only games. 
23 If the concept of utopia is to be used as a blueprint or regulative ideal in the present, then utopia 
must be believed to be possible to obtain; for one cannot rationally subscribe to a political schema 
that one believes cannot be achieved. An impossible political schema cannot be action-guiding, 
unless it one mistakenly believes it to be possible. 
24 Suits refers to this state as “the end of history itself, and with it the end of the future” (Suits 19--
c, p. 117). 
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games in a ‘leisure ethic’25 as being the justification for work (Suits 2007 [1973], 
pp. 13-14) and the key to realizing human capacities which could not be elicited 
via other means (Suits 2007 [1973], p. 12), I think it safe to conclude that the 
more interesting and consistent way to read Suits is to affirm that gameplay is 
normatively charged on his account, despite his inconsistent protests to the 
contrary. 
Suits explicitly criticizes Davis on the basis that “his characterization of 
utopia appears to… differ very little, if at all, from the characterization of any 
reasonably well-conducted political society” (Suits 1988b, p. 269). In other words, 
if Suits’ utopia is too fanciful for Davis, then by the same token Davis’ Utopia is 
too plain for Suits. I find this objection unconvincing however, for Davis 
sufficiently distinguishes his concept of Utopia from extant reasonably well-
conducted political societies when he writes that “these three—totality, order, 
perfection—are cardinal characteristics of the utopian form” (Davis 2003 [1981], 
p. 38) and that “almost by definition, then, the perfection of utopias must be 
total and ordered; the totality, ordered and perfect” (Davis 2003 [1981], p. 39). 
Thus, if a totalized, ordered condition of perfection can be considered different 
                                                          
25 This is contrasted with the so-called ‘work ethic’. Traditionally, work was viewed as an important 
moral corrective, because—by the dim lights of the doctrine of original sin—freedom from toil is 
freedom to do mischief. A world without work would, therefore, necessarily lead to moral 
degeneracy. From such a perspective, games of all kinds can be viewed with suspicion and derision, 
as a profligate indulgence; even under conditions of enforced idleness, such as those in Suits’ 
utopian vision. 
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and better than the political status quo—and of course it can—then Suits cannot 
fairly take issue with Davis on grounds of an infelicitous usage of terminology. 
Moreover, Suits proposes an alternate definition of ‘utopia’ which is 
vague to the point that it would wholly contain Davis’ conception within it: a 
good place that does not exist (Suits 1988b, p. 270). He distinguishes this 
definition of ‘utopia’ in logical contrast to eutopia, a good place that does exist; 
dystopia, a bad place that does exist; and dysutopia, a bad place that does not 
exist (Suits 1988b, p. 270). More formally, Suits writes elsewhere that “some x 
can properly be called a Utopia if and only if it depicts or proposes (or in general 
has to do with) a condition of man different from and better than the condition 
of man which obtains, or is thought to obtain, at the time of the Utopian thinker’s 
depicting or proposing it”26 (Suits 19--d, p. 1). Both Suits’ simple and formal 
definitions are very broad, inclusive to a fault, and—unelaborated and 
undefended—lack the nuanced distinctions of Davis’ typology of ideal societies. 
                                                          
26 Immediately preceding this passage, Suits writes that “a philosopher more influenced by 
Wittgenstein than I have been (which is scarcely at all) would very likely begin from the position 
that the various uses to which the term Utopia have been put… do not conform to one meaning, 
but at most, perhaps, bear what Wittgenstein calls family resemblances to one another. I submit 
that things are not that bad” (Suits 19--d, p. 1). I must confess that I cringed in recognition when I 
read this. For just as McGinn admits to being a lapsed and disillusioned former disciple of 
Wittgenstein (McGinn 2012, Chapter 2, notes 8, 9, 19), I too must own up to my own moment of 
doubt and pain. Despairing of the disarrayed conceptual state of affairs in the field of utopian 
studies, I too once surrendered the quest for a definition of ‘utopia’ and drank from the bitter cup 
of family resemblances (Yorke 2007, p. 98). It is of some consolation that this bit of intellectual 
cowardice occurred at the terminus of a fruitless line of analytic inquiry, rather than at its outset. 
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Thus I am inclined to conclude that Davis gets the better of Suits on the 
definitional front. However, Suits’ utopia can avoid conflicting with Davis’ 
typology by adopting my suggested nomenclature of the ‘techno-Cockaygne’. 
Suits’ use of ‘utopia’ is a case wherein a vague use of a term must give way for a 
more technically precise use of that term—given by Davis’ definition—much in 
the same manner that Suits argues that his definition of ‘game’ trumps ordinary 
language usage of the word in terms of its conceptual precision (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 199). Thus whenever the term ‘utopia’ appears subsequently in this 
text as shorthand with reference to Suits’ work, the techno-Cockaygne will be 
specifically what is meant. Nevertheless, given Suits’ comprehensive description 
of his techno-Cockaygne as a conceptual space, he draws some surprisingly non-
ideal conclusions on its bases. Keeping that description in mind, the subsequent 
chapters will constitute an examination of the logical consequences of the 
particulars of Suits’ utopian vision. 
 
1.6 Suits’ Utopia of Totalized Gameplay 
First, however, we must address a potential contradiction between Suits’ 
concepts of ‘game’ and ‘utopia’ that he does not fully explore: the implicit 
requirement that both can be entered into, and exited from, on one’s own 
volition. After all, first and foremost, play is a voluntary activity. As Johan 
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Huizinga writes, “play to order is no longer play: it could at best be but a forcible 
imitation of it” (Huizinga 1955 [1938], p. 7). Suits conspicuously builds this 
volitional requirement into his definition of games, but does not acknowledge 
the violation of that volitional requirement when games are totalized, which is 
to say when they are made to constitute the entirety of a human life—as they 
would in his vision of utopia. Troublingly, entry into a totalized life of gameplay, 
which would perdure throughout one’s existence, would be non-voluntary for 
Suits’ utopians: they would be born into it. Thus, games in his utopia would 
constitute non-voluntary attempts to overcome necessary obstacles. That is, 
utopian games would be, paradoxically, anti-games or work by Suits’ definition. 
Instead of recognizing and addressing the inherent contradictions of a 
non-voluntary utopia of gaming, Suits claims to the contrary that “Utopia is 
intelligible, and… game playing is what makes Utopia intelligible” (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 188). But portraying utopia as a totalized network of interlocking 
games, in addition to running counter to Suits’ definitional project, poses a 
separate logical difficulty for his hypothetical utopians as well. For utopia would 
cease to be utopia if its citizens could not elect to leave; if there was no option 
for defection (contrariwise: if all utopians left utopia, it would also cease to be 
utopia). Utopian citizens cannot be prisoners of their utopias if they are, indeed, 
utopias. As it happens, no well-balanced utopian citizen would leave a true 
utopia, but not because it was prohibited by law, or contingently impossible. 
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Utopians would stay in their utopias simply because egress would be rationally 
non-maximizing: for if one lives in the perfect state, it does not behoove one to 
take flight. But in Suits’ utopian vision, there is nowhere to fly to: for utopia is 
everywhere; and everywhere, games are being played. 
To address this potential contradiction in his definitions, Suits must give 
his utopians an ‘out’. Happily, he accomplishes this in a passage wherein he 
states that his utopians can will themselves free of the use of their 
telepathically-controlled supercomputers that—when used—make instrumental 
activity impossible (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 195). This means that egress from his 
utopia is possible, and that there is another type of activity than gameplay 
available to post-utopians who desire to leave their Edenic condition of life in 
the techno-Cockaygne—namely, work. Thus, the totalization of gameplay in 
Suits’ utopia is not as totalized as it first appears, and we can consider the 
volitional requirements of both gameplay and utopian citizenship to be 
conceptually satisfied. 
 
1.7 Summary 
Wittgenstein’s family resemblance thesis fails to capture what a ‘game’ is 
in many ways. It is overly-inclusive in that there is no clear mechanism for sorting 
out surface resemblances from deep resemblances; it accepts the necessity of 
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conceptual vagueness regarding ‘game’ without testing that premise; and it 
creates a false dichotomy between theorizing and seeing, not recognizing these 
as two parts in a larger process of conceptual creation and refinement. By 
comparison, Suits’ moderate definitionist effort to define ‘gameplay’ neatly 
captures the essential elements of the activity in a largely unobjectionable 
fashion, and constitutes a contribution to philosophy in that it successfully 
refutes Wittgenstein’s antiphilosophical thesis. 
Many objections raised by Suits’ critics can either be directly answered, or 
explained by reference to his utopian thesis. While Suits’ later efforts to define 
‘utopia’ are less convincing, and run afoul of more conceptually precise accounts 
of the term such as J.C. Davis’, he can sidestep this conceptual conflict by defining 
his utopian vision as a techno-Cockaygne. Suit’ utopia of totalized gameplay thus 
does not constitute a contradiction of terms upon closer examination. However, 
there are a host of other philosophical issues raised by contemplating Suits’ 
utopian thesis—including whether the lives of his utopians would represent the 
ideal of existence, or whether they would go mad from boredom; whether his 
utopians are capable of being virtuous, or whether they would be behaviourally 
conditioned to the point of having no free will; and whether or not we can hope 
to understand what utopian games are from our pre-utopian perspective—which 
we will now turn to consider in the subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 2: ‘Wholly Automated Machines’: Suits, Nozick, and Utopia  
 
Let us imagine, then, that all of the instrumental activities of human beings have been 
eliminated. All of the things ordinarily called work are now done by wholly automated 
machines which are activated solely by mental telepathy… (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182) 
 
Bernard Suits' vision of utopia in his The Grasshopper: Games, Life and 
Utopia is that of a perfectly peaceful society wherein all the socio-political 
problems of our world have been fruitfully solved by technological advances. It is 
a society of material superabundance, serviced by telepathically-controlled 
automata: a techno-Cockaygne (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 183). Admittedly, Suits’ 
utopian vision is but one instantiation of many possible good worlds: but he 
claims that in such a post-instrumental society, intrinsically enjoyable activities 
will of necessity be valued above all else, with games constituting the ultimate 
unifying category of these activities (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 188). Games are to 
occupy the waking hours of his utopians, who otherwise would have nothing 
useful or diverting to do, and eventually become malcontent or suicidal (Suits 
1984b, p. 8). Thus, according to Suits—who holds that “a game Utopia is a logical 
inevitability” (Suits 1984b, p. 19)—one of our present pragmatic duties is to 
invent marvellous entertainments in preparation for the future, so that his 
utopians will not face an existential crisis once utopian conditions obtain (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 194). Good games are seen to be a means of preserving utopia, if 
not a means for establishing it. 
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In this context I interrogate Robert Nozick’s famous thought experiment, 
the experience machine—and its lesser-known cousins, the result machine and 
the transformation machine—as they all have their functional correlates in Suits’ 
utopian vision. My goal in this chapter is not necessarily to further Nozick 
scholarship, but to use his thought-experimental machinery as analogues to help 
us understand the form of life of Suitsian utopians from a novel angle. For any 
philosophical objections which would apply to using Nozick’s machines—i.e., ‘we 
want to do certain things’, ‘we want to be certain kinds of people’, and ‘using the 
machine would limit us to a man-made reality’—apply equally to both the use of 
the supercomputers which facilitate Suit’s utopia, the techno-Cockaygne, and 
also the use of fully immersive games themselves. 
In this chapter, I argue that the standard epistemological and 
metaphysical reasons given for non-usage of Nozick’s machines can be 
satisfactorily refuted, and thus life in Suits’ utopia is analogously defensible. 
However, I conclude with a dilemma. For if my defence of utopian life in the 
techno-Cockaygne is unconvincing, then Suits’ utopia is deeply problematic on 
the standard Nozickian account; and if my defence is convincing, then there are 
still two additional problematics which remain to be answered, requiring 
separate treatments: lack of moral agency, and existential boredom in utopia. 
 
74 
 
2.1: Suits’ Techno-Cockaygne as Nozickian Result Machine 
Suits’ telepathically-controlled “wholly automated machines” are the 
under-described technological enablers of his modern-day version of the 
mythological Land of Cockaygne, serving as a prop to get his utopian thought 
experiment off the ground (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182). From what little can be 
gleaned from Suits’ description, these machines appear to be the logical 
correlates of a Nozickian result machine, “which produces in the world any result 
you would produce and injects your vector input into any joint activity” (Nozick 
2013 [1974], p. 44). This reading is consistent, for example, with Suits’ claims that 
in utopia “all of the economic problems of man have been solved forever”(Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 183) and that “with no competing claims for goods requiring 
legislation and adjudication, there is no need for government” (Suits 2014 [1978], 
p. 184). These machines are strictly better technological upgrades on the wish-
granting genies of fairy tale lore, because they can grant endless wishes to 
unlimited numbers of wishers (they are not arbitrarily restricted to three wishes 
per user), and they admit of no possibility of having the users’ desires be 
misunderstood: wishes becomes world states instantly, without the possibility of 
a mischievous djinn intervening between word and deed and causing an 
undesired world state to obtain due to ambiguous terminology employed by the 
wisher, a too-literal interpretation of semantics, or errors in their use of syntax. 
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Nozick claims that we would not use his result machine, on the grounds 
that it would live out our lives for us—a result he finds undesirable (Nozick 2013 
[1974], p. 44). Still, in non-utopian circumstances the mere existence of such a 
technological wonder would mean that possessing it would create some moral 
duties for its users. By this I mean that Nozick would need to have a very good—
irrefutable, really—reason why someone who owns a result machine should not 
immediately push a button and bring about a world state in which all forms of 
cancer are cured, for a start. The objection that the machine would be “living our 
lives for us” does not do the job of providing moral grounds for non-usage in this 
and similar cases, since there is no relevant sense in which we could be living out 
our own lives, and still bring about the desired (and morally desirable) result. 
Indeed, Nozick’s assertion that using the result machine would mean that 
we are not living our own lives must stand on something like the belief that there 
is something irreplaceably valuable about difficulty, effort, and engagement with 
processes. But all well-designed machines less dramatically—but still 
noticeably—reduce difficulty, mitigate effort, and help minimize the level of 
engagement required of us in the process of achieving our goals. We cannot 
consistently condemn use of just the result machine, and exempt other machines 
from a parallel axis of critique, except by dint of the result machine’s complete 
efficiency. If the problematic is read as drawing its force from the machine’s mere 
reduction of human effort tout court, then Nozick's position could oddly imply 
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that it is less authentic to mend a tear in your pants using a sewing machine, than 
with a needle and thread; and that an airplane is ‘living my life for me’ when it 
takes me from Airport A to Airport B more quickly than I could move unaided, 
which is highly implausible. Thus, we must conclude that Nozick is not taking aim 
at merely partially efficient machinery. A similar concern to Nozick’s apparent 
worry about completely efficient machinery is raised by Suits with regard to life in 
his utopia—that death or madness by boredom is a likely outcome for utopians 
who are confronted with the perpetual conundrum of having nothing at all that 
needs doing; living lives fully bereft of effort due to the wish-granting technology 
of their telepathically-controlled supercomputers (Suits 1984b, p. 8). 
Use of a completely efficient result machine could also be objected to on 
alternate consequentialist grounds. For bad people want bad things to happen 
quite often, and even the more morally restrained among us might wish for 
wicked world state to come about, if we were sufficiently provoked. More 
mundanely, consider a petulant child’s ill-considered cry of “I wish you were 
dead!” to a well-meaning but desire-frustrating parent. Hooked up to a result 
machine, the teenager would make the parent’s death obtain with one errant 
thought-command. This possibility stands in stark contradiction to Suits’ assertion 
that “in Utopia no evil or wrong can befall anyone” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 185). 
Unrestricted result machine usage by a number of psychologically fallible or 
morally corrupt individuals would inevitably produce a dystopia, wherein at least 
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some people would wage a perpetual war of all against all with unfailingly lethal 
machine-generated weaponry—as opposed to a utopia, wherein such scenarios 
are seemingly ruled out by definition. Indeed, result machine usage put to 
genocidal ends could even devolve into what Nick Bostrom has called an 
‘existential risk’, a risk that “threatens the premature extinction of Earth-
originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its 
potential for desirable future development” (Bostrom 2013, p. 15). Thus, the 
under-described “quite new development in socio- or psychotherapy or in 
pharmacology” Suits posits, which results in “one hundred percent cures for all 
psychic disturbances” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 183), must predate the invention of 
his result machine analogues, and therefore the onset of the post-instrumental 
utopian condition they enable—or else this ‘utopia’ would be rapidly destroyed 
by its own completely effective wicked-wish-fulfilling technology. 
 
2.2: The Transformation Machine and the Need for Morally Perfect Utopians 
The transformation machine Nozick outlines can instantaneously change 
its users into any kind of person they want to be, at the touch of a button (Nozick 
2013 [1974], p. 44). It is trivial for Nozick, but important for Suits, to note that a 
transformation machine can be wished for by a result machine and thereby come 
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into existence in his thought-experimental scenario.27 Alternately, if one’s 
psychological and physiological composition counts as a ‘result’ in the world, one 
could forego the superfluous machinery and alter oneself directly through result 
machine usage. 
In any case, use of a transformation machine looks like it could put us on 
the fast track toward producing a perfect moral commonwealth—all we would 
need to do would be to enter it and to wish to become infallibly morally good, 
and we would become such.28 As a finesse on this, and ignoring the 
unsavouriness of the methodology, imagine that anyone unwilling to use the 
transformation machine for the purpose of becoming infallibly good was coerced 
to do so (it matters not whether this coercion is put into effect by state or non-
state actors). This would make evil as impossible for anyone to do as it is for Suits’ 
utopians (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 185), and so unrestricted result machine usage 
would then be safe to generally permit without horrific consequences obtaining. 
Although using a result machine is the most obvious route for producing a 
transformation machine, the result machine cannot be safely employed without 
first using the transformation machine, which forecloses that alternative. Thus, 
moral indoctrination in combination with pharmaceutical bioenhancement—
                                                          
27 See Chapter 7 for a discussion of how unrestricted transmogrification of the human body would 
vitiate the possibility of utopian sport. 
 
28 The question of whether automatic or conditioned virtue counts as a coherent concept or a 
contradiction in terms is taken up in earnest in Chapter 3. 
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which together can effect a very convincing imitation of a transformation 
machine in terms of producing reliably good human behaviour (Persson and 
Savulescu 2012)—will have to do instead. 
This kind of ‘moral doping’ could be what Suits has in mind when he states 
that by the time his utopia arrives “all possible interpersonal problems have been 
solved by appropriate methods… some quite new development in socio- or 
psychotherapy has made it possible to effect one hundred per cent cures for all 
psychic disturbances” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 183). By these mysterious methods, 
Suits’ utopians are made completely neuroses-free, and with neither material nor 
psychological motivation for doing evil remaining, they would have no occasion 
for making harmful use of their telepathically-controlled supercomputers. Under 
such conditions the result machine would exceptionally escape what Ingmar 
Persson and Julian Savulescu call the ‘dual use problem’, that technology “can be 
put to both beneficial and harmful uses” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, p. 124): 
for there would be only beneficial usage of the result machine left as a live 
possibility. 
 
2.3: Are Suits’ Utopian Games Nozickian Experience Machines? 
 Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ is yet another a thought experimental 
construct, designed by fictional “superduper neuropsychologists” (Nozick 2013 
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[1974], p. 42) to allow its patrons to have any experience they desire. The 
procedure for usage is simple: the user programs the set of experiences they wish 
to have into the machine, enters it, and has electrodes attached to their brain 
which realistically simulate that set of experiences as actually occurring in the 
mind of the user. The user is finally released after two years of experiencing their 
choices, and is then free to program their next two-year stint in the machine 
(Nozick 2013 [1974], pp. 42-43). However, this would occur at the cost of the user 
sentencing themself to a prison of sorts within the experience machine, wherein 
their contact with reality, their effect on the world, and arguably their existence 
as a person (though not as an experiencing entity) would be nullified for the 
duration of their usage. This is because even though “while you’re in the tank you 
won’t know that you’re there; you’ll think it’s all actually happening” (Nozick 
2013 [1974], p. 43), in reality “all the time you would be floating in a tank, with 
electrodes attached to your brain” (Nozick 2013 [1974], p. 42). 
By pumping our intuitions that we would not use such an experience 
machine, Nozick hopes to demonstrate that there are more valuable activities 
than merely experiencing pleasure which, upon due reflection, demand our 
philosophical allegiance (Nozick 2013 [1974], pp. 42-45). This concern is mirrored 
in Suits’ utopia as an existential anxiety about the low overall perceived value of a 
life consisting entirely of contentedly playing games compared with the relatively 
high perceived value of overcoming ‘real’ obstacles. (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 195-
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196). The worry that “life for most people will not be worth living if they cannot 
believe that they are doing something useful” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 196) 
necessitates a kind of utopian self-delusion akin to the kind experienced by 
Nozick’s experience machine users, in that they must bring themselves to believe 
that their utopian games are “not games at all, but vitally necessary tasks which 
had to be performed in order for human survival” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 195). This 
self-delusion necessitated by existential angst, however, results in Suits’ utopians 
banning the use of their telepathically-controlled wish-granting supercomputers, 
and thereby bringing about “the downfall of Utopia” (Suits 2014 [1978], 195). 
 For Nozick, “plugging into the machine is a kind of suicide” (Nozick 2013 
[1974], p. 43), just as for Suits’ utopians, exclusively plugging into a series of 
games (in the knowledge that they are games) provokes a utopia-wide existential 
crisis leading to their “vanishing on the spot”, for “they would have felt that their 
whole lives had been as nothing—a mere stage play or empty dream” (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 196). The dilemma for Suits is seemingly no longer between utopian 
gameplay and utopian suicide, but between utopian suicide provoked by 
boredom at the very onset of utopia (U1) and utopian suicide provoked by 
disillusionment a reasonable amount of time after its establishment (U2). No 
doubt these extreme formulations rest on the fact that these two thought 
experiments present us with parallel logical extremes: human lives reduced to a 
series of illusive or delusive experiences with no productive outcome, interrupted 
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only by brief interstices of self-awareness between continuous diversions. The 
main reasons Nozick gives that we would not, as a rule, voluntarily use the 
experience machine—nor, by extension, Suitsian utopian games—are the 
following: (1) “we want to do certain things”, (2) “we want to be a certain way”, 
and (3) “plugging into the experience machine limits us to a man-made reality, to 
a world no deeper or more important than that which people can construct” 
(Nozick 2013 [1974], p. 43). Let us now examine whether Nozick’s presumption 
that the default human preference would be for non-usage of experience 
machines is justified, before considering the implications of his position for Suits’ 
utopian thesis. 
 
2.4: Refuting Nozickian Justifications for Non-Usage of Experience Machines 
Nozick’s first reason that we would not voluntarily use an experience 
machine, that we want to do certain things in the world, seems to unfairly 
privilege achievements that result in products over achievements that result from 
processes. As Thomas Hurka notes: 
Many philosophers have assumed, with Aristotle, that the value of a process aimed at 
producing some end-state must derive entirely from the end-state’s value, so if the latter 
is negligible so is the former. But there is no reason to believe this. Even if some of the 
process’s intrinsic value depends on its instrumental value… there can also be intrinsic 
value in its properties just as a process and apart from any value in its product (Hurka 
2006, p. 234).  
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The only difference between person A, who seeks to bring about certain worldly 
states for the sake of having an experience (say, assembling a kit car for 
amusement), and person B, who employs an experience machine to acquire that 
experience directly (to have A’s experience of building a kit car for amusement), 
is that A has a product at the end of their process, whilst B does not: their 
experience of the process is identical. In a world where product is rendered 
trivial—e.g., Suits’ materially superabundant techno-Cockaygne (where anyone 
can simply wish for a kit car and immediately have one)—it is difficult to preserve 
Nozick’s intuition that machine usage is a priori undesirable simply of the basis of 
its being unproductive. 
The second reason that Nozick gives for assuming we would not want to 
use an experience machine hinges on the fact that, while in the experience 
machine, a person cannot be any certain way they want to be. Nozick offers the 
example that an individual cannot be "courageous, kind, intelligent, witty, loving" 
(Nozick 2013 [1974], p. 43) while in the machine, because she cannot actively 
display these traits at that time. No private (or latent) qualities appear to be 
taken into consideration here. Thus, ‘being a certain kind of person’ is 
functionally equivalent to ‘doing certain things’, and the second reason for non-
usage is thereby made redundant (that is to say, it becomes a reformulation of 
the first reason, which urged us to stay out of the machine in order that we might 
make certain states obtain in the world).  
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 The last main reason given for presuming our preference for non-usage, 
that "plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality" 
(Nozick 2013 [1974], p. 43) invokes a kind of separation anxiety, a concern that 
experience machine usage would separate humans from a ‘deeper reality’. Nozick 
claims that, all things considered, “we want to be importantly connected to 
reality, not to live in a delusion” (Nozick 1989, p. 106), and this is no doubt the 
case for many people. He fails, however, to adequately address the fact that 
reality is unkind to a good many other people, who might not value this 
connection to reality as much, if at all. While we all generally want to do certain 
things and be certain ways, the odds of us actually doing those things and being 
those ways are rather poor, at least for many of us (relative, of course, to the 
extravagance of our desires). Nozick is clearly not playing to this part of the 
crowd; but the bleaker the prospects for human life on this planet become, 
economically, politically, and environmentally, the more people that will 
predictably have this pessimistic attitude toward reality, and the more strongly 
escapist urges will (rightly or wrongly) hold sway over the intuitions which Nozick 
intends to evoke with his experience machine thought experiment. On the other 
hand, neither can Nozick’s appeal to a connection with a deeper reality motivate 
Suitsian utopians, for whom no constraints on life prospects apply; for there is no 
deeper reality for them to connect to—their reality is solely mediated via, and 
made radically pliant by, their telepathically-controlled supercomputers. So all 
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utopians, and a continuously growing number of pre-utopians, might reasonably 
share the intuition that experience machine usage is acceptable or even 
desirable. 
 
2.5: Utopian Applications of Experience Machine Usage qua Gameplay 
If experience machine usage were to become socially acceptable (or, 
more dramatically, socially expected), eventually many would find it impossible 
to resist the use of that technology, just as we have historically found it 
impossible to resist the use of personal computers, cellular phones, and remote-
controlled televisions, once they became ubiquitous. Indeed, as Alex Barber 
quips, “we all already own and enjoy using something like an experience machine 
on a daily basis: our beds” (Barber 2011, p. 267). The host of less efficient 
experience machines currently at our disposal, such as games, books, and 
recorded entertainments, have long been regarded as an acceptable surrogate 
for social interaction (if not regarded as comprising a form of indirect social 
interaction in themselves). In a certain mood, books are preferable to the 
company of other persons, and from a certain perspective, temporary experience 
machine usage could be seen as being analogous to reading a very long book or 
playing a very long game of solitaire. 
86 
 
The success of books and games in generating human happiness implies 
that we can have at least a rudimentary sympathetic understanding of each 
others’ experiential lives. This is an intuitively appealing idea: through our natural 
empathy, we do seem to be capable of sharing in each other’s pleasures and 
pains. Thus it stands to reason that a competently designed and operated 
experience machine would have an excellent chance of improving the overall 
standard of lived human experience. If we can consider books, movies, and 
games to be experience machines of a lesser intensity and reliability, minus the 
aspect of self-deception, then contrary to Nozick's intuitions on the matter, we're 
already using them and asking for more—for they are better tools for generating 
meaning than chance encounters with a fundamentally indifferent ‘deeper 
reality’. They may even, as Martha Nussbaum suggests, count among our most 
reliable tools for training and refining our moral sensitivities (Nussbaum 1990). 
In his later work, Nozick concurs that if used temporarily, rather than 
perpetually, the experience machine could be considered as a tool that “might 
teach you things, or transform you in a way beneficial for your actual life later. It 
also might give pleasures that would be quite acceptable in limited doses” 
(Nozick 1989, p. 108). Just as the flight simulator prepares pilots for flight, 
without actually sending them into the air, the experience machine could teach 
people how to engineer more meaningful existences for themselves without 
risking any undesirable consequences in the process. In this utopian mode of 
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operation, the machine could be used as a tool for self-discovery and self-
improvement, and perhaps even cultural reform. In that sense, experience 
machine usage has much in common with playing the utopian games described 
by Suits, “games that will require for their exploitation—that is, for their mastery 
and enjoyment—as much energy as is expended today in serving the institutions 
of scarcity” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). Pleasure, development of capacities, and 
intellectual stimulation are all meted out in desirable portions in both cases. 
Indeed, a technology like the experience machine could be used as the ultimate 
immersive gaming platform, delivering games so impactful and realistic that 
“you’ll think it’s all actually happening” (Nozick 2013 [1974], p. 43). Games that 
are thereby not experienced qua games, but rather as “vitally necessary tasks… 
for human survival” and thus played unconsciously by utopians, might be the key 
to preventing the downfall of Suits’ utopia (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 195). 
 
2.6: Summary 
Suits’ techno-Cockaygne is based on the employment of thought-
experimental machinery very similar in function to Nozick’s, if not identical. 
Therefore, any concerns convincingly raised against the use of Nozick’s machines 
are likely to weigh equally against Suits’ utopian vision. However, I have provided 
sufficient grounds for concluding that Nozick’s reasons for positing that a shared 
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intuition against experience machine usage exists are unconvincing. Additionally, 
I explored some possible utopian applications for moderate experience machine 
usage, and showed how experience machine usage was a natural extension of 
existing cultural technologies. I have also explained why transformation machine 
usage and result machine usage are theoretically necessitated on Suits’ schema—
the former because his utopian vision would self-destruct without something like 
it, and the latter because its use is the necessary condition for its realization. In 
conclusion, we can reasonably claim that Suits’ utopian vision does not, 
ultimately, fall prey to Nozickian concerns. However, this does not preclude the 
possibility that Suits’ work is open to other axes of criticism. 
 The existential concern raised at the beginning of this chapter—that Suits’ 
utopia may collapse due to a lack of meaningful activity for his utopians—remains 
fundamentally unaddressed. Suits’ utopia thus remains in a state of conceptual 
peril, but not for the reasons put forward by Nozick. To address this lacuna will 
require a consideration of what existential meaning is, how it can be generated, 
and whether gameplay could reasonably be considered to constitute meaningful 
activity in Suits’ utopia. In addition, it seems as if the stability of utopian life in the 
techno-Cockaygne requires something like the moral doping of all result machine 
users in advance of its establishment. This raises additional worries about the 
bare possibility of utopian virtue, which I now turn to address in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3: ‘No Such Shortcomings’: Is Virtue Possible in Suits’ 
Utopia? 
 
What does this ‘working at’ mean in the case of a marriage or, for that matter, 
any other intrinsically valued relationship between people? Does it not mean, 
essentially, being tolerant of, and helpful with respect to, one another’s social 
and psychological shortcomings? But in Utopia we are supposing that there are 
no such shortcomings to be tolerant of. (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 184) 
 
Bernard Suits stipulates that his utopians are psychologically flawless 
(Suits 2014 [1978], p. 183), and incapable of doing harm to each other (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 185). Moreover, “they have acquired all the knowledge there is” (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 186), so they may also operate with perfect knowledge in each 
situation they encounter. Good in Suits’ utopia, then, is automatic: right action is 
known, urges to act contrary to the good are eradicated a priori, and so each 
utopian is incapable of doing evil, or even forming an evil intention. However, it 
might be objected that such automatic virtue is no real virtue at all. Suits himself 
shares this intuition: “Morality is relevant only to the extent that the ideal has not 
been realized, but there is no room at all for morality in the ideal itself, just as 
there is no room for revolution in the ideal which inspires revolutionary action” 
(Suits 2014 [1978], p. 185). Thus, it appears that virtuous action might be 
impossible in Suits’ utopia.  
Through positions I outline such as ‘the effort argument’, ‘the autonomy 
argument’, ‘the desire argument’, and ‘the homogeneity argument’, I consider 
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whether such social technologies as Platonic indoctrination, Skinnerian operant 
conditioning, and more contemporary innovations such as Persson and 
Savulescu’s moral bioenhancement—as real-world analogues or precursors of 
Suits’ utopian supercomputers—allow enough wiggle room for moral agency in 
his utopia, or whether they render concepts such as ‘virtue’ and ‘character’ 
empty therein. Either (A) some minimal scope for moral action is possible in Suits’ 
utopia, and he has simply erred in claiming it was not (this is the most likely 
reading, since he later vacillates on this point, conceding that “perhaps morality 
will also be present, possibly in the form of what we now call sportsmanship”) 
(Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194); or (B) morality is impossible in Suits’ utopia, and his 
position is far less theoretically rich than it would have been otherwise. However, 
if (A) is indeed the case, as I argue it is, then the further problematic remains that 
his utopians are not only alien to us by token of the omnipotence they wield, and 
the omniscience they have, but also the omnibenevolence they are bound by. 
 
3.1 Prospects for Virtue in Suits’ Utopia of Gameplay 
In the previous chapter, I flagged the necessity of moral perfection for 
Suits’ utopians, as each would be entrusted with the use of telepathically-
controlled, reality-warping supercomputers, the misuse of which would have 
horrific consequences. Nick Bostrom agrees that “it could turn out… that 
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attaining certain technological capabilities before attaining sufficient insight and 
coordination invariably spells doom for a civilization”, because if “some 
technology is discovered that puts immense destructive power into the hands of 
a large number of individuals, and no way to prevent individuals from having 
access to it, then civilization cannot last, since in a sufficiently large population 
there are bound to be some individuals who will use any destructive power 
available to them” (Bostrom 2013, p. 25). Thus, the cost of living in Suits’ techno-
Cockaygne—wherein technology has advanced to the point wherein any human 
desire can become reality with but a thought, immediately, unfailingly, and with 
complete efficiency—is undergoing a 100% effective programme of moral 
indoctrination prior to entry. The alternative would mean offering innumerable 
unfailing murder machines to a morally imperfect general public, with all of the 
predictable consequences. The question I address in this chapter is whether it is 
possible for Suits’ utopians to exhibit virtue after such a complete indoctrination. 
This concern has a distinguished lineage: George Kateb writes of a 
“notion, as old as Plato, but easily lost sight of, that virtue is the key to the 
persistence of a utopian way of life, and that, in turn, the key to virtue is 
education in the fullest sense” (Kateb 1971, pp. 11-12). Without the proper 
education, in other words, virtue is not considered to be possible; and without 
virtue, a utopian state is considered unsustainable. However, the education 
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described by Plato—i.e., for his Auxiliary caste in the Republic—strikes the 
modern liberal democratic ear as rather problematic: 
You should assume that the educational programme was designed for one purpose only: 
to indoctrinate them so thoroughly that the laws take in them like a dye, so that their 
notions about what is to be feared and about everything else hold fast… with the dye 
being incapable of being washed out by those solvents which are so frighteningly good at 
scouring—pleasure, which is a more efficient cleanser than any soda and lye, and pain 
and aversion and desire, which outclass any solvent (Plato 1950 [c. 380 B.C.E.], § 430 a-
b). 
 
All the same, Plato writes to us from antiquity, long before the 
establishment of modern science: his means of inculcating virtue are relatively 
primitive, and their small-scale application to a city-state may seem charmingly 
outdated. As Michael Hauskeller notes, “the availability of the means makes a 
huge difference in practical terms. Plato’s vision of a radically transformed society 
ruled by philosophers could not do much harm because he lacked the political 
power to make his vision real” (Hauskeller 2012, p. 45). It is only when Plato’s 
praise of indoctrination as a tool of social control is echoed in a context wherein 
political power is more efficiently extended over ever-widening territorial units, 
and the scientific and industrial capacities in its service are significantly increased, 
that we are compelled to urgently inquire into the philosophical implications of a 
practical realization of his programme. 
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While Suits’ utopia is the logically extreme formulation of this 
technologically-enabled social reform, a more modest revitalization of Plato’s 
program was attempted by social scientist B.F. Skinner, who was also concerned 
with the role of pleasure and pain in relation to the teaching of virtue (Skinner 
1962). It is in the recommended means by which virtue is to be taught—via 
schemes of negative and positive reinforcement resulting in the behavioural 
conditioning of human beings (Skinner 1971)—that Skinner distinguished himself 
from Plato sufficiently to disturb the modern imagination. With Skinner’s 
methods, moral autonomy is presumably compromised, if not altogether 
negated. For if consistent expressions of virtue are only made possible through 
behavioural conditioning, and all Skinnerian conditioning is blatant 
indoctrination, which precludes the possibility of free choice, then the idea of 
freely-chosen virtue is out of the question. Insofar as autonomy is considered 
crucial to the exercise of moral choice, a utopia of perfect virtue looks to be a 
hollow imitation of our comparatively richer actual moral and political lives.29 
Of course, Skinner is not alone in speculating on the possibilities 
suggested by the plasticity of human nature. For instance, Eugen Weber warns of 
the immanent “prospect of bio-control, defined as ‘the control of physical 
movements, mental processes, emotional reactions and apparent sensory 
                                                          
29 Therein lies the plausibility of Suits’ discursive complaint that in “our non-Utopian existence… 
there is, quite simply, vastly more scope for action than there is in the Utopian world” (Suits 
1984b, p. 15). 
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perceptions…by means of bioelectrical signals which are injected into the central 
nervous system of the subject’” (Weber 1971, pp. 83-84). The utility of such ‘bio-
control’ is frighteningly apparent, but Skinner does not endorse the application of 
such biotechnology, contenting himself, in Kateb’s words, “to replace the regime 
of fear [which maintains our current status quo] with the system of habit…to 
avoid association of virtue and toilsomeness… [and] to condition men so perfectly 
that whatever they desire is licit and whatever is required of them they do 
without strain” (Kateb 1963, p. 159, brackets mine). In other words, Skinner has a 
kinder, gentler form of social manipulation in mind than the crude electro-
mechanical interventions anticipated by Weber. He saw no reason to glorify 
moral struggles if they were ultimately dispensable, and separable from the end 
of behaving virtuously: 
We may mourn the passing of heroes but not the conditions which make for heroism. 
We can spare the self-made saint or sage as we spare the laundress on the river’s bank 
struggling against fearful odds to achieve cleanliness (Skinner 1971, p. 73). 
 
 In the end, Skinner confronts his readers with the following trilemma: 
“Are we to be controlled by accident, by tyrants, or by ourselves in effective 
cultural design?” (Skinner 1971, p. 67) He believes that if we refuse to 
acknowledge and act on the scientific fact that human behaviour can be 
manipulated, then we will leave the development and application of behaviour-
control techniques and technologies to unscrupulous and power-hungry tyrants, 
who will be all too glad to use those very same tools toward ends less noble than 
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the elimination of vice (Skinner 1971, p. 74). Alternately, by taking the reign of 
these technologies, a utopian possibility presents itself: for through their use we 
could transcend the caprices of brute evolutionary forces and begin to design a 
new future for our species (transhumanist themes are very pronounced in his 
work). In support of his position, Skinner submits that individuals of great merit 
and admirable qualities are currently produced randomly, in uncontrolled social 
situations. He cites the example of Abraham Lincoln, who rose from an 
ignominious childhood to become one of most famous presidents of the United 
States, the ‘Great Emancipator’ of the slaves, for arguably no better reason than 
the caprices of fortune—for Lincoln was not the product of an intentional cultural 
design, but rather had to overcome many hardships in the absence of a 
supportive cultural apparatus (Skinner 1971, p. 68). 
For every Lincoln, believes Skinner, there are multitudes of individuals 
who are capable of equivalent expressions of excellence but lack the proper 
opportunities to develop their capacities and refine their sensitivities. He thinks 
that this waste in human potential can be avoided through experiments in 
cultural design, and especially through the development of an education system 
so efficient and thorough that it would be deemed indoctrination by today’s 
standards (indeed, the sole criterion that separates education from 
indoctrination for Skinner is its effectiveness). If Suits’ utopian games could serve 
as ‘Lincoln factories’—cultivating and realizing superlative human capacities with 
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unerring consistency—then Skinner would no doubt advocate their use as such. 
Skinner wants to improve the odds of society’s production of such virtuous 
individuals in the same sense that the founding of Harvard improved the odds of 
producing intelligent students, even at the cost of their chances of exerting 
effort—say, those efforts which would have been expended by having Harvard 
students engage in needless acts of intellectual heroism to achieve comparable 
levels of academic achievement at less effective institutions of higher learning. 
Skinner is representative of a wider psychological movement known as 
situationism, of which there are various expressions. What Christian Miller calls a 
defensible version of ‘positive situationism’ is the position that “behaviour is 
primarily a product of situational forces… personality only has a modest causal 
contribution to make” (Miller 2014, p. 99), while ‘negative situationism’ is the 
claim that “there is a large body of experimental evidence which is incompatible 
with the widespread possession of folk moral virtues and vices” (Miller 2014, p. 
94). According to the doctrine of positive situationism, character is largely 
circumscribed by environmental factors; and according to the doctrine of 
negative situationism, virtue is a complete myth. Both positions draw their 
plausibility from experimental bases, such as the studies of John Darley and John 
Batson, which have demonstrated that humans are generally much less prone to 
behave altruistically when under time pressure, and much more prone to 
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altruistic behaviour after recieving small unexpected rewards (Miller 2014, pp. 
98-99). 
Putting the issue of the validity of these experiments (and others like 
them) aside for the moment, let us contemplate situationism’s ramifications for 
the possibility of virtue in utopia if they are valid. If negative situationism is 
factually correct, then creating a utopia of morally perfect entities is as simple as 
(1) identifying the correct set of situations for eliciting the desired types of 
‘virtuous’ behaviours in individuals, (2) designing an effective formula of 
combinations and durations of these situations, sufficient to produce a lasting 
and sustainable elicitation of those behaviours, and then (3) going about their 
practical construction. If positive situationism is factually correct, then following 
the same protocol will also produce a utopia, but it will be a utopia of imperfect 
virtue, since the shortcomings of our personalities would still exert some 
resistance to the influence of the engineered situation; additional measures 
would be required to create unfailing virtue in this case. This brings us to consider 
the additional practical possibility of taking a ‘morality pill’ to supplement the 
environmental factors meant to guide the behaviour of utopian citizens. 
Recently, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have suggested that we are 
not evolutionally well-suited for dealing with contemporary political and 
environmental crises, and therefore have a pressing duty to investigate the 
potential of species-wide pharmaceutical bioenhancement to improve our moral 
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capacities, for example by dosing ourselves with oxytocin to boost “trust and 
other pro-social behaviour towards others” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, p. 119) 
and inhibit reuptake of serotonin “to make subjects more fair-minded and likely 
to cooperate” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, p. 120). Despite their 
acknowledgement that current biotechnologies are less than ideally effective, 
and lacking concrete political recommendations for having the use of new and 
yet-to-be-invented drugs (and the concomitant programme of moral re-
education they endorse) be adopted in a widespread fashion by the citizens of 
liberal democracies, they insist that this route is the most promising avenue for 
survival of the human species (Persson and Savulescu 2012, p. 124). If their vision 
were realized, and some new and completely effective morality pill were to be 
invented, it would be the closest real-world possible analogue to Nozick’s 
transformation machine, enabling an effortless reinvention in character for all 
who took it. However, inserting effortless and perfect morality into Suits’ utopia, 
in theory or in practice, seems to make it vulnerable to George Kateb’s concern 
that “utopianism threatens to banish from the world, together with difficulty, 
together with most of the tension between precept and inclination, any shred of 
real virtue. What merit is there in something done with ease?” (Kateb 1963, p. 
173) Let us now turn to a consideration of this worry. 
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3.2 The Effort Argument: Effortless Virtue Is Impossible 
Let us recall Nozick’s ‘transformation machine’: the perfectly reliable 
thought-experimental version of a morality pill that omits any disturbing 
particulars involved in training humans to be good. Nozick describes the 
transformation machine as a machine that one could step into to become any 
kind of person one wanted to become, just by pushing a button (Nozick 2013 
[1974], p. 44). Let us say in this case that we wanted to become ‘virtuous’ 
persons, although in principle it could grant any such type of request. Nozick 
holds that it would not be worth our while to use his transformation machine to 
become virtuous, as there is something which he holds to be intrinsically valuable 
about doing things for ourselves (Nozick 2013 [1974], p. 44)—when things are 
done for us, we lose whatever value there is in the process of exertion. 
I call this line of objection the ‘effort argument’ against the possibility of 
automatic virtue. If we think of virtue as a practice, then using the transformation 
machine will do us no good; as without effort, there is no practice, and thus no 
virtue. This line draws credence from the work of Thomas Hurka, who identifies 
difficulty as a source of good, and loving difficulty as an additional good (Hurka 
2006). Gwen Bradford refers to this additional good as the amare bonum bonus—
"to love the good is good”—and cites Nozick as one of its chief theoretical 
proponents (Bradford 2015, p. 164). On these accounts, without effort there 
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would be no encounter with difficulty, and so effortless virtue would lack the 
distinctive good-making feature that difficulty provides. 
Skinner can perhaps evade the effort argument, since practically speaking 
in the non-ideal case it could be argued that behavioural conditioning is far from 
an effortless process on the part of its subject, and that following the dictates of 
behavioural conditioning constitutes a practice of being virtuous no less than the 
manner in which non-behaviourally conditioned agents could be construed as 
practicing virtue. Suits, however, cannot evade the effort argument so easily—
because he relies on his 100% efficient supercomputers to bring about a similar 
end. Thus, we cannot dispel the lingering, somewhat odd intuition that an 
inefficient, labour-intensive, and potentially painful programme of indoctrination 
is somehow more valuable than an effortless one. 
 From a certain perspective, the prospect of instantaneous moral 
improvement seems unobjectionable, and in the mutual interest of all. For 
instance, T.H. Huxley cheerily asserts that: 
if some great Power would agree to make me always think what is true and do what is 
right, on condition of being turned into a sort of clock and wound up every morning 
before I got out of bed, I should instantly close with the offer. The only freedom I care 
about is the freedom to do right; the freedom to do wrong I am ready to part with on the 
cheapest terms to anyone who will take it of me (Huxley 1870, p. 373). 
 
The freedom Huxley bargains for here is the freedom of a clockwork-being, albeit 
a clockwork-being of the greatest possible moral precision—it would be a form of 
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‘moral doping’ as effective as that promised by use of Nozick’s transformation 
machine, and more reliable than Persson and Savulescu’s recommended 
programme of pharmaceutical bioenhancement. Nevertheless, an entity such as 
Huxley’s clockwork-being would elude most categorizations of what it is to live a 
moral life. The clockwork-being simply acts—it does not choose; all its choice was 
expended in the act of making the original bargain that brought it into being. That 
ultimate choice might, in itself, count as an ‘effort’, broadly construed; although 
this many not completely satisfy a strong reading of the effort argument, as 
requiring consistent moral exertion. If we can reasonably expect that Skinnerian 
behavioural conditioning will be as effective as he thinks it will, then the choice to 
undergo behavioural conditioning will constitute such an ‘ultimate’ choice, and 
perhaps Skinnerian—and by proxy Suitsian—utopians will be in much the same 
position as a Huxleyan clockwork-being. The mere act of ‘choosing virtue’ might 
suffice to satify a weak reading of the effort argument, but this consideration will 
not be enough to satisfactorily address the next argument against the possibility 
of virtue in utopia: the autonomy argument. 
 
3.3 The Autonomy Argument: Conditioned Virtue Is Impossible 
(1) Virtue is—or at least requires—the proper exercise of the faculty of moral choice. 
(2) In Suits’ utopia, virtuous behaviour is conditioned, which eliminates the possibility of 
exercising the faculty of moral choice tout court. 
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Therefore (3) virtue understood as the proper exercise of the faculty of moral choice is 
not possible in Suits’ utopia. 
 
 Let us consider the argument as it stands. The first premise asks us to 
assign a precondition to virtue: that of moral choice. But on Rosalind 
Hursthouse’s generally accepted neo-Aristotelian picture (Hursthouse 2001), it is 
not the case that this premise holds. On that account, the exercise of practical 
wisdom (phronesis) is internalized by the virtuous agent to the point that 
responding appropriately to the demands of a moral situation is largely an 
automatic process. A perfectly virtuous moral agent would not need to stop and 
deliberate on what to do, and in some situations it would be entirely 
inappropriate to do so, as that would prevent right moral action from being 
expressed. For example, the virtuous agent does not need to think before saving 
a drowning baby from a river, they just see what needs to be done to remedy the 
situation, and then they do it. Intellectual deliberation on the proper course of 
action, when faced with an immediate moral dilemma, is considered to be a sign 
of incomplete virtue—or weakness of will (akrasia)—in the moral agent. 
To reiterate: the response of a truly virtuous agent is largely automatic, 
much as Skinner would like it to be. But it would be inaccurate to say that 
Skinner’s moral indoctrination targets the character, as in the neo-Aristotelian 
schema. For Skinner, character is a myth: “since we cannot give a plausible 
account of the action of… complex… environment[s], we attribute… 
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achievement[s] to some admirable quality in the man himself. But such ‘faculties’ 
are suspiciously like the explanatory fictions against which the history of science 
warns us” (Skinner 1971, p. 68). As phlogiston theory and character theory are on 
the same par for Skinner, clearly his moral education aims solely at the 
modification of behaviour through the conditioning of a subject or the 
modification of their environment, which is to say that whatever is happening to 
the ‘virtuous agent’ internally is beside the point for him. The important 
consideration for Skinner is what goes on outside the person: the actual, 
observable performance of moral actions. Dispositions to act as such come as the 
result of moral education and training, Skinner claims, and do not emerge from 
the nebulous template which some call ‘character’. Kateb notes that for Skinner, 
“human nature is, in principle, fully understandable; and being fully 
understandable, it is, in principle, fully controllable, fully governable” (Kateb 
1963, p. 197). Skinner doesn’t care about whether someone has ‘laudable 
desires’ or ‘disreputable desires’. Again, he cares solely about how people act, 
what moral actions they perform. Whether we call this set of behaviours a 
‘character’ or not is merely a matter of semantics for Skinner: the subject is the 
same in either case. For the purposes of our discussion, we will continue to use 
the term ‘character’ as a useful conceptual expedient, while remaining agnostic 
about its metaphysical basis—though I have weighed in on this subject elsewhere 
(Yorke 2008). 
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In any case, in principle we should be able to gauge—and design means of 
consistently eliciting—a person’s disposition to behave in certain ways by 
observing the actions they perform in any given set of circumstances. These 
circumstances could include those of gameplay, to bring the discussion back 
around to Suits. Now part of what makes games good is, presumably, the 
opportunity they provide for players to exercise their agency: to make 
meaningful choices within the context of the game. Those choices should, if the 
game is sufficiently deep, reflect and inform (at least in part) the character of the 
player who makes them. From one side, insofar as “a virtue is generally held to be 
a character trait, a state of one’s character” (Hursthouse 2001, p. 11), we can 
expect the in-game choices that players make to be correspondingly uniform if 
they are sourced from the virtues. However, from another angle we can identify a 
possible tension between the restrictions inherent to a character-based action 
schema and the supposed openness of intralusory choice: for if my choice is 
uniformly conditioned or predetermined as a function of my character, how can it 
be considered an autonomous exercise of my free will? Do Suits’ utopian games 
condition the characters of their players, or provide opportunities for the 
expression of their characters? Can they do both, as parts of a mutually-
reinforcing cycle? 
This seeming tension can be slightly diminished by restricting the claim to 
there being some intra-lusory actions that can meaningfully express character, 
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while many cannot. Certainly, we will want to distinguish between certain types 
of intralusory actions: for does my choice to buy Park Place in Monopoly really 
express a virtue or represent who I am in a meaningful way? Only under certain 
conditions: I cannot, for example, simply be following a dominant strategy. If any 
competent player of Monopoly would have purchased Park Place under that 
certain set of circumstances as a ‘rule of skill’, then I clearly cannot claim that that 
move uniquely represents who I am, nor hope for it to be identified as virtuous. 
However, utopian games ought to be dramatically unlike Monopoly, which is to 
say that the opportunities that utopian games provide for meaningful choices to 
occur should be maximized, and expressions of virtue ought to be possible via 
their gameplay. So long as utopian games make variegated and difficult demands 
of their players, different virtues will be required to succeed at them, and 
different methods for expressing the same virtue might also be demanded with 
each instance of replaying. This line matches up with Suits’ later postulate that 
‘sportsmanship’ could exist as a utopian virtue elicitable by gameplay (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 194). 
If the lives of Suits’ utopians are, by definition, an endless series of 
games—interpretable as an indefinitely (or conceivably infinitely, if utopian 
immorality is a live option) long tournament—then their virtues can only be 
expressed through actions taken in the games they play. Therefore, utopian 
games ought to be a good mix of skill and chance, so that utopian lives are 
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neither boringly predictable (excluding all chance) nor boringly unpredictable 
(excluding all skill), and so the input of their characters has a chance to determine 
the outcome of many, though not necessarily all, competitive games. Thus, 
insofar as Suits’ utopians are capable of having characters, these ought to be 
discernible via their gameplay, and virtuous gameplay ought to generally—but 
not always (so that matches are not foregone conclusions)—lead to intralusory 
victory in these competitive games. 
Alasdair MacIntyre concurs that success—intralusory or otherwise—
typically corresponds with the possession of the virtues: 
If human life is understood as a progress through harms and dangers, moral and physical, 
which someone may encounter and overcome in better or worse ways and with a 
greater or lesser measure of success, the virtues will find their place as those qualities 
the possession and exercise of which generally tend to success in this enterprise and the 
vices likewise as qualities that likewise tend to failure. Each human life will then embody 
a story whose shape and form will depend upon what is counted as a harm and danger 
and upon how success and failure, progress and its opposite, are understood and 
evaluated. To answer these questions will also explicitly and implicitly be to answer the 
question as to what the virtues and vices are (MacIntyre 2010 [1981], p. 144, emphasis 
mine). 
 
By MacIntyre’s lights, virtue is less a matter of metaphysics and more a matter of 
socially and individually pertinent consequences; an ethical correlate to the 
theory of natural selection.30 If we can get to successful consequences with 
increased reliability using behavioural controls, it is not clear why we should we 
                                                          
30 There is an implicit concern here that linking success to virtue runs the risk of inversely linking 
failure to vice, a variation on the morally problematic practice of ‘victim shaming’. I note it here in 
passing without further elaboration. 
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mourn the loss of our much-touted but less effective moral autonomy, which fails 
to consistently produce the desired virtuous results. Still, it may appear difficult 
to apply MacIntyre’s schema to Suits’ utopian vision, wherein all ‘harms and 
dangers’ have been sanitized from human life, and the only criteria for ‘success’ 
and ‘failure’ are those given by the rulesets of games—unless we are willing to 
concede the point that, in a life consisting of nothing but gameplay, losing games 
is the worst kind of harm imaginable, and winning games the best kind of success 
one would know. 
Even if we accept the premise that exercising the faculty of moral choice is 
essential for the expression of virtue on the sports pitch, we cannot 
unambiguously accept that morally conditioned players are capable of expressing 
sufficient autonomy to accomplish this. Recall the example of Huxley’s clockwork-
being—autonomy is present at the beginning of the process of its creation, but it 
is completely exhausted in the act of making the ultimate choice to be 
transformed. Is this enough moral choice? Is it the right kind? Perhaps the gears 
can be loosened somewhat. Instead of a clockwork-being, we might picture an 
automatically virtuous agent as a heat-seeking missile, where the ‘heat’ being 
sought is the good. Such agents will always tend toward the good, but the good 
or right action to be performed will change with every new situation… and so 
such conditioned moral agents will at least be in a position of having a will free 
enough to choose and adjust their own moral ‘trajectories’ toward their ultimate 
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end of ‘doing good’.31 As mentioned, there might be multiple equally plausible 
courses of action resulting in the same good being realized. In other words, due 
to the inevitable complexities introduced by the changing conditions essential to 
utopian games, some moral choice and participation is required in principle, even 
for the most strictly conditioned of utopian moral agents. The virtuous agent in 
utopia will be consistently engaging in reliable processes (though perhaps not 
accessible to immediate introspection), which will act as reliable indicators of 
moral value: and this constant exertion of moral judgment will satisfy the effort 
argument mentioned in the previous section, as well as the autonomy argument 
currently under consideration. 
Thus, it appears as if the autonomy argument does not support the 
conclusion that virtue, predicated upon moral choice, is impossible in utopia. 
Virtue can be, and often is, conceived as more of an automatic response than a 
deliberate choice (even for those moral theorists who hold the concept of 
character to be central to their accounts of moral life). Furthermore, Suits’ utopia 
cannot altogether do away with the complexity that necessitates moral choice; 
nor can moral programming do more than give his utopians a rough orientation 
                                                          
31 There remains some possibility that perfect moral agents may tend to isolate themselves, or to 
place themselves in morally comfortable scenarios. We might find them buying real estate on the 
quiet side of town, for example, to avoid being unwillingly embroiled in some situations which 
would objectively demand their active moral intervention. That being said: if we picture a utopian 
world as nothing but a global conjunction of just such tranquil neighbourhoods, then perhaps the 
willful evasion of conflicts requiring moral responses is a non-issue. 
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toward a constantly shifting behavioural target as ‘doing good’. That is, knowing 
the right action to take in any given situation, and the means required to effect it, 
will differ from agent to agent, place to place, and time to time. Without Suits’ 
leaving some avenues of moral choice open to his utopians, they would never be 
capable of following through with their vague imperative to ‘always do the right 
thing’, or ‘always do good’. Lived experience generates too high a level of 
complexity to have conditioned directives be anything but open-ended, and thus 
(admittedly limited) autonomy would remain, even in the face of the most 
effective behavioural conditioning. For some theorists, however, simply behaving 
in a morally good way is not sufficient to be an instance of virtuous behaviour—
the virtuous agent must also want to be good, i.e. they must have the right set of 
desires to count as fully virtuous. 
  
3.4 The Desire Argument: Desireless Virtue Is Impossible 
Tony Milligan identifies desires as the motivating forces behind exercises 
of virtue (Milligan 2005). Doing the right thing is thought to flow naturally from 
wanting the right thing; recall that this is also discussed at length in Martha 
Nussbaum’s work, in Love’s Knowledge, wherein she emphasizes the importance 
of ‘educating the emotions’ towards virtuous ends (Nussbaum 1990). Milligan 
even allows for the possibility of impossible desires—wanting something that 
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could never be attained, such as “to be a tree, to be God, or undo the past”—the 
fact of which he uses to claim that desires do not simply collapse into dispositions 
to act, as there is no action that one could perform to bring an impossible desire 
closer to realization (Milligan 2005, p. 63). The utopian longing to ‘create’ more 
good people through founding an ideal society, however implausible the methods 
for accomplishing this seems, looks like a decent candidate for such an impossible 
desire, as well as one that could encourage us to behave virtuously. 
Ironically, however, utopia has been broadly criticized for endeavouring to 
kill or dilute desire, either through indoctrination or desire satiation. Kateb 
reports that “the utopian impulse has been, for the most part, to reduce as much 
as possible the tension between individual inclinations and social precept, to 
make it as easy as possible to be adequate to the requirements of virtue (as 
virtue is defined in the given utopian society)” (Kateb 1963, p. 157). In other 
words, in utopia “the discrepancy between what men want to do and what they 
ought to do is at the smallest conceivable” (Kateb 1963, p. 166, emphasis mine). 
Nevertheless, a general anti-desire trend in utopian thought need not result in a 
paradox or contradiction: desire is here being employed as a means to achieve a 
greater utopian end: the eradication of (potentially destabilizing) desire itself.32 
                                                          
32 This has traditionally been a central aim of stoicism, as well as various Eastern intellectual and 
spiritual movements, including Buddhism and neo-Confucianism. 
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Pre-utopian drives need not persist under realized utopian conditions—desire can 
be re-educated and channeled towards morally laudable ends. 
There are three ways to effect this correspondence of desire with moral 
duty: (1) to lessen what is expected of the utopian citizens, or to make the laws 
and customs as loose as possible, so that the full range of usual—and in some 
cases unusual—human appetites are given full vent (see, for example, the 
Marquis de Sade’s sexual utopia described in his La Philosophie dans le Boudoir as 
a good exemplar of this strategy) (Sade 2006 [1795], see Fifth Dialogue, 
"Frenchmen, Some More Effort if You Want to Become Republicans"); (2) to stifle 
desire, and thus vouchsafe stability via the employment of an ascetic ethos, social 
conditioning, eugenics, pharmaceuticals, or brain surgery; or (3) employ some 
admixture of the first two approaches. Most utopian schemes pursue some 
variation of the third option, making this category a rather heterogeneous one. 
But since our topic is not option (1), which is to say the subject of permissiveness 
in utopia, but rather the possibility and desirability of conditioned virtue, via the 
moderation or elimination of the natural passions, I will move to examine 
another possible argument against desire-stifling or desire-transforming option 
(2) utopians: 
 (1) Desires are the wellspring of both virtue and vice. 
(2) Utopia destroys or dilutes desires. 
Therefore (3) utopia destroys or dilutes both virtue and vice. 
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Paraphrasing John Stuart Mill (Mill 1977 [1859], from "On Liberty"), Kateb 
writes that “the passions are the source of all virtues; though in an ill-governed 
mind, the passions are, of course, the source of all vices… if you eliminate that 
which makes for vice you simultaneously eliminate that which makes for virtue. A 
lobotomy is the model for such a procedure” (Kateb 1963, 167, n. 31). Kateb’s 
suggestion, that the aim or function of utopia is to level down the human subject 
via a form of ‘desire lobotomy’ or moral handicapping in order to come to a static 
state of satiety, sounds frankly dystopian—it reads like Aldous Huxley’s 
description of embryonic and social conditioning of the Epsilon class in Brave New 
World (Huxley 2006 [1932])—and is quite at odds with our previous 
understanding of Suits’ utopia as levelling up its citizens via some type of moral 
doping to embrace and enjoy a better, more fulfilling life of gameplay. 
Thus, the desire argument against Suits, that his utopia destroys the 
conditions by which exhibitions of virtue and vice are made possible, through 
extinguishing human passions, does not hit its target. Suits, Skinner, Plato, and 
the other utopians under our current consideration, seek to educate rather than 
extinguish or radically diminish desires. There remains, however, a final and 
subtler argument against the possibility of utopian virtue left to consider—one 
that takes conceptual aim at any programme which aims to make virtue 
universal—namely, the homogeneity argument. 
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3.5 The Homogeneity Argument: Homogenous Virtue Is Impossible 
(1) Virtue is a quality that needs to be ‘salient’ (noticeable) in moral actions, in order to 
facilitate recognition and imitation (mimesis) by others. 
(2) Utopia creates (or enforces) homogeneity in moral actions (i.e., all utopians are 
perfectly virtuous). 
(3) If all moral actions in utopia are homogenous, then no moral action can be more 
salient than any other in utopia. 
Therefore, (4) virtue is not a quality that can be possessed in utopia. 
 
 Les us analyse the argument as it is stated: does virtue really need to be 
salient, as claimed in premise (1)? Briefly, yes. If we understand virtue as being 
exhibited through moral actions, it must be possible to practically identify those 
actions as either virtuous, non-virtuous, or vicious, if our account of virtue is to 
bear any relation to the real actions and behaviour of human beings—which is an 
obvious desideratum. Conversely, if ‘virtue’ cannot be discerned from within the 
set of extant moral actions, then the concept has no meaningful application. 
 Does, however, utopia truly require homogeneity in the moral actions of 
its citizens, as claimed in premise (2)? This strikes us as a more contentious claim. 
It does certainly seem that if moral agent A and moral agent B behave in exactly 
the same fashion, then ceteris paribus agent A will have little grounds on which to 
morally criticize (or praise) agent B, and vice versa. Such homogeneity neuters 
our practices of assigning praise and blame to moral agents, as in such a scenario 
we will lack the appropriate means for moral calibration. This seems to be 
undesirable kind of utopian homogeneity, on the face of it. 
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We can easily imagine tragicomic scenarios resulting from the 
aforementioned state of moral homogeny: picture several utopian moral agents 
jumping into a river to save a drowning baby simultaneously—because they are 
incapable of resisting their behavioural conditioning to help out—and knocking 
their heads together in the process, while the infant continues to drown. Utopia 
cannot reasonably demand this type of complete homogeneity of its moral 
agents: in the hypothetical case of the drowning baby, it would produce a much 
better moral outcome if some utopians hung back on the riverside, while one or 
two of the closest individuals jumped in to help. This kind of successful rescue 
effort would require only moderate social coordination, i.e., an intuitively 
appealing division of labour supplemented by the possession of a common ethos 
of assistance. What we want is homogeneity in the type of moral agents and 
moral actions: homogeneity in that they are all virtuous in type, though the 
content of virtuous actions may vary from case to case according to context. Our 
baby-rescuers could each exhibit different virtues in the same collaborative effort 
of rescue—courage, wisdom, prudence—all based on the physical positions they 
happened to occupy at the moment when the baby first fell in the river. Kateb 
reminds us that “the [utopian] aim must be to construct a society in which 
individuality flourishes, but within the limits of excellence… the wish is to have all 
men alike in that they are excellent, not to have all men excellent in the same 
way” (Kateb 1963, p. 225). So a diverse set of human excellences could 
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conceivably flourish, even in Suits’ utopia of perfected moral conditioning. Not 
every flower must bloom at once, nor every voice call out in unison—indeed, this 
is the very picture of a dystopia by modern standards. 
Neither would it be desirable from a utopian perspective to have uniform 
homogeneity in non-moral actions, e.g. homogeneity in timing. For example, we 
don’t want everyone in utopia to brush their teeth together at 8:00am, mop their 
floors at 9:00am, and do their shopping at 10:00am. Such a state of hyper-
regimentation, accompanied by a synchronization of activity, would be 
catastrophic from the point of view of social coordination—and elevate social 
unity at inordinate costs to other goods. Nor, however, could we have a state of 
no social coordination, i.e. no division of labour and no common ethos, a 
completely disorganized system wherein agents would be prone to 
(unintentionally, perhaps) frustrate each other’s attempts at virtuous actions. 
This would be a state of anarchy, not a utopia of perfect virtue.  
 Premise (3), however, that no moral action is more salient than any other 
in utopia, is clearly false, for the reasons given above. The homogeneity in moral 
behaviour we discussed was a homogeneity in type, not a homogeneity in the 
specific actions or the contexts in which they are performed. There will be certain 
actions performed at certain times, and these will have more salience than the 
same actions performed at other times, in other situations. If I sing well in choir 
practice, for example, it is all well and good, but perhaps it would be a more 
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salient action if I sang the same song solo, and in front of a concert hall.33 The 
notes and melody of my singing would be the same in both cases, but while my 
solo effort produced a standing ovation from the audience, my performance in 
the choir received only tepid applause. Perhaps another singer’s off-key 
squawking was more salient than my mellifluous baritone in our group recital on 
this occasion, tainting the overall reception. C’est la vie. And so it would go with 
instances of offering help when it was needed more in one instance than another 
(compare the value, say, of saving a drowning child over changing a flat tire for a 
troubled traveller): although all instances of offering help when it is needed might 
constitute a homogeneous moral type—all are instances of ‘helpful’ virtuous 
action—we are able to distinguish between these instantiations by dint of their 
differing moral ‘weight’ in the contexts in which they are expressed. 
 Thus the final argument against the possibility of virtue in Suits’ utopia, 
that virtue cannot be salient in a utopia wherein everyone is virtuous, is patently 
false. Homogeneity of type within a range of moral actions is no threat to their 
salience because discrete exhibitions of human behaviour, which can be observed 
and weighted against other moral actions of the same type, are exhibited in 
necessarily different contexts. Perhaps the relevant grounds for moral 
discernment or critique in utopia might be the time and place in which an action 
                                                          
33 To make this situation parallel with the problem of a fully-virtuous community: we might 
consider the possibility that every member of the audience can sing as well (or perhaps even 
better) than I can, but that they recognize that there is no need to do so during my recital. 
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was performed; e.g. the same action might have done more good if it were 
performed in a different place, or at a different time. 
 
3.6 Summary 
Suits’ utopia of perfect moral conditioning does not, therefore, necessarily 
preclude the expression of virtue, despite his affirmations to the contrary. 
Conditions of life in the post-instrumental techno-Cockaygne may lessen the 
scope for moral effort, autonomy, desire, and heterogeneity, but do not 
altogether extinguish these. Considering the role of virtue within this utopian 
context allows us to contemplate new avenues of instilling and stimulating virtue, 
e.g. realizing human capacities via utopian gameplay, as we will discuss in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 4: ‘The Alexandrian Condition’: Suits on Games, Boredom, 
and Utopia 
 
It is a commonplace that once a scientist or philosopher after great effort solves a major 
problem he is very let down, and far from rejoicing in the possession of his solution or 
discovery, he cannot wait to be engaged once more in the quest. Success is something to 
shoot at, not live with… We might call this state of affairs the Alexandrian condition of 
man, after Alexander the Great. When there are no more worlds to conquer we are filled 
not with satisfaction but despair (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 189). 
 
Bernard Suits posits that his utopians will experience the ‘Alexandrian 
condition’, finding life in a materially superabundant post-instrumental utopia to 
be necessarily existentially empty, because “when there are no more worlds to 
conquer we are filled not with satisfaction but despair” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
189). With no real obstacles to overcome—no more frontiers to push back or 
push against—he predicts that utopian life would have no structure or purpose. 
As he claims elsewhere that utopians trapped in a culture of material plenitude 
would “die—or go mad—from boredom” (Suits 1984b, p. 8), it appears that he is 
committed to this logical and anthropological premise about the nature of post-
instrumental existence. The ‘crisis of leisure’ represented by this Alexandrian 
condition motivates Suits’ overall conclusion that games are a necessary element 
of utopian life; that only “game playing makes it possible to retain enough effort 
in Utopia to make life worth living” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 189) and without them 
utopians would self-destruct. Games function here to alleviate the logically 
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inevitable existential boredom of utopia by giving utopians something meaningful 
to do, thereby pre-empting their self-destruction. 
In this chapter, I argue that the apparently exclusive choice between Suits’ 
utopia of gameplay and death by suicide is a false dilemma, one which obscures a 
‘third way’ of positive boredom, cashed out as psychic self-mastery. Further, I 
offer a deeper reading of the internal logic of Suits’ utopian vision, identifying 
two different temporal phases of his utopia. At time U1, just after the founding of 
Suits’ techno-Cockaygne, the Alexandrian condition affects ‘freshmen’ utopians 
by producing a state of existential meaninglessness and thereby conceivably 
motivating utopian suicide. At time U2, however, sufficient time will have passed 
for the surviving ‘sophomore’ utopians to adopt marvellous, meaning-generative 
utopian games as a tool for defeating the Alexandrian condition and realizing 
Suits ‘ideal of existence’ in a utopia of gameplay. 
 
4.1 The Dilemma of Gameplay or Suicide in Suits’ Utopia 
Suits asserts that if and when a techno-Cockaygne is established, his new 
utopians would initially suffer an extreme existential crisis arising from an 
inversion of their previous, instrumentally-oriented, values: despondency, 
depression, and even suicide are all live possibilities in his utopia—call this the 
utopian suicide thesis (Suits 1984b, p. 8). Utopians would thus be offered 
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“occupational methadone” in the form of allowing them to act out their former 
jobs, “to mitigate the withdrawal effects of too abrupt a deprivation of the opiate 
their work had always provided” (Suits 19--c, p. 94), until they are made ready for 
more advanced forms of amusement. Here Suits is toying with an inversion of 
Karl Marx’s analysis of religion as an “opium of the people” (Marx 1977 [1844], 
"Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction", p. 64) by 
designating work as the opiate of his utopians. Marx himself took a similar stance 
when he wrote that “in a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving 
subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the 
antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished… labour has 
become not only a means of life but life’s prime want” (Marx 1977 [1875], 
"Critique of the Gotha Programme", p. 569). 
I refer to play-working utopians (those using occupational methadone) as 
playing games-by-default, so called only because any activity would be 
considered a game by Suits’ definition as “the voluntary attempt to overcome 
unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 43) in the complete absence of 
instrumentally-compelled activity (i.e., every obstacle encountered in utopia, 
including work simulations, would be unnecessary, and voluntarily chosen). I 
contrast these with games-by-design, the utopian games specifically intended to 
fully and meaningfully engage their players by providing optimized opportunities 
for them to realize their capacities, those that Suits refers to as the “sports and 
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games unthought of today… that will require for their exploitation—that is, for 
their mastery and enjoyment—as much energy as is expended today in serving 
the institutions of scarcity” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). These games constitute 
‘scarcity machines’ in themselves: i.e., they have limitations of means built into 
them by definition, via their rulesets, which combat the potentially deleterious 
effects of superabundance (Suits 19--c, p. 111), and therefore can give meaning 
to utopian lives. 
I offer a reading of Suits that deflates an apparent contradiction between 
the two versions of ‘utopia’ that Suits seems committed to defending: the settled, 
harmonious utopia of gameplay, and the existentially bleak, suicide-inspiring 
utopia of ennui. There is a simple but meaningful distinction to be made between 
psychically disturbed freshmen utopians at time U1, in the unstable proto-utopia 
immediately after the techno-Cockaygne obtains, and psychically perfected (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 183) sophomore utopians at U2, in the stable utopia a sufficiently 
long period of time after the techno-Cockaygne obtains (see Table 1, below). If 
this distinction stands, then Suits avoids contradiction on this front, for he is 
implicitly discussing two different types of utopians—happy and unhappy—both 
cohabiting one and the same utopia, but at different times. However, this does 
not address the larger question of why Suits would think humans entering into a 
culture of plenitude would immediately contemplate self-annihilation. To explain 
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that apparent leap in logic, we need to discuss the background of leisure studies 
more generally. 
 
POINT IN HUMAN HISTORY KINDS OF GAMES THAT ARE PLAYED 
Present day 
 
Set of known games 
Immediately after techno-Cockaygne 
obtains, an unstable proto-utopia (U1) 
Set of known games + set of former 
work activities replayed as games + 
set of unknown games 
A sufficient period after the techno-
Cockaygne obtains, a stable utopia 
(U2) 
Set of unknown games 
 
Table 1: Interpretation of Suits’ implicit taxonomy of utopian games 
 
4.2 The Crisis of Leisure 
In the late 19th century, the ‘leisure class’ became concretized as a subject 
of sociological study in the work of Thorstein Veblen, who coined the familiar 
concepts of ‘conspicuous consumption’ and ‘conspicuous leisure’, recognizing 
these as distinctive hallmarks in the lifestyles of the elite (Veblen 2007 [1899]). 
Later, in the early 20th century, leisure became a broader cultural issue as the 
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wide-scale ‘technological unemployment’ presaged in the previous century came 
to provide the working classes with greater access to leisure opportunities than 
they were hitherto accustomed. This phenomenon become known as the 
‘problem of leisure’, popularized in the work of John Maynard Keynes:  
The economic problem, the struggle for subsistence, always has been hitherto the 
primary, most pressing problem of the human race… Thus we have been expressly 
evolved by nature—with all our impulses and deepest instincts—for the purpose of 
solving the economic problem. If the economic problem is solved, mankind will be 
deprived of its traditional purpose… must we not expect a general ‘nervous 
breakdown’?... for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his 
permanent problem—how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to 
occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him (Keynes 
2010 [1930], "Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren", pp. 327-328). 
 
The cultural upshot of technological unemployment is less hyperbolically parsed 
by an anonymous columnist for Nature: “As the machine lessens the volume of 
toil required from men and women, our social organization must be adapted to… 
a corresponding increase in the hours of leisure” (Anonymous 1937, p. 941). The 
problem of leisure is the first element that Suits selects for magnification in his 
utopia: by formulating a utopia wherein the rate of technological unemployment 
has reached 100%, he magnifies it into what I call a crisis of leisure—a culture 
shock caused by a sudden expansion of leisure time so great that, for many 
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utopians, death will (somehow) seem preferable to continued existence.34 This is 
one aspect of Suits’ Alexandrian condition. 
There is a profitable comparison which can be drawn between the crisis of 
leisure and the phenomenon of retirement. For some, retirement is a boon, a 
chance to tackle important projects of self-realization, and for others (without 
such projects, or with health or money worries) it is a curse, where boredom and 
a sense of meaninglessness pervade all activities. Indeed, some individuals who 
identify too fully with their work lives do not survive their own retirements. 
Similarly, in the techno-Cockaygne, the utopian population is retired en masse at 
U1, and “those who are able to learn and enjoy our games survive as happy 
Utopians... But those who cannot must… die out forever” (Suits 1984b, p. 24). 
Some utopians, in other words, are not expected to survive the transition from U1 
to U2. Suits clearly believes that without the adoption of meaningful gameplay, at 
least some inhabitants of his techno-Cockaygne would simply waste away or kill 
themselves. He anticipates, in other words, mass suicide and perhaps other 
potential forms of societal upheaval that would threaten his ideal world (such as 
                                                          
34 Suits actually magnifies all of these contemporary trends in his utopia: (1) his utopians have the 
fewest possible working hours per week [0 hours]; (2) live the longest possible lifespans [they are 
in perfect health, and conceivably have access to life-extending technologies] ; (3) have the greatest 
possible percentage of leisure time available to them [100%]; and (4) have access to limitless 
recreational technologies, including utopian “games so subtle, complex, and challenging that their 
inventors will be seen as the ludic Einsteins of the future” (Suits 1984b, p. 24). 
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rebellion), as soon as it was established.35 Indeed, he predicts that there may 
even be a counter-utopian force of ‘ludic luddites’ who would struggle toward 
“the elimination—or at least a massive withholding of—labour-saving devices” 
(Suits 1984b, p. 20) to prevent the occurrence of U1, or to reverse U2 entirely, “in 
order to escape the dreariness and despair of utopian gamerooms” (Suits 1984b, 
p. 21).  
Here we might want to concur with J.C. Davis that the thought-
experimental world that Suits describes, with its widespread self-destructiveness 
and predictable grounds for civil unrest, does not deserve the epithet ‘utopia’ 
(Davis 2003 [1981]). Davis, on the other hand, does seem to allow room for the 
possibility of limited existential despair and occasional suicide in his concept of 
Utopia as a sober installation of novel state apparatuses meant to promote the 
general good, built in line with established psychological and sociological facts 
and principles (Davis 2003 [1981], pp. 36-40). On the other hand, Cockaygne—
understood as perpetual collective satiety—seems to have less latitude for the 
negative emotions which would motivate suicide, in no small part because it has 
less of a connection to reality in toto—to the point that it is difficult to imagine 
                                                          
35 This partially motivates the duty to design, Suits’ exhortation that “It behoves us… to begin the 
immense work of devising these wonderful games now, for if we solve all of our problems of scarcity 
very soon, we may very well find ourselves with nothing to do when Utopia arrives” (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 194). For if we fail in this duty, the projected consequence for Suits is the annihilation of 
his utopia as soon as it obtains at U1. 
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human life under such conditions in the long term. Thus, by Davis’ lights, Suits 
may be right about the bare possibility (but not the projected scale) of utopian 
suicide, while still being wrong about his conception of utopia. 
Logically, if Utopia is an ‘ordered and perfect totality’ in Davis’ intended 
sense, it occupies the conceptual space as one of the best possible worlds, and in 
the best of all possible worlds, people generally do not want to do themselves in. 
If people did, that would speak against utopia being one of the best of all possible 
worlds, because then we could easily imagine a better possible world—namely, a 
world wherein people did not generally want to do themselves in—a world less 
miserable.36 And we would want to call that world ‘Utopia’ instead, as it would 
clearly be more deserving of the appellation. After all, suicide is typically 
understood as an expression of human misery, and if human misery has not been 
altogether extinguished in Utopia, then it should at least have been radically 
diminished, and along with it the presumptively reasonable grounds for killing 
oneself off. Reasonable grounds are thus lacking for asserting the speculative 
phenomenon of widespread Utopian suicide. However, to put the ball back in 
                                                          
36 If utopia is built by humans for humans, it will bear the imperfections of humanity, and its 
institutions will have to account for these flaws. Thus, misery may well yet persist in some 
widespread form in utopia, and therefore logical and intuitive grounds for utopian suicide in the 
individual case might not be lacking. But the utopian precondition of perfect moral conditioning 
and unfailing psychological health might nevertheless be reasonably interpreted as precluding any 
suicidal impulses. 
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Suits’ court, we must also discuss whether or not there are reasonable grounds 
for the speculative phenomenon of widespread Cockaygnian suicide. 
The concept of the techno-Cockaygne, with its perpetually sated and 
entertained patrons, might once again conjure up images of Robert Nozick’s 
experience machine. Recall that in Nozick’s thought experiment, satiety of desires 
comes at a regrettable cost of knowledge about the world: users of his 
experience machine are offered an endless string of any experiences they desire 
(without knowing they are in the machine) at the cost of being reduced to the 
status of a ‘brain in a vat’ with no interaction with, and therefore no true beliefs 
about, the world as it actually is (Nozick 2013 [1974], pp. 42-45). Suits, however, 
holds that we can simultaneously have all the knowledge that there is (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 186) while still satisfying all the needs and wants there are. The 
constant glutting of lower pleasures need not separate us from knowledge or 
experience of the higher reality in Suits’ utopia. Although we may agree with J.S. 
Mill that it is “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill 1961 
[1863], p. 410), it is better again to be a Socrates satisfied. And if the life of a 
satisfied Socrates is possible in utopia, then where does the spectre of 
Cockaygnian suicide in U1 draw its apparent force from? 
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4.3 Existential Boredom 
To address this question, we must consider another aspect of the 
Alexandrian condition: the phenomenon of existential boredom. Suits magnifies 
boredom from a condition we occasionally experience to a state that utopians 
would indefinitely endure. Boredom, writ large, would be the baseline condition 
of the denizens of Suits’ techno-Cockaygne, as robotic servants would materially 
provision both their essential needs and excessive desires. Suits reminds us that 
in his utopia, “there are so many goods being produced so abundantly that even 
the most acquisitive cravings… are instantly satisfied… yachts, diamonds, racing 
cars, symphonic performances, mansions, and trips around the world are as 
easily plucked from the environment as breadfruit is in Tahiti” (Suits 2014 [1978], 
p. 183). Due to this same thought-experimental wish-fulfilling technology, 
immortality for humans appears to be conceptually possible—at the very least, 
living forever is a desire that one could conceivably have and which the 
machinery might mysteriously grant (if physics does indeed go on holiday in Suits’ 
utopia, as it seems to; he himself is silent on whether or not immortality is 
possible and whether his utopians are truly omnipotent or omniscient)37—thus 
                                                          
37 Suits claims that “nothing in my account of Utopia requires individual omniscience”, though he 
permits us to “suppose that the Utopians have the kind of omniscience that includes mental 
telepathy, which could indeed make impossible the playing of most games” (Suits 19--b, pp. 24-
25, emphases mine). If Suits’ utopians are truly omniscient—having “acquired all the knowledge 
there is”(Suits 2014 [1978], p. 186)—then, paradoxically, utopians cannot enjoy games as games, 
for ‘all knowledge’ presumably includes knowledge of the future; which includes the outcome of 
all future games. Games of chance can be parsed as deterministic if one precisely understands 
how the laws of physics decide what face a die will fall on, or exactly how the mathematics 
behind a computer algorithm will generate supposedly ‘random’ digits. Games of skill can also be 
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the scale of the problem is potentially magnified. Humanity’s condition of 
universal, meaningless, and boring retirement could conceivably last indefinitely. 
This extreme case raises the most doubt as to whether or not “wonderful games” 
on their own would be enough to dispel Suits’ predicted utopian malaise (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 194).38 For it is not at all clear whether games can actually 
function in the role that Suits posits for them, as inexhaustible generators of 
existential meaning and defeaters of boredom capable of transforming freshmen 
utopians into sophomore utopians, or whether he has estimated their value out 
of all proportion.39 With this projected homogeneity of utopian lusory 
                                                          
parsed as predetermined if the exact skill levels of all competitors and the particular moves they 
will make are accurately known in advance of a contest. It is a distinctive feature of a game for 
Suits that “the outcome is not known beforehand”—this is, for Suits, what separates a game from 
a performance or scripted undertaking (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 97-98)—he would hold that a game 
with a known outcome is no game at all. The only way out of this conclusion is either to 
(somehow) argue that knowledge of the future is not perfectly inferable from having perfect 
knowledge of everything in the present and the past, or to impose some limitation on utopian 
powers. Suits attempts to achieve this latter aim via the following injunction: “all the telepathic 
players need do is refrain from exercising that particular talent (that is, they, like any game player, 
will confine themselves to lusory means) in order to play games which require concealment or 
deception” (Suits 19--b, p. 25). I am indebted to Uku Tooming for initially bringing this point to my 
attention during my 2018 presentation to the Canadian Philosophical Association. 
 
38 Suits’ 100% efficient, telepathically-controlled supercomputers would be the most effective 
suicide machines ever invented, if indeed the perfect programme of psychological conditioning 
outlined for his utopians (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 183) would actually allow them enough latitude of 
desire to crave death in the face of unremitting existential boredom. 
 
39 Thomas Hurka criticizes Suits on precisely this point: that Suits “argues for the strong thesis that 
playing games is not just an intrinsic good but the supreme such good, since in the ideal conditions 
of utopia, where all instrumental goods are provided, it would be everyone’s primary pursuit.” 
Hurka, by contrast, favours “the weaker thesis that playing games is one intrinsic good” among 
many (Hurka 2006, p. 220). 
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experience, we might legitimately worry, with Shelly Kagan, that “game playing is 
not a rich enough diet to make life in Utopia worth living” (Kagan 2009, p. 393). 
However, by adopting a more nuanced view of boredom than Suits offers, 
the existential crisis it is thought to motivate appears far less plausible. In Lars 
Svendsen’s A Philosophy of Boredom, we find his description of Martin 
Doehlemann’s typology of boredom (Svendsen 2008, pp. 41-42) which covers 
four separate species, one of which—‘existential boredom’—overlaps with Suits’ 
utopian schema, “where the soul is without content and the world is neutral” 
(Svendsen 2008, p. 42). Another, ‘boredom of satiety’, roughly translates to being 
tired of getting what you want, and therefore is also possibly descriptive of life 
under conditions of the techno-Cockaygne. Suits interchangeably conflates these 
two senses of the term, though Doehlemann holds them to be 
phenomenologically distinct. ‘Situative boredom’ is transitory and so less 
worrisome—it is tokened by the feeling of being stuck on a train when one would 
rather be elsewhere—and is easily defeated by changing one’s contingent 
location or activity. Finally, ‘creative boredom’ can actually have positive 
outcomes (despite being unpleasant to experience) in that it compels its subjects 
to engage in novel strategies and techniques for overcoming it. It is in this sense, 
perhaps, that Suits suggests “boredom is the mother of play” (Suits 1988a, p. 5). 
None of these varieties of boredom appear to logically require the people 
suffering from them to contemplate or commit the act of suicide; but neither do 
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any of them offer the possibility of reframing the experience of boredom into 
something experienced as good in itself (as opposed to being merely 
instrumental in producing desirable outcomes). That is to say, none of the items 
in Doehlemann’s typology allow for the possibility of experiencing ‘positive 
boredom’: say, tranquillity as opposed to restlessness; acceptance, as opposed to 
dissatisfaction. 
An analogue to the positive boredom I propose as an addition to 
Doehlemann’s typology may appear in Suits’ schema as the possibility of 
achieving ‘nirvana’ (Suits 19--c, p. 45). Here too, the “soul is without content and 
the world is neutral” (Svendsen 2008, p. 42), though the result is not distress, but 
peaceful acceptance. Such a state serves as anodyne for both worries 
surrounding death, and also the odd dissatisfaction that Suits predicts would 
occur to humans upon attaining a utopia of material superabundance. There is a 
certain peaceful, contented attitude towards existence that is presumably 
possible, and it doesn’t require the agonistic mechanics of competitive gaming to 
achieve. In fact, the busywork of ever-increasing intellectual challenges that Suits 
proposes as utopian entertainments would likely preclude such tranquil nirvanic 
achievement. A durable base for utopian happiness, ironically, might not rest 
exclusively in gameplay after all, but in somehow achieving and sustaining a state 
of psychic self-mastery. But on Suitsian grounds, it should still be argued that it is 
active gameplay, and not a passive state of tranquility, that best expresses the 
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ideal of human existence—for games purportedly constitute meaning-generative 
life projects in a manner that merely experiencing a state of positive boredom 
(or, for that matter, taking an anti-boredom pill or having a surgical boredom-
ectomy) cannot. 
 
4.4 Games as Meaning-Generative Life Projects 
Suits proposes that life projects are a meaning-generative technology, and 
negatively caricatures death as the interrupter of these life projects (Suits 19--c, 
p. 43). He considers various possible strategies for beating death (qua interrupter 
of projects), the most promising of which is by viewing life as a timed game 
wherein the timer is hidden from all players, in the fashion of musical chairs. 
Once one has achieved something—like finding a seat in musical chairs—it can no 
longer be interrupted, as the achievement has reached a state of completion by 
the moment the timer has sounded40 (Suits 19--c, p. 46). If my life’s purpose is to 
publish a book, for example, and if that book has been published, then that 
achievement is in a certain sense death-proof, though my mortal body may not 
be. He also argues that achieving certain mental states, such as nirvana, may 
                                                          
 
40 Achievements are in this sense temporally transcendent, and on this ground intralusory 
achievements constitute Suits’ best bet at salvaging his thesis of utopian gameplay as being the 
ideal of existence. 
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defeat interruption by death, in the sense that static states of consciousness are 
not interruptible in the manner that physical processes or progressions of mental 
states are (Suits 19--c, p. 45). Finally, he argues that viewing life as a timed game 
is a way to take agency over its termination, for “if a game is a thing which 
necessarily ends, then by intending to play… I would necessarily intend it to end” 
(Suits 19--b, p. 183). By bringing our intentions and expectations in line with the 
occurrence of death, accepting it as a necessary condition of the game of life, “if I 
play the game to its end, then—win, lose, or draw—death is no interruption” 
(Suits 19--b, p. 187). So, for Suits, life projects can be games, and in fact a life 
could be nothing but a game, and that game could still be meaningful. This theme 
is carried over from his earliest published articles (Suits 1967a), and has been 
revived by recent commentators (Kolers 2015). 
In contrast, Bernard Williams argues that if character is stable and a 
lifespan is infinite, then immortality produces a meaningless existence because 
boringly repetitive experience is inevitable for static characters (Williams 1973, 
Chapter 6). And if character is not static, then we shouldn’t care about 
immortality because it’s not ‘us’ who are immortal but a series of successor 
characters who are importantly ‘other’—i.e., their set of projects will not be 
identical with our own, and so our lives would be interrupted in a fashion not 
unlike the occurrence of death, although our bodies would physically persist. 
Sophie-Grace Chappell best sums up this position in the following neat 
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reformulation: “Briefly: if [the immortal agent]’s life remains hers it goes round in 
circles; if it doesn’t go round in circles it ceases to be hers” (Chappell 2007, p. 38). 
Williams’ theory has direct relevance to projections of life in Suits’ techno-
Cockaygne, as it seems that there one could order ‘immortality’ from the wish-
granting supercomputers as easily as one could a three-course meal. 
This reveals a potential theoretical inconsistency in Suits’ schema. For if 
immortality is a live option in his techno-Cockaygne (and if we take his word that 
utopian supercomputers really can deliver on any desire utopians can conceivably 
have, then we have good reason to believe that immortality is a deliverable 
good), then death is not a necessary condition of utopian life, and therefore 
death-qua-interrupter of projects cannot be defeated by viewing life as a timed 
game: the timer never sounds. In other words, in utopia we cannot lean on 
mortality as a natural endpoint for our game-lives, to provide them with structure 
and meaning, which leaves Suits open to Williams’ objection that “immortality, or 
a state without death, would be meaningless… death gives the meaning to life” 
(Williams 1973, p. 82). For even though we might view death as being trivially 
‘defeated’ by the invention of immortality, the question of existential meaning 
for human lives under conditions of immortality remains.41 
                                                          
41 It is very odd, if not a contradiction in terms, to speak of ‘immortal human beings’, or indeed 
‘post-instrumental human beings’. This may give us some grounds for us to suspect that it may be 
a successor species, and not our own, which would be able to successfully inhabit a Suitsian utopia. 
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As a possible defence against concerns such as Williams’, we might raise 
Suits’ own example of ‘open games’—“games which have no inherent goal whose 
achievement ends the game” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 143)—which nonetheless 
seem to function to meaningfully structure human experience. Open games 
might be invoked as a means by which a meaningful existence under conditions 
of immortality could be made possible (though Suits himself does not make this 
move). Games of make-believe with no win conditions, but with the lusory goal of 
continuing the activity for as long as possible, would seem to qualify as 
meaningful activities which require no end-point; as would simple cooperative 
games such as hacky sack in which players succeed or fail as a group, no scores 
are kept, and iterations can be rapidly effected if desired. Moreover, such games 
seem ideally suited to utopian entertainment, since “open games appear to be 
essentially co-operative enterprises” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 149) and thus are a 
better fit with Suit’s claim that “the culture of utopia will be based on 
plenitude”42 (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194)—for competitive behaviour can only be 
rational under conditions of scarcity, and his utopia eliminates all varieties of 
scarcity, even that scarcity of time we recognize as a the condition of mortality. 
                                                          
Indeed, there may be insufficient overlap between the experiences of such hypothetical entities 
and our own for us to relate to the contents of their consciousnesses, or adequately assess the 
biological gap which must obtain in order for utopians to achieve immortality. 
42 By comparison, “our own culture is based on scarcity” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194) and is thus 
“more inclined to emphasize closed games” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 149) which are typically 
competitive. 
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More directly Chappell, contra Williams, rejects the idea that an immortal 
life would necessarily be a boring one, claiming that “only a person who has 
worthwhile projects can be justifiably bored by anything: if A is justifiably bored 
with X, then there is some Y with which A is, justifiably, not bored” (Chappell 
2007, p. 41). Justified boredom is subjective, relational, and contrastive on 
Chappell’s account, not objective, agent-neutral, and absolute. Thus, on this view, 
meaningful existences can obtain for immortal entities, and in some cases 
immortal entities will find it easier to have meaningful existences than mortals, 
since their projects are never in danger of interruption (though, we might object, 
they are also under no deadline pressure to complete their projects either). 
Chappell’s position has interesting implications for Suits’ account, which we will 
now explore. 
Suits’ chief existential concern arises from his utopians being bored, from 
having ‘nothing they must do’.43 But even in the absence of instrumental 
concerns, there is always a host of ‘things that can be done’. Those things are 
games, for Suits: but none of them on their own would be guaranteed to stave 
                                                          
43 As Scott Kretchmar notes, more generally: “The Grasshopper is fundamentally about boredom 
and how we might best cope with it” (Kretchmar 2008, p. 152). Kretchmar correctly identifies the 
concept of ‘occupational methadone’ or ‘games-by-default’ when he writes that Suit is primarily 
interested in “a particular species of games—one that, in effect, provides a substitute for work” 
(Kretchmar 2008, p. 152). My schema builds on his, however, in that I posit that Suits’ ultimate 
aim is to replace these play-working games-by-default, needed at time U1 to help overcome the 
Alexandrian condition, with games-by-design—truly utopian games that go beyond mere labor-
surrogates and express the ideal of human existence—at time U2. 
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off boredom for all utopians—this is only logically necessary of the set of all 
utopian games. The defeat of boredom is their holistic purpose. But, as Chappell 
might argue, the phenomenon of utopians being bored with the particular games 
they contingently happen to be playing need not concern Suits, as it would only 
be certain individuals in that case, not all utopians, who would experience 
justified boredom at any given time; a general existential crisis in a utopia of 
gameplay is thus highly unlikely. Moreover, since boredom is taken to be 
essentially contrastive by Chappell, all bored individuals would necessarily have 
found sufficient sources of interest (i.e., projects) outside of certain games to 
existentially preserve themselves (even if those projects were necessarily 
contained within other games, or in training certain capacities in preparation for 
gameplay, or in archiving utopian activities in the form of writing tournament 
reports and the like).44 Profound misery, not incidental boredom, seems to 
provide stronger justification for predicting suicidal behaviour—and we would, as 
noted, not expect to find such a profound level of misery in a techno-Cockaygne. 
Games may therefore plausibly serve as a sufficient existential balm for enough 
utopians to defeat any assertion of universal misery. 
                                                          
44 Interestingly, Suits holds that utopia is “the end of history itself, and with it the end of the 
future”; as such, the only occurrences of note would be “games won and lost, records achieved 
and broken, and the endless collection of such things as batting and earned run averages” (Suits 
19--c, p. 117). Nevertheless, this does not mean that being a utopian archivist of records and 
statistics might not be a meaning-generative activity, or at least an activity that forms part of a 
holistically meaningful life. 
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Suits’ existential thesis that the institution of gameplay will be enough to 
make life worth living for his utopians runs counter to Albert Camus’ 
metaphilosophical position on the subject. Camus asserts that “judging whether 
life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of 
philosophy,” and that “all the rest… are games” in a pejorative sense (Camus 
1955, p. 3). For Suits, the ‘fundamental question’ of existence facing his utopians 
dissolves in the flow of gameplay (that is the purpose of games in his utopia, 
including the utopian game of ‘philosophy’), while for Camus such activities 
merely obfuscate a deadly serious line of inquiry (for non-gamified philosophy). 
Their existential concerns, however, rest on similar grounds and have similar 
stakes: they both take the attraction of suicide, when put face-to-face with the 
inescapable absurdity of the human condition, seriously. Nevertheless, the 
solutions they offer to the existential problem are, in an important sense, 
diametrically opposed. For Camus, the resolution lies in the celebration of revolt, 
and in the embrace of freedom and the passions (Camus 1955, p. 47); for Suits it 
is in the submission to constitutive rules, and the willing adoption of the lusory 
attitude with regard to cerebral exertion. Suits’ reply to the existential challenge 
is intellectual, whereas for Camus it is emotional. 
We might reasonably attempt a synthesis of these two positions, as both 
intellectual projects and emotional commitments contribute meaning to life in 
the world as we currently find it. But if instrumentality is completely removed 
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from the picture, as it is in Suits’ utopia, then emotional commitments appear to 
be off the table. For “if love and friendship could exist in Utopia, they would have 
to be… extremely attenuated forms” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 187) due to the lack of 
anything of consequence occurring—in fact, Suits claims that all emotional 
content is liable to disappear in the techno-Cockaygne, including “aspirations and 
frustrations, hopes and fears, triumphs and tragedies… joy and sorrow” (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 185). Intellectual projects, on the other hand, could not exist 
outside the realm of the lusory—that is their only sphere of potential application 
in Suits’ utopia—and if these were not incorporated with the appropriate zeal 
into the pursuit of some game’s prelusory goal, they would constitute trifling 
(one of the few possible utopian crimes) on his account (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 50). 
From such a perspective, utopian life threatens again to be existentially 
meaningless on both emotional and intellectual bases. 
To avoid this repugnant conclusion, Suits gives everything back in the final 
act. For with the installation of games-by-default and games-by-design in Suits’ 
utopia at U1:  
both admiration and sharing are again possible, and so love and friendship as well. And 
with the re-introduction of the emotions associated with striving—the joy of victory, you 
know, and the bitterness of defeat—emotional content is provided for art. And perhaps 
morality will also be present, possibly in the form of what we now call sportsmanship 
(Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 193-194). 
 
140 
 
If utopian life is nothing more than “in fact nothing but a series—indeed, a 
network—of interlocking games” (Suits 1984b, p. 19), then Suits can reasonably 
expect that those games would be imbued with the same degree of serious 
intensity, and thus meaning, as in our non-lusory lives in the present. 
 
4.5 Summary 
I have identified two main components of what I call the Alexandrian 
condition in Suits’ utopia: the crisis of leisure, and existential boredom. The crisis 
of leisure is a scaling up of the cultural concerns first raised by the phenomenon 
of technological unemployment and the possibility of life without work. 
Existential boredom is the extreme magnification of the phenomenon of 
boredom as we experience it today, spread across the class of all U1 (freshman) 
utopians, and made all the worse by the conceptual possibility of utopian 
immortality. 
Suits’ reasoning for the utopian suicide thesis can be summarized in the 
following formulation:  
P1) In the techno-Cockaygne, there is material superabundance (no material scarcity). 
 
P2) Without material scarcity, there can be no sufficiently meaningful activity for utopian 
agents which renders their continued existence worthwhile. 
 
P3) Without such sufficiently meaningful activity, utopian agents will commit suicide or 
go mad. 
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Therefore: 
C1) Utopian agents trapped in the techno-Cockaygne will commit suicide or go mad. 
 
In introducing a novel terminology which distinguishes U1 from U2 
(sophomore) utopians in Suits’ schema, I have shown (counter P2) that the 
utopian suicide thesis is only a concern for U1 utopians—U2 utopians are those 
who survive the transition from an unstable proto-utopia to a stable utopia; from 
the ‘occupational methadone’ of games-by-default to the ‘wonderful’ games-by-
design that are unique to utopia. The crisis of leisure is easy to overcome for U2 
utopians, who are able to identify meaning-generative life projects in the games 
they play. Moreover, I have deflated the false dilemma (counter C1) between a 
utopia of gameplay and suicide from boredom which Suits proposes, by showing 
that (counter P3) on most accounts boredom alone does not motivate suicide; 
that positive boredom is a live and unexplored theoretical alternative, and thus 
that there therefore may be more to do in utopia than simply play games, for 
example, achieve and maintain a state of psychic self-mastery. 
I have also examined Suits’ positive utopian thesis: 
P4) Games are the only tool with the capacity for artificially manufacturing artificial non-
material scarcities in a predictable manner within the techno-Cockaygne, without 
threatening its material basis of superabundance (i.e., with no decrease in plenitude). 
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P5) With the artificial non-material scarcity introduced by games, there can be 
existentially meaningful activity for utopian agents despite material superabundance. 
P6) With existentially meaningful activity available to utopian agents, they may flourish 
in the techno-Cockaygne. 
Therefore: 
C2) Utopian agents trapped in the techno-Cockaygne may achieve human flourishing 
through the playing the games. 
 
I have shown that (C1) and (C2) create an apparent contradiction when 
taken together, which can be resolved when my distinction between the two 
temporal phases of utopia at U1 and U2 is taken into account. (C2) is therefore 
promising, which means that reasonable grounds for suicide are lacking in the 
techno-Cockaygne of U2. 
Suits writes that “Alexander the Great… had run out of worlds to conquer 
by impetuously conquering the only world there was, [but] he could have given it 
all back and started over again, just as one divides up the chess pieces equally 
after each game in order to play another game” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 192). The 
Alexandrian condition is defeated in Suits’ utopia by precisely this method: each 
game is considered a world unto itself to explore; some will invite conquering; 
some will invite sharing; all will be restored to their original board states for 
potential replay when each session of gameplay is concluded. We reset the 
utopian gameboards, and thereby overcome the spectres of existential boredom 
143 
 
and the crisis of leisure, to arrive at Suits’ ideal of existence: a flourishing life of 
meaningful gameplay. 
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Chapter 5: ‘Endless and Endlessly Boring Summer’: Suits’ Utopian 
Games Are Unknown and Unknowable 
 
It behoves us… to begin the immense work of devising these wonderful games now, for if 
we solve all of our problems of scarcity very soon, we may well find ourselves with 
nothing to do when Utopia arrives… we should begin to store up games—very much like 
food for winter—against the possibility of an endless and endlessly boring summer… 
their serious cultivation now is perhaps our only salvation. That, if you like, is the 
metaphysics of leisure time (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). 
 
In this chapter, I argue that in the absence of a suitably robust account of 
utopian games we have good reason to reject Bernard Suits’ utopian thesis that 
game-playing is the ideal of human existence. Suits himself does not give such an 
account of utopian games; thus, we must either give an account on his behalf, or 
reject the utopian thesis. But the set of utopian games is unknown and 
unknowable, hidden from our view behind an unbridgeable cultural gap between 
here and utopia. So Suits simply helps himself to the premise that there exists 
some possible set of games-by-design in his utopia, such that the playing of (a 
sufficient number of) its members would sustain an existentially meaningful 
existence for his utopians, in the event of a hypo-instrumental culture of material 
superabundance obtaining. I conclude that any implications of Suits’ utopian 
vision for the utilization of our leisure time in the present are vitiated by the 
collapse of his normative ideal: his ‘metaphysics of leisure’ misses its mark. 
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5.1 Suits’ Utopian Games and their Relation to Contemporary Games  
The post-instrumental techno-Cockaygne that Suits details at the end of 
his groundbreaking contribution to the philosophy of sport, The Grasshopper: 
Games, Life, and Utopia, raises important philosophical questions about the ideal 
utilization of leisure time. For instance, given the parameters that Suits has 
stipulated for his utopia—that the social sciences have perfected the human 
psyche (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 183); that telepathically-controlled machines can 
grant any material wishes one might have (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 182-183); that 
games are the sine qua non of utopian life (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194), and not 
some other intrinsically-valued pursuit—what kinds of games will his utopians be 
likely to play? Alternately, what types of games will be impossible or forbidden 
for them to play? And why? 
These questions about utopian games go unanswered in the text, at least 
in part due to a tension generated by Suits’ claims about contemporary games. 
On the one hand, Suits advises us that “the games we play in our non-Utopian 
lives are intimations of things to come… They are clues to the future” (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 194), and on the other that we have a quasi-urgent duty to design: “to 
begin the immense work of devising these wonderful [utopian] games now, for if 
we solve all of our problems of scarcity very soon, we may very well find 
ourselves with nothing to do when Utopia arrives” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). 
Though these clues are unspecified, and the duty to design seems dubious at 
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best, Suits’ utopian vision presumably relates to our current recreational 
practices in two important ways: it exposes the relative crudity of our present 
ludic entertainments when compared to those of the possible future and, 
perhaps in part due to this, it recommends that our free time is better spent 
designing and developing new games than indulging in traditional ones. Suits 
therefore exhorts us to play less now, so that his utopians can play more later. 
Leaving aside the contentious issues of intergenerational justice and 
possible duties to future persons (of varying degrees of likelihood—utopians 
being the least likely of possible future persons), the causal link that Suits posits 
between the games of the present and the games of the future calls for closer 
scrutiny. The form and content of these “sports and games unthought of today” 
(Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194) are left largely to the reader’s speculation, other than 
Suits’ assertion that pre-utopians are somehow capable of designing games for 
utopians by using relatively crude extant games as source materials or 
inspiration: call this the clue model, after the wording in Suits’ quotation above. 
The unresolved tension of the clue model is that our current games are 
apparently so bad as to not be worth playing in utopia, and yet paradoxically so 
good that they can be used as a platform for designing future utopian 
entertainments. 
I argue that there is no link vis-à-vis game design between utopian 
entertainments and our own, no road from here to there for creatures such as us. 
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The lives of Suits’ utopians are so alien from extant forms of human experience 
and social organization that the task of designing games for them is impossible. 
His clue model is thus a dead end, because we are incapable of designing, or even 
describing, utopian games. If I am correct, then Suits’ assertion that game-playing 
is of ultimate value in human life—that it constitutes an essential part of the 
“ideal of existence” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182)—comes under threat, because his 
utopia (the ultimate logical expression of that ideal) is inchoate. 
 
5.2 Suits’ Reticence Regarding Utopian Games 
Despite the warm critical reception for The Grasshopper, and the many 
opportunities Suits had to return to its main themes subsequent to its 
publication, he never took any occasion to explicitly describe the types of games 
his utopians will play in his projection of the “endless and endlessly boring 
summer” of post-instrumentality (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). But the importance 
of describing utopian games for Suits seems undeniable. Such a description would 
illustrate and help ground his claim that “game playing makes it possible to retain 
enough effort in Utopia to make life worth living” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 189). 
Conversely, without a concrete example to offer, Suits could be accused of 
assuming precisely what he needs to prove: i.e., that there is a set of games such 
that the playing of a sufficient number of them would preserve existential 
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meaning in a post-instrumental world (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 189). Call this the 
problem of reticence. 
Thus, describing utopian games in greater detail was a crucial task for 
Suits’ project, and one that deserved his careful attention. The closest he comes 
to doing so, however, is in a short passage wherein he acknowledges that under 
conditions of post-instrumentality, activities that were once chiefly valued 
instrumentally could be ‘replayed’ solely for their intrinsic merits. His incomplete 
manifest of utopian games reads like a list of contemporary chores or vocations: 
utopians can play “fix the kitchen sink” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 190); “building the 
house” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 191), ‘do scientific research’ (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
192), and even “philosophy”45 (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 193). What makes all of 
these disparate activities ‘games’ for Suits is simply the fact that the 
telepathically-controlled machinery which enables his techno-Cockaygne could 
produce the end results of these processes instantly if desired, and so they are 
only being ‘played through’ because they are intrinsically valued by their 
‘players’. These activities are games-by-default—because everything in a utopia is 
                                                          
45 However, claiming that there are epistemic conditions for determining philosophical 
‘completion’ seems very odd indeed. How do we know, with an activity such as philosophy, when 
the game is over? What are the win conditions? Surely they are not as unambiguous or 
uncontroversial as those of fixing a sink or building a house. Perhaps ‘winning at philosophy’ 
means knowing all there is that can be known, including the knowledge that all that could be 
known is known in fact. The seeming impossibility of attaining such knowledge is a side issue for 
Suits which is not addressed here. 
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a ‘game’, in Suits’ intended sense of being voluntarily-pursued non-instrumental 
goal-driven processes—they are not games-by-design. 
Importantly, Suits must have found these games-by-default to be 
insufficiently entertaining for his utopians, otherwise the threat of having 
“nothing to do when Utopia arrives” would not motivate the quasi-urgent duty 
he formulates “to begin the immense work of devising these wonderful games 
now” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). Therefore, not all utopian games could simply 
consist of the chores of today, stripped of their necessity. Otherwise ‘fix the sink’ 
and its ilk would do the trick of diffusing utopian existential angst and idleness on 
their own, and there would be no pre-utopian game design obligation to fulfil. 
The uniquely utopian games, the philosophically interesting ones which Suits 
claims will be efficacious in staving off boredom, must be of another genre 
altogether, in which designer intention is key. 
So why didn’t Suits tell us more about the unique games-by-design his 
utopians would play, instead of dodging the issue with a misdirection—the claim 
that every possible utopian activity can be construed as a game-by-default?46 And 
                                                          
46 The closest Suits comes to committing to a description of utopian games-by-design is a vague 
claim in his “Games and Utopia: Posthumous Reflections” to the effect that utopians will play 
“really magnificent games—games so subtle, complex, and challenging that their inventors will be 
seen as the ludic Einsteins of the future” (Suits 1984b, p. 24). This hand-waving is, unfortunately, 
no more informative than its precursor passage in The Grasshopper wherein he invokes an image 
of “wonderful games”… “games that will require for their exploitation—that is, for their mastery 
and enjoyment—as much energy as is expended today in serving the institutions of scarcity” 
(Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). 
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what does this explanatory lacuna signify for the logic of his argument? We are 
nudged toward the position that Suits believed that he couldn’t describe the 
kinds of games that utopians would enjoy in a philosophically satisfying fashion. 
His reticence on the nature of utopian games is best explained by the presumed 
epistemic inaccessibility of his subject. But if uniquely utopian games are 
inchoate, then his concept of utopia, which consists of an endless series of such 
games being played, is infinitely more so. Perhaps in acknowledgement of this, it 
would appear that Suits took the advice of his erstwhile theoretical foil, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” 
(Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §7). 
Alternatively, perhaps Suits was strategically exploiting a well-established 
utopian rationale for omitting details of the desired future society. As Robert 
Nozick points out, “No person or group I (or you) know of could come with an 
adequate ‘blueprint’ (much less be trusted to do so for a society of beings as 
complex personally and interpersonally as they themselves are… In view of this, it 
is strategically shrewd of groups who wish totally to remake all of society 
according to one pattern to eschew stating that pattern in detail and to keep us 
in the dark about how things will work after their change” (Nozick 2013 [1974], p. 
313 footnote). Thus, some degree of reticence, or at least an intentional omission 
of key details, may be required in order for a utopian vision to be sufficiently 
compelling to its target audience, who might otherwise be repelled by some 
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incidental detail in its description. I call this a pig-in-a-poke utopia, wherein 
would-be utopians are asked to subscribe to a vision of an ideal society without 
full cognizance of its overall constitution or societal implications, as opposed to a 
blueprint utopia, wherein each significant feature is adquately described and 
rationally defended (or is at least rationally defensible) to its prospective 
adherents. 
Suits’ reticence cannot, however, be entirely attributed to pig-in-a-poke 
utopianism. For Suits does not claim that utopians play unknown games simply 
because playing unknown games is the best thing they could be doing. In fact, he 
takes great pains to insulate his utopia from charges of normativity in the 
following passage: “The Utopia I envisage is not a state of affairs that is ideally 
desirable, it is simply a state of affairs that is logically inevitable” (Suits 1984b, p. 
15). This is because the aim of all work is its own extinction—it is “self-defeating 
in principle” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 10). Accordingly, games are (descriptively) the 
only remaining candidate for human activity in a utopia where the need to 
engage in purely instrumental activity has been eliminated. As Suits plainly puts 
it, “we work so that we won’t have to work; nothing else makes any sense to me” 
(Suits 1984b, p. 16). 
Nevertheless, given the history of its use, it is impossible to employ the 
term ‘utopia’ without some normative connotation being evoked. If utopia is not 
thought to be the ‘best of all possible worlds’, then it at least elicits a ‘better 
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than’ comparison with the world of here and now. Suits, indeed, glowingly refers 
to a life of game-playing as “the ideal of existence… a state of affairs where 
people are engaged only in those activities which they value intrinsically” (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 182). Though Suits thus does seem to regard utopia as the best 
possible state (despite his protests to the contrary noted above), wherein the 
necessary evils of work are finally rendered obsolete, with his philosopher’s 
caution he was hesitant to furnish it with excessive detail, which might have 
created hostages to fortune for his argument. Despite this descriptive paucity, 
using Suits’ own unique logic of utopia we can meaningfully say more than he did 
about the necessary restrictions on what games-by-design can reasonably be 
called ‘utopian’ and those that are not deserving of the appellation.47 More 
precisely: we can map out the conceptual space that utopian games cannot 
inhabit. 
 
5.3 Unpacking Suits’ Negative Account of Utopian Games-by-Design 
To reiterate: if we make the strong claim that Suits’ reticence is the result 
of it being conceptually impossible to describe utopian games-by-design, then 
Suits’ utopia is itself conceptually impossible. And if his utopia is conceptually 
                                                          
47 Certain pre-utopian games-by-default, such as ‘plot a murder’ and ‘incite a riot’, which 
presumably should not be ‘replayed’ in utopia for whatever intrinsic merits they might be seen to 
possess, as such entertainments would threaten the moral and political foundations of the 
enterprise. 
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impossible, then it cannot also be “logically inevitable”, as he claims (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 15), but is inchoate. And if Suits’ utopia is inchoate, this consequently 
threatens his claim that a life of game-playing is the ideal of human existence. 
A more charitable explanation for Suits’ silence on utopian games-by-
design than their conceptual impossibility would be to say that at the moment of 
writing, they contingently could not be described by him, due to limitations on his 
imagination, a lack of time, or some other obstacle. This opens up a space 
wherein we might be able to repair Suits’ schema by offering our own account of 
what utopian games might look like. To be clear, what we are looking for here is 
not specific rulesets, nor game mechanics, nor a description of components: that 
would be overly presumptuous for pre-utopian game designers and philosophers 
alike. What we are looking for—what Suits failed to provide—is a range of 
parameters that utopian games-by-design must fall within; a set of conceptual 
boundaries that they cannot exist outside of. In other words, our best bet of 
getting a rough idea of what utopian games are is by delineating what they 
cannot be. 
First, let us take Suits’ general assertion that “in Utopia no evil or wrong 
can befall anyone” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 185). It clearly follows from this premise 
that immoral games will be forbidden in a Suitsian utopia. So games that 
necessarily, in the course of playing them, incur irreparable physical harm upon 
their participants—such as Russian Roulette and boxing—will be excluded from 
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the utopian set.48 Similarly, games that require players to engage in immoral 
behaviors like bald-faced lying in order to play effectively—Werewolf and 
Diplomacy come to mind—will be off the menu as well. What is left in utopia are 
moral games, and games with negligible moral content—non-moral games. 
Secondly, because “all possible interpersonal problems have been solved 
by appropriate methods” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 183) in Suits’ utopia, his utopian 
games will not be ruined by the bad behavior of their players. Cheating, trifling, 
spoilsporting, bullying, and grousing behaviors will all be pre-emptively (if 
somewhat rather mysteriously) eliminated. Admittedly, this has more to do with 
how games will be played in utopia, rather than what kinds of games will be 
played in utopia—but how people play a game (as part of its institution) has as 
much to do with the lived experience of playing it as do the rules themselves. 
Utopian Soccer, for instance, would be an experientially very different game from 
soccer as we currently play it, because its institution would necessarily be altered 
                                                          
48 It becomes more difficult to rule out boxing as a utopian sport if optimally-protective gear, pain-
negating drugs, and the guaranteed full medical restoration of participants to their pre-match 
levels of health are brought into play as possibilities (so that most matches are decided on points 
rather than knockouts). But other objections can be brought to bear if we take the line of making 
utopian sports completely anodyne. Keith Thompson, for example, attacks the desirability and 
intelligibility of Suits’ utopia precisely because “there would be no pain, suffering, or 
disappointment” in it (Thompson 2004, p. 60), and thus no high-level competitive sport would be 
possible. Utopia is no country for losers, and thus no country for competition either. Although 
Suits did not specifically respond to Thompson’s criticism, one potential way to diffuse it would be 
to posit that utopian games are necessarily cooperative. That way, Suits could have kept the good 
of ‘striving’ against unnecessary obstacles without reintroducing the emotionally unbalancing 
extremes of the “joy of victory” and “bitterness of defeat” resultant from besting, and being 
bested, by others in competition (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194), which arguably threaten his utopian 
thesis that “the moral ideal of man does, after all, consist in game playing” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
193). 
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under utopian conditions even if its ruleset stayed roughly the same: there would 
be no more faking of injuries in attempts to incur penalties on the opposing team, 
no curses shouted at the other team’s players or the referees, and perhaps no 
need for referees as all, as utopian players would be unfailingly self-regulating. 
Utopian games would be played in a morally non-problematic fashion, regardless 
of the players’ skill levels, and thus the experience of playing with and against 
others in utopia would always either be positive or merely neutral (at the 
absolute worst), rather than be negatively tainted by displays of poor 
sportspersonship.49 
Finally, we have Suits’ warning that boredom will pose an existential 
threat to his utopians, since “there does not appear to be anything to do in 
Utopia, precisely because in Utopia all instrumental activities have been 
eliminated… everything has already been achieved” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 188). It 
is for the purpose of giving utopians something meaningful to do, to combat the 
deleterious effects of boredom, that games are required in Suits’ schema to begin 
with, and on that basis they are afforded their high status of being “the essence, 
the ‘without which not’ of Utopia” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). So utopian games 
                                                          
49 William Morgan helpfully commented (after a presentation of an earlier draft of this chapter) 
that the moral status of a feint in utopian sport should not differ from its status in contemporary 
sport: it should not be considered to be immoral or unsporting behavior, but rather lauded, even 
on the rarified pitch of utopia. This is line with Kathleen Pearson’s distinction between ‘strategic 
deception’ which is considered to be an essential part of skilful gameplay and includes feinting, 
and ‘definitional deception’, which is outright cheating and includes intentional fouling, on her 
account (Pearson 1973). 
156 
 
cannot be boring: that would be self-defeating, for boring games would threaten 
to destroy a utopia wherein there is nothing to do but play games. Boring games 
would include soluble games (those with a dominant strategy that, once known, 
leave no opportunity for the exercise of meaningful player agency, like Tic-Tac-
Toe), games of pure chance (those that leave no opportunity for the exercise of 
meaningful player agency because strategy and tactics cannot have any impact 
on their outcome, such as Snakes & Ladders), and games of pure skill (like 
chess—since utopians will have endless hours to devote to its study, and live in a 
time “when everything knowable was in fact known” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 192), 
including optimal moves for all possible game states, chess would likely be as 
solvable for utopians as Tic-Tac-Toe is for us).50 From this we can infer that 
utopian games will be well-designed, with a healthy mixture of skill and chance, 
                                                          
50 Potentially, however, utopians could play complex games of pure skill with a handicap, by 
denying themselves reference to the sum total of all information contained in their 
supercomputers (assuming, for the moment, that the rote memorization of all optimal moves for 
all possible game states for such a game would be cognitively impossible), or perhaps by 
cognitively handicapping or impairing themselves with performance-inhibiting substances. If 
games are valuable in utopia because they are ‘scarcity machines’, then in order to play certain 
games utopians might make unorthodox requests of their supercomputers to generate scarcity, 
such as “Give me a limp” to make football more interesting, or “Make me forget all I know from 
the chess manuals I’ve accessed” to make chess more interesting. This is the inverse of 
technological doping qua enhancement. Consider chess grandmaster Bobby Fischer dosing 
himself with LSD to make a chess game with a novice more challenging (rather than, say, the 
novice letting a supercomputer find the optimal moves for him): a ‘doping down’ rather than a 
‘doping up’. But radically depriving oneself of the realization of one’s human capacities looks like 
a kind of self-harm occurring in utopia, which Suits rules out in The Grasshopper, for “in Utopia no 
evil or wrong can befall anyone” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 185). Thanks to Alex Barber for originally 
bringing this intriguing puzzle to my attention. 
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resulting in their insolubility.51 Thus Suits can conceivably hold that such games 
would indefinitely maintain the interest of his utopians, by continuously 
generating meaningful problems for them to work out. 
 
5.4 We Cannot Design Utopian Games: Thus, There Is No ‘Duty to Design’ Them 
We can posit the conditions for life in a post-instrumental utopia as Suits 
does, via stipulation, but that does not bring us any closer to understanding what 
it would be like to be a utopian living under those conditions. The first move is a 
logical delineation, the second an imaginative exercise which seems likely to fail 
due to the epistemic inaccessibility of its object. The cultural gap between a 
society dominated by instrumentally-oriented behavior, such as our own, and a 
society which solely exhibits intrinsically-oriented behavior, such as Suits’ utopia, 
seems too wide to bridge. If this is in fact the case, then attempts to figure out 
the values of a post-instrumental entity (such as a Suitsian utopian), and 
therefore understand what types of games might suffice to entertain them, must 
                                                          
51 It should be noted here that no utopian game can be played for any meaningful stakes. Because 
material superabundance is vouchsafed in Suits’ utopian schema by his telepathically-controlled 
supercomputers, the prospect of material loss or material gain can add nothing to the interest or 
enjoyment of games. Utopian game mechanics must stand or fall on their own merits, without 
extrinsic sweetening. As Suits observes, “if Utopians tried to play poker they would find that they 
could not” (Suits 19--c, p. 114) but “in contrast bridge, for example, is a Utopian game, for in it 
nothing is at stake” (Suits 19--c, p. 115). However, in this passage it is nothing more than bridge’s 
lack of stakes that single it out as being a distinctly ‘utopian’ game: and although lack of stakes 
might be a necessary condition for utopian games, this feature cannot in itself be taken as 
sufficient. 
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remain in the realm of pure speculation (aside from the relatively uninformative 
negative parameters outlined in the previous section), and thus outside the 
purview of philosophical analysis. 
Let us assume that there is a good chance that our living as we do, in a 
world with a very high degree of instrumentally-oriented activity, would make it 
difficult for us to understand the values implicitly expressed by utopian games. 
The lack of comprehension or basic interest may cut both ways: we probably 
couldn’t, or wouldn’t want to, play utopian games; and utopians probably 
couldn’t, or wouldn’t want to, play ours. Suits himself posits this cultural gap 
which, if taken at face value, seems to vitiate the duty to design: “Utopians will 
look back on names like Queensbury, Naismith, the Parker Brothers, even Rubik, 
with the same indulgent condescension that that today’s physicists look back on 
those ancient investigators who proclaimed air, earth, fire, and water to be basic 
elements of nature” (Suits 1984b, p. 24). By Suits’ reckoning, contemporary game 
designer Richard Garfield is no more qualified—or statistically likely—to design a 
utopian game than Heraclitus was to design an atomic bomb. 
Let us explore one of the many potential ways this cultural gap could 
mitigate against there being an intentional causal link between the games of 
today and the games of tomorrow (although my position does not stand or fall on 
the plausibility of its specifics—for there are a multitude of other potential 
avenues of cultural gap exist which could be similarly investigated). Many 
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contemporary games trade on the thrill on defeating an opponent for their 
appeal and, as it happens, a feature of our contemporary society is that defeating 
others (who we often organically characterize as opponents or competitors) is 
instrumentally required for us to succeed in achieving many important goals. Key 
turning points of our lives can often take the form of contests over scarce 
resources: like getting a job at the expense of another applicant, or securing a 
mate at the expense of a sexual rival. But, as Suits asserts, “whereas our own 
culture is based various kind of scarcity—economic, moral, scientific, erotic—the 
culture of Utopia will be based on plenitude” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). This one 
change turns the world on its head, and radically redefines both the broad 
strokes and the minutiae of the culture. And as games imitate—or, perhaps more 
accurately, simulate—life, we can reasonably postulate that many utopian games 
would lack the combative, zero-sum design of many of our contemporary games. 
For who is to say that a psychologically-perfected utopian, freed from 
instrumental pressures in a world of material superabundance, wouldn’t dismiss 
our entire category of competitive games out of hand as being brutish and 
perverse?52 Alternately, wouldn’t we presumably find cooperative utopian games 
                                                          
52 This line might be misconstrued as running counter to Robert L. Simon’s popular notion of 
competitive games as a “mutual quest for excellence” (Simon, Torres, and Hager 2015, Chapter 
2). For Simon, competition itself is cooperative and not zero-sum, as it provides the precondition 
for achieving certain kinds of excellence, and thus redounds benefits to all contracting 
participants. My suggestion here, however, is simply that utopians from a ‘culture of plenitude’ 
might reasonably find games with overtly competitive themes or mechanics to be gauche or 
passé, and thus refuse to play them on aesthetic grounds (leaving aside, for the moment, the 
thornier issue of their potentially eschewing competition on moral grounds). This is an entirely 
different point than Simon’s concern. 
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to be rather dull, flat, and abstract for our relatively vulgar tastes? The fact that 
we are simply not in the epistemic position to decide the matter either way 
serves to weaken Suits’ assertion that we have a duty to design marvellous games 
for his future utopians. Even by his own lights, we are likely extremely poor 
candidates for such a task—recall the ‘indulgent condescension’ that he predicts 
his utopians will look back at the game designers of today with—and the intuitive 
appeal of his pessimism is almost certainly down to probable essential cultural 
differences between ourselves and utopians. Again, whether it is competition, or 
some other feature(s) of our contemporary games that utopians might find either 
offensive or banal, is relatively trivial: the point here is the probable conceptual 
unsuitability of contemporary games for the purposes of enabling utopian leisure, 
on x plausible grounds or y. 
So to claim, as Suits does (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194), that we have a 
present duty to engage in guesswork as to the favored leisure activities for an 
alien culture filled with under-described hypothetical entities, seems implausible 
at best. This implausibility of a duty to design utopian games is magnified if one 
takes into consideration how terribly low the probability of our success would be, 
combined with the fact that contemporary humans such as ourselves come with 
pre-existing pressing instrumental concerns of our own which must take moral 
and pragmatic priority. Further, the odds of Suits’ post-instrumental utopia ever 
obtaining, and thus of utopian persons existing sometime in the very distant 
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future that we might arguably have moral duties regarding, are lower still. This 
means that all other moral duties to actual persons would take probabilistic 
triage over that of designing utopian games, up to and including the duty of 
creating a state of post-instrumentality. Suits puts his rhetorical cart before the 
horse here, as the duty to build a utopia must be logically prior to any duty 
regarding its preservation once established. 
If, indeed, we attempted to fulfil this purported Suitsian duty in the 
present, given the projected temporal and cultural gap between our society and 
that of utopia, the games we designed would likely have as low a chance of 
serving the function of utopian entertainment as a Neanderthal game designer’s 
invention would have of entertaining us contemporary homo sapiens sapiens. In 
other words, a hyper-instrumental culture (where nearly all activities are 
instrumentally-oriented) would face similar difficulties in designing games for an 
instrumental culture (like ours—where many, but not all, activities are 
instrumentally-oriented) as an instrumental culture would face in designing 
games for a hypo-instrumental one (where hardly any activities are 
instrumentally-oriented). It is, perhaps, an expression of hubris to assume that 
Tetris would have any more grip on the utopian imagination than Throw-a-Rock 
has on ours.53 Nozick makes an analogous point when he writes: “It is helpful to 
                                                          
53 With all due considerations to shot put enthusiasts, a caveman could not have intended to 
‘design’ modern shot put for us, with its standardized equipment and rules governing bodily 
movements (although my hypothetical primitive sport of Throw-a-Rock—or something very like 
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imagine cavemen sitting together to think up what, for all time, will be the best 
possible society and then setting out to institute it. Do none of the reasons that 
make you smile at this apply to us?” (Nozick 2013 [1974], pp. 313-314). 
Without any realistic picture of the content of a post-instrumental culture, 
we lack the perspicacity to apprehend the ideal forms of utopian amusement. 
Just as we are best able to hit dartboards that are visible and within throwing 
range, we best design games (as we best make clothes, write plays, and generate 
other forms of cultural product) when we have a target audience in mind that are 
like ourselves, or are at least hypothetical entities that are closely relatable. 
Without that context, the conceptual divisions between games, performances, 
and rituals are not readily decipherable, and what was intended to entertain only 
serves to confuse. Kabuki theater would, for example, likely alienate the viewers 
of contemporary American reality television—an audience it was never tailored 
to, possessing different tastes and expectations. Similarly, we have good reason 
to believe that the games we would design for the amusement of Suitsian 
utopians would fail to bridge the cultural gap, and so baffle or bore them, rather 
than amuse. Game design aimed at a utopian audience would constitute a shot in 
the dark, at a target of unknown proximity. 
                                                          
it—might indeed be its genuine historical ancestor and efficient cause of shot put). A caveman 
simply intends to play Throw-a-Rock; the tides of time and custom build up (or fail to build up, in 
the case of non-viable games) the institution from there. 
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It would seem, paradoxically, that members of a truly post-instrumental 
culture could not design games for themselves, either; for this would constitute 
instrumental activity, and violate Suits’ definition of utopia itself. Call this the 
problem of design: utopians cannot design their own games in the future, and 
neither can we in the present; so utopian games are impossible to design 
(although they might indeed ‘evolve’ unintentionally; as the jumbo jet can be 
plausibly regarded to have evolved unintentionally from the designs of the 
Wright brothers—or shot put from Throw-a-Rock).54 Thus, to return to the issue 
of Suits’ purported duty to design utopian games: we cannot reasonably be held 
to have a moral duty to design impossible objects. 
In addition to this problem of design, the problem of reticence—Suits’ 
apparently inability to adequately describe post-instrumental life, as evidenced 
by the lack of a convincing blueprint utopia in his work—might be a source of still 
further trouble for his account. For if post-instrumental existence is ineffable, and 
thus inchoate, then a utopia built on its grounds is doubly so. And, bearing in 
mind the stakes as previously stated, if Suits’ utopia goes, then so too does his 
assertion that a life of game-playing constitutes the ‘ideal of existence’. Thus, let 
                                                          
54 We are compelled to assume that Suits’ utopian supercomputers are incapable of designing 
sufficiently entertaining games to guarantee the amusement of their operators: otherwise his 
exhortation for us to design games in the present for future generations of utopians to enjoy 
would be completely robbed of its force. 
164 
 
us now turn to a closer examination of post-instrumental life, in order to gauge 
its prospects for intelligibility. 
 
5.5 Is Post-Instrumentalism Intelligible? 
As Andrew Holowchak points out regarding Suits’ utopia, even 
telepathically ordering your next meal is instrumentally-oriented activity, 
regardless of the brevity of the task (Holowchak 2007, p. 91). It is work of a kind, 
despite being comparatively less laborious than our current practices of food 
preparation. And the need to eat has, conspicuously, not been extinguished in 
Suits’ vision of utopia. Nor has the need to relieve boredom, the (evidently 
instrumental) purpose which games purportedly function to serve therein. So, 
Suits’ claim that his utopia is post-instrumental seems, strictly speaking, to be 
false: for as long as essential needs remain, then so too will instrumental 
activities be required—no matter how trifling—to satisfy them. 
Human beings—as individuals, as a species, and as the prospective 
inhabitants of a utopia—will always have physiological needs, at the bare 
minimum. So pure post-instrumentalism may be unintelligible for creatures like 
us, which means that an absolutist reading of Suits’ utopia is similarly beyond the 
pale: and thus it is probably not what he intended. Otherwise, Suits would be 
caught on the horns of a dilemma: either there would be so little instrumentally-
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oriented behavior in his utopia that it is necessarily inchoate to us qua 
instrumentally-oriented beings, or else there would turn out to be so many 
instrumental concerns occupying the thoughts of his utopians (as they 
telepathically controlled their need-fulfilling machines) that his post-
instrumentality would be a sham—utopia thus stated would just be 
instrumentalism at one remove. Call this the problem of post-instrumentalism. 
Since the first horn of the problem has been adequately explored above, and its 
prospects for a satisfactory resolution found dim, let us consider whether or not 
there exists a more charitable, less absolutist interpretation of the second horn 
which can rescue Suits’ position. 
Scott Kretchmar argues from an anthropological standpoint that human 
beings have always been a need-driven species, and that this helps explain how 
we have become the problem-solving and problem-seeking animals we are today 
(Kretchmar 2006, pp. 72-73). We needn’t completely buy into a Darwinist line to 
appreciate Kretchmar’s perfectly reasonable observations about our species’ 
unique relation to obstacles, which stands as one of our defining characteristics. 
If Kretchmar is correct, we were made into metaphorical ‘ants’ by pre-historic 
and historical pressures; all wholly-intrinsically-oriented Suitsian ‘grasshoppers’ 
died out along the way, leaving instrumental thought hardwired in us to the point 
that we are incapable of living life without it. Presumably, this is what makes a 
life of game-playing ideal for Suits’ bored utopians (whom he implicitly situates 
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on a psychological continuum with ourselves—their ultimate boredom is, rightly 
or wrongly, nothing but a hypertrophic projection of our own fleeting boredoms): 
the surrogate instrumentality of solving contrived problems is itself intrinsically 
valuable, regardless of whether these problems are generated by features of 
games-by-design or games-by-default. 
An underlying implication of Kretchmar’s stance is that strict post-
instrumentalism would require radical post-humanism as its base; only then 
could the need for the existential crutch of artificial obstacles supplied by utopian 
games conceivably fall away in Suits’ schema. Shifting the goalposts of human 
experience and cognition would, indeed, constitute a possible resolution of the 
dilemma posed above: when you change the species, you change its utopia. 
However, allowing transhumanist considerations to enter the utopian frame 
would obviously greatly exacerbate the problem of cultural gap. 
But perhaps coming at what are essentially philosophical issues of leisure 
from a species-perspective is a misguided strategy from the beginning. By 
zooming out too far we may lose focus on the very phenomenon we are 
attempting to study. It is arguably a weakness of Suits’ account of utopia of 
game-playing that it treats boredom as an undifferentiated cultural phenomenon 
that can be collectively diagnosed and addressed en masse (in his case, by the 
invention of new games), whereas phenomenologically speaking, boredom is a 
profoundly personal issue that must be addressed on an individual basis. What 
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dispels your boredom, in other words, may or may not suffice to dispel mine, and 
in fact might only exacerbate it.55 The seemingly political issue here—the collapse 
of a future society through endemic boredom—looks like it may be reducible to a 
merely personal matter. 
Utopia, as a political ideal, does not necessarily mandate the manner in 
which individuals deal with their personal travails. As J.C. Davis writes, regarding 
the designer of utopias: “his prime aim is not happiness, that private mystery, but 
order, that social necessity” (Davis 2003 [1981], p. 38). Human beings are taken 
to have an irreducible set of essential needs, and the task of a utopia is to 
optimally address these: qualia resulting from this process are beside the point. 
Utopias (as a Davisonian category of ideal society) are not constructed to probe 
the ‘private mystery’ of the experiential content of their citizens—neither their 
private joys, nor their private miseries—but with designing state structures, the 
constitutions and laws which best function to provide the preconditions for 
human flourishing (the bedrock that sustainable happiness rests on).56 Thus it 
seems that Suits has not actually designed a ‘utopia’ per se, but rather described 
                                                          
55 Our previous discussion of Lars Svendsen’s ‘typologies of boredom’ in A Philosophy of Boredom 
(Svendsen 2008, pp. 41-45) should serve to establish just how subjective and multifaceted the 
phenomenon of boredom actually is. 
 
56 Despite this fact, it may still be reasonably considered a misnomer to call a society wherein the 
framework for meeting human needs was conceptually optimized, but all its citizens were 
contingently miserable, ‘utopia’. 
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the cultural apparatus of an alien species, which (mis)understands boredom as a 
social problem which can be objectively and universally solved.57 
Setting aside the semantic difference between Suits and Davis for the 
moment (which is, of course, not purely semantic, for Suits has built a logic 
around his own unique definition of utopia), let us return to a key point of 
distinction which, once made, may clear the waters somewhat. If we charitably 
modify Suits’ definition of utopia as being strictly post-instrumental to being 
merely hypo-instrumental, then perhaps his vision of utopia can be rendered 
intelligible, and his ideal of existence validated. We might imagine that his 
utopians are like us, except they need to do far, far less to obtain the objects of 
their desires. This is a potential method for making utopians into relatable 
hypothetical entities. 
The quality of relatability is, however, not binary but locatable on a 
continuum. There may be some elements of utopian life we can identify with, but 
other crucial features—such as the paradigm shift necessitated by the move to a 
culture of plenitude from a culture of scarcity—that are irreducibly foreign to us. I 
                                                          
57 Utopia, qua cultural apparatus, is a moving target: its composition will change with the culture 
that generates it. Even assuming that the base set of essential human needs is static and 
objectively discernible, the optimal manner of meeting those needs in a meaningful way will differ 
according to time, place, and custom (ignoring, for the moment, the more subjective and difficult 
to discern higher-order needs that humans have). So the caveman’s utopia is not our own (as 
Nozick intones), and our utopia will not be identical with the utopias of future generations. 
Paradoxically, while the utopia of the worker often manifests itself as a land of idle and plenty, 
the utopia of Suits’ utopians, who live in a land of idle plenitude, may well be a romantic return to 
the heroism of work (which they would presumably express via their playing of faux-instrumental 
games-by-default). 
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posit that utopian hypo-instrumentality, and the alien values and culture which 
must of necessity accompany such a state of being, constitute an insurmountable 
obstacle to the project of utopian relatability. If this is the case, then even if we 
are able to ameliorate the theoretical problem of post-instrumentalism by 
tweaking Suits’ account to be less absolutist—and consequently address the 
problem of design, by allowing utopians minimal latitude for instrumental actions 
(such as facilitating their own amusement through minimally effortful computer-
assisted game design)—the practical problem of cultural gap continues to be an 
issue, in addition to the lingering problem of reticence. On this account, Suitsian 
utopian games are not only contingently unknown, but also conceptually 
unknowable. 
 
5.6 Summary 
I end with the question I began with: What games will Suits’ utopians 
play? As Suits did not tell us himself (outside of the very few marginally 
informative negative parameters outlined above), we are obliged to try to fill in 
the blanks. But as it seems likely that his utopians will constitute an alien species 
with a culture, values, and experiential content very different from our own, we 
cannot accomplish the task of describing their games. From a philosophical 
perspective, we must be as reticent as Suits was: philosophers, unlike novelists, 
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cannot reasonably be asked to speculate on what kinds of entertainments hypo-
instrumental entities on the other side of a wide cultural gap might enjoy. 
Relatedly, as a strictly post-instrumental condition appears to be necessarily 
conceptually inchoate, given the essentially needful entities that human beings 
are, there can be no ‘endless summer’ for which games will be urgently required 
“to retain enough effort in Utopia to make life worth living” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
189) There is, therefore, no concomitant duty to design utopian games (whether 
these are conceptualized as being intended for the amusement of future 
generations of human beings, or a successor species). Furthermore, we cannot 
pretend that games are a ‘silver bullet’ universal cultural solution to the private 
experience of boredom in Suits’ projected future, any more than they are in our 
lived present. 
Ultimately, in the absence of a suitably robust account of utopian games, 
we have good reason to reject Suits’ assertion that game-playing is the ideal of 
human existence. The chief motivating force behind this rejection rests on the 
grounds that Suits helps himself to the premise that there exists some set of 
games-by-design in his utopia, such that the playing of (a sufficient number of) its 
members would sustain an existentially meaningful existence for his utopians in 
the event of a hypo-instrumental culture of material superabundance obtaining. 
But the set of utopian games is unknown and unknowable. Thus any implications 
of Suits’ vision for the utilization of our leisure time in the present is vitiated by 
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the collapse of his normative ideal: his ‘metaphysics of leisure’ (Suits 2014, 194) 
misses its mark. 
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Chapter 6: ‘The Metaphysics of Leisure’: Suits on Autotelic 
Gameplay 
 
The games we play in our non-Utopian lives are intimations of things to come. For even 
now it is games which give us something to do when there is nothing to do. We thus call 
games ‘pastimes’ and regard them as trifling fillers of the interstices in our lives. But they 
are much more important than that. They are clues to the future. And their serious 
cultivation now is perhaps our only salvation. That, if you like, if the metaphysics of 
leisure time (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). 
 
Underlying the central role of gameplay in Bernard Suits’ utopian thesis is 
what he refers to as “the metaphysics of leisure time” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
194)—his conviction that there is something uniquely good (possessing a value no 
other process can supply; otherwise, games would not be the exclusive 
preoccupation of his utopians) and independently good (not conducive of some 
further good; for games are essentially non-productive, and thus a fitting activity 
for a post-instrumental culture) about playing games. Suits’ attempt to describe a 
unique and independent intralusory source of value in his utopia is supported by 
his subscription to the concept of autotelic (from the ancient Greek telos 
meaning ‘end’, ‘goal’, or ‘completion’, and autos meaning ‘self’) gameplay: the 
idea that the activity of gameplay is valuable for its own sake. 
Suits illustrates autotelic activity—“activities which are ends in 
themselves” (Suits 1977, p. 117)—with the following example: “a genuine 
surmounter of obstacles does so in order to get to the other side, but a high-
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jumper tries to get to the other side only so that he can be surmounting 
obstacles” (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 101-102, emphases mine). According to Suits, 
we play only in order to be playing—the end is contained in the rule-governed 
activity of gameplay itself—and for players the “reason for accepting such rules is 
just because they want to act within the limitations the rules impose. They accept 
rules so that they can play a game, and they accept these rules so that they can 
play this game” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 33, emphases mine). Thus, the mere fact 
that someone is playing a game is proof of its unique and independent value for 
them; the proof is in the playing. 
In this chapter, I will analyse the concept of ‘gameplay’ in Suits’ work in 
terms of its autotelic character, and defend it by way of John Rawls’ perfectionist 
‘Aristotelian Principle’, which “characterizes human beings as importantly moved 
not only by the pressure of bodily needs, but also by the desire to do things 
enjoyed simply for their own sakes, at least when the urgent and pressing wants 
are satisfied” (Rawls 1971, p. 431). I will also discuss critics of Suits’ position such 
as Thomas Hurka, who holds that competing activities may have equal or greater 
autotelic value than gameplay (thus threatening the unique value of games), and 
Randolph Feezell, who raises the possibility that gameplay may be inherently 
atelic, or pointless (thus threatening the independent value of games). I conclude 
that Suits can defend a moderate, but not ultimate, valuation of autotelic 
gameplay. 
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6.1 Suits’ Autotelic Gameplay through the Lens of Rawl’s Aristotelian Principle 
It would be difficult to argue that winning a large pot in a game of poker is 
not valuable, for the instrumental value of money is near-universally accepted. 
Nor would it be reasonable to suggest that recreational soccer is not valuable, for 
the instrumental payoffs of physical fitness and athletic discipline are abundantly 
clear. However, when instrumental sites of value are removed from the equation, 
identifying what unique and independent values the activity of gameplay might 
have is difficult. For example, what is the intrinsic value of playing a video game 
alone in a basement for a week straight? In other words what, if anything, is 
uniquely good (possessing a value no other process can supply) and 
independently good (not conducive of some further good) about playing games? 
According to Suits, the players of games have a motivation for playing that 
is internal to their games of choice. This he calls the lusory attitude: “their reason 
for accepting such rules is just because they want to act within the limitations the 
rules impose. They accept rules so that they can play a game, and they accept 
these rules so that they can play this game” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 33). In this 
sense, gameplay is necessarily autotelic: we play games essentially in order to be 
playing games. That is not to say that a game cannot also incidentally have 
instrumental purposes attached to it, only that “such purposes are no part of the 
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definition of game playing” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 156). Suits’ definition of 
gameplay—briefly, that “playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome 
unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 43)—establishes that the lusory 
attitude is a necessary component of it, but also allows for the possibility of the 
melding of intrinsic and instrumental values in an activity, wherein people “are 
paid for doing what they would be doing anyway”, a condition Suits refers to 
elsewhere as the Happy Hooker Principle (Suits 1984b, pp. 16-17). 
Suits thus claims to eschew radical autotelism, “the view that unless 
games are played solely as ends in themselves, they are not really games, that is, 
that amateurs alone are playing games” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 158). Instead, he 
suggests that “although professionals and amateurs admittedly have different 
attitudes towards the games they play, the have the same attitude towards the 
rules of those games” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 157). This move addresses an 
immediate objection to his account—the conceptual queerness produced by the 
possibility that professional game-players might not counting as playing their 
games due to their motivations in participating not being purely autotelic.  
However, it should be remembered that in “Tricky Triad”, Suits seemingly 
contradicts the central role the lusory attitude plays in his earlier account, by 
producing a typology with a non-empty category of non-played games, including 
professional athletic games (such as pro basketball and pro hockey) and 
professional nonathletic games (such as pro poker and pro bridge), which are 
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categorically “instrumental rather than autotelic events” (Suits 1988a, pp. 7-9). 
Although Suits himself is not consistent on this point, his earlier position fits more 
comfortably with the arguments presented in most of his other pieces, and with 
ordinary language—we do not, for instance, intuitively understand Wayne 
Gretzky to have been ‘working’ hockey, but rather playing it. Thus, I take Suits’ 
ultimate position on this matter to be reflected in the Happy Hooker Principle: 
that either the presence or absence of instrumental considerations in gameplay 
do not weigh for or against its status as an autotelic activity. 
On this less objectionable reading of Suits, “all instances of play are 
instances of autotelic activity… autotelicity [is a] necessary but not sufficient for 
an adequate definition of play” (Suits 1977, p. 119). Primitive play is not intended 
to advance any other good instrumentally, and is therefore considered a good 
which has itself as its own end (Suits 1988a, p. 2). Similarly, sophisticated play, 
amateur games, and amateur performances also qualify as autotelic pursuits for 
him (Suits 1988a, pp. 7-9). More deeply, Suits identifies autotelic game-playing as 
the telos of the human being: it is the ideal of existence (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 
182), which arguably situates intralusory achievements as those possessing the 
highest possible value. Still, Suits’ descriptions of intralusory experience can read 
as worryingly flat, such as his depiction of an interminable ping-pong rally which 
he claims fits the description of an open game (because he can identify its 
prelusory goal): 
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A hits the ball to B so that B can hit the ball to A so that A can hit the ball to B, and so 
on… In a ping-pong rally there is a perfectly clear state of affairs that the players are 
striving to achieve. It is the state of affairs which consists in the ball’s being in play (Suits 
2014 [1978], pp. 145-146).  
 
From an external point of view to the activity of gameplay, this 
interminable ping-pong rally can look frivolous and pointless; but from an internal 
point of view it could be phenomenologically quite absorbing. And the internal 
frame is the relevant one for assessing an activity’s autotelicity. We are reminded 
of John Rawls’ thought-experimental grass counter: 
Imagine someone whose only pleasure is to count blades of grass in various 
geometrically shaped areas such as park squares and well-trimmed lawns. He is 
otherwise intelligent and actually possesses unusual skills, since he manages to survive 
by solving difficult mathematical problems for a fee. The definition of the good forces us 
to admit that the good for this man is indeed counting blades of grass, or more 
accurately, his good is determined by a plan that gives an especially prominent place to 
this activity (Rawls 1971, p. 432). 
 
What makes the grass counter’s grass-counting activity rational is that is 
counts as an exercise of a human capacity towards a complex end, and that the 
grass counter is enjoying the activity. The behaviour conforms, in other words, to 
what Rawls call the ‘Aristotelian Principle’: 
The Aristotelian Principle runs as follows: other things equal, human beings enjoy the 
exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment 
increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity. The intuitive 
idea here is that human beings take more pleasure in doing something as they become 
more proficient at it, and of two activities they do equally well, they prefer the one 
calling on a larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle discriminations. For example, 
chess is a more complicated and subtle game than checkers, and algebra is more 
intricate than elementary arithmetic. Thus the principle says that someone who can do 
both generally prefers playing chess to playing checkers, and that he would rather study 
algebra than arithmetic (Rawls 1971, p. 426). 
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The perfectionist framework provided by the Aristotelian Principle is 
perfectly tailored to explain and justify why Suits’ utopians would play games in a 
post-instrumental, materially superabundant utopia, and how this autotelic 
gameplay expresses the ideal of human existence. Both Suits and Rawls would 
agree that by “accepting the Aristotelian Principle as a natural fact, it will 
generally be rational, in view of the other assumptions, to realize and train 
mature capacities” (Rawls 1971, p. 428). And so it is that Suitsian utopian 
games—those that require the most human capacities to be exercised at their 
highest thresholds to succeed at—would be the logical choice of activity for his 
utopians on this principle. 
However, if we do not accept the Aristotelian Principle as a ‘natural fact’ 
(perhaps because we think it fails as an explanatory fiction to capture the 
phenomenon of laziness or other entropic forms of human behaviour), then it is 
far less clear why we should not entertain the possibility that gameplay is 
pointless, and thus lacking in unique and independent value. In the following 
section, I will attempt to provide alternate routes to Suits’ position that gameplay 
is autotelically valuable. In the process, I will review alternate forms of telicity, 
provide an exegesis of Scott Kretchmar’s concept of lusory ‘gratuity’, and offer 
my own concept of ‘ludic alchemy’ to help explain how the activity of gameplay 
can count as a value-conferring process in itself. 
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6.2 Other Forms of Telicity, Gratuity, and Ludic Alchemy 
Like Suits, Aurel Kolnai believes that “playing chess is an autotelic activity: 
not primarily a means to something else but an aim in its own right in some 
people’s lives, actualized into a ‘here and now’ autonomous aim at times” (Kolnai 
1966, p. 113). Unlike Suits, Kolnai contributes many other telos-derived terms to 
the discussion of aims in games, many of which illustrate subtle distinctions. 
Activities are said to have heterotelic (purely instrumental) value if they are “not 
enjoyed or appreciated in themselves”, such as “walking to one’s chess-club in 
wretched weather” (Kolnai 1966, p. 113). Meanwhile, a unit of action is 
considered to be descriptively orthotelic if “as a whole it is autotelic and its 
components are heterotelic” (Kolnai 1966, p. 113). Thus, an entire day dedicated 
to gameplay can be considered to be autotelically valuable from a holistic 
standpoint, including the heterotelically valuable actions which are performed in 
service of it: travelling to the venue of play, setting up the board, waiting for 
one’s opponent, and so forth. Kolnai introduces the term syntelic to describe 
activities which further multiple independent (autotelic and/or heterotelic) aims 
simultaneously; for instance, “a man may undertake a journey in order at the 
same time to see once more a place of which he is fond, to attend to some 
business and to see a personal friend of his there, and still at the same time to 
satisfy his craving for a change of air and to enjoy a night or two in a sleeping-
berth” (Kolnai 1966, p. 113). 
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Finally, Kolnai refers to an internal, subordinate aim of an autotelic 
activity as paratelic. He writes: “I would also call the aim of ‘winning’ a paratelic 
aim, and the activity displayed in the game a paratelic endeavor or pursuit” 
(Kolnai 1966, p. 116). So on Kolnai’s account, while chess is played “normally for 
its own sake” (Kolnai 1966, p. 113) and “is not chosen… as a means to the end of 
being entertained somehow… but a specification of the entertainment desired” 
(Kolnai 1966, pp. 112-113), every act which serves to enable the desired chess 
gameplay shares in its autotelic value, and the value of this play in itself is not 
lessened by any other aims incidentally achieved in its pursuit, such as “the 
sharpening of our intelligence… [enjoying] companionship… [or] the aesthetic 
pleasure derived from handling a fine set of chessmen, etc.” (Kolnai 1966, p. 113). 
Additionally, in choosing to play—and thereby value—chess, one is also by 
extension subordinately choosing to value obedience to the rules, and to value 
achieving checkmate (or, failing in this, to value avoiding being checkmated by 
one’s opponent). Just as, for Ludwig Wittgenstein, “I bring about the act of wiling 
to swim by jumping in the water” (Wittgenstein 2001 [1958], §613), we 
paratelically oblige ourselves to will to win by the act of agreeing to play chess. 
Thus Kolnai’s position, though it employs a host of novel and potentially useful 
supplementary terms, is perfectly in line with Suits’ concept of the lusory 
attitude, the Happy Hooker Principle, and the autotelic character of gameplay 
more generally. 
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A seeming challenge to Suits’ schema comes from Randolph Feezell, who 
evokes the figure of Sisyphus from ancient Greek mythology “condemned by the 
gods to the eternal drudgery of ceaselessly and strenuously pushing a huge stone 
to the top of a hill, only to see it roll back down, from where he must retrieve it 
and continue his endless toil” (Feezell 1984, pp. 320-321). Sisyphus’ rock-rolling 
“is an activity which has no telos; no goods come about, no external justification 
invests it with meaning” (Feezell 1984, p. 321). Let us call such purposeless 
activities, following Kolnai’s naming conventions, atelic. Feezell compares 
Sisyphus’ absurd and “pointless toil” to the atelic acts of the archetypal player of 
games, in that similarly “the activity of the player results in nothing tangible being 
produced” (Feezell 1984, p. 321). If the fundamentally non-productive nature of 
gameplay does indeed reduce it to being pointless, then a contradiction is 
generated for Suits: for gameplay cannot be both autotelic and atelic at one and 
the same time. 
But while Sisyphus’ activity appears to be a kind of inevitable torture that 
draws it sting from its being existentially meaningless, Feezell nevertheless invites 
us to: 
Suppose that Sisyphus wanted to do what he is, in fact, doomed forever to do by 
necessity. We should think that his activity would then be like the bliss of heaven rather 
than the torment of hell, for his activities would be in perfect conformity with his desires, 
and each moment would be the experience of immediate gratification. What makes 
Sisyphus the image of an absurd life is the gap between his desires and the reality of his 
activity; he is burdened by attitudes absurdly distant from reality (Feezell 1984, p. 323). 
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Feezell’s account implies that if Sisyphus could come to see his punishment as a 
game that he wanted to play, then he could find meaning in it. For if “one desires 
to engage in the activity; it is a good” (Feezell 1984, p. 322), much as in the case 
of Rawls’ grass counter. Let us refer to this as ludic alchemy: the idea that 
mundane activities can be made into desirable games—either by an act of will, a 
change of conceptual frame, or some other means—and therefore manifest the 
autotelic goods unique to gameplay. This potential power of volition to 
alchemically valorize gameplay is captured in a phrase by Yasunari Kawabata’s 
eponymous Master Shusai in The Master of Go: “If one chooses to look upon Go 
as valueless… then absolutely valueless it is; and if one chooses to look upon it as 
a thing of value, then a thing of absolute value it is” (Kawabata 1996 [1951], p. 
107). 
A slightly more modest version of the employment of volition to ludically 
transform reality is proposed by Scott Kretchmar, who writes that “lusory 
interests infuse routine events or potentially tedious work-like activities with 
additional meaning” (Kretchmar 2008, p. 150). Kretchmar offers us the do-it-
yourself gamewrighting tools of gratuitous valuation (“when work, some routine 
event, or even a game itself is assigned extra worth or significance”) and 
gratuitous variation (“the introduction of factors that increase uncertainty and 
unpredictability and, as a consequence, interest”) (Kretchmar 2008, p. 151) to 
gamify our lives and thus “create a second world—a more challenging and 
183 
 
meaningful world—than the natural one” (Kretchmar 2008, p. 153).58 If 
Kretchmar is right, and “The Grasshopper is fundamentally about boredom and 
how we might best cope with it” (Kretchmar 2008, p. 152), then he and Suits have 
much in common; for they both advocate using the artifice of game design to 
transform the world into a non-alienated state wherein meaningful activity is 
effortlessly generated via submitting to a framework of self-chosen or self-
designed rulesets. 
However, here the spectre of instrumentalism creeps back in again, for it 
appears that Feezell and Kretchmar are advocating the gamification of everyday 
life in order to defeat existential boredom or generate existential meaning. The 
committed instrumentalist—or radical instrumentalist, in Suits’ parlance (Suits 
2014 [1978], p. 158)—would indeed regard the value of any activity, including 
gameplay, solely on the merits of the instrumental payoffs causally attached to it. 
Relatedly, Gwen Bradford intuits an instrumental motivation for gameplay in 
Suits’ utopia, as she claims that “we would do anything in order to stave off the 
incredible boredom that might set in while in Utopia… difficult activity is of 
necessary instrumental value in this respect—it’s necessary for our sanity”59 
                                                          
58 This terminology is built upon William Morgan’s earlier use of gratuitous logic to describe the 
game player’s adoption of the lusory attitude: to treat prelusory goals which are essentially 
valueless (from an extralusory standpoint) as if they had great value (from an intralusory 
standpoint) (Morgan 1994). 
 
59 However, in the passage that immediately follows this quotation, Bradford seemingly breaks 
with Suitsian canon, claiming that in his utopia “There are pills that we can take [to] give us 
whatever state we want, so feelings of boredom can be eliminated instantly” (Bradford 2015, pp. 
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(Bradford 2015, p. 96). Here, Bradford paraphrases one of Suits’ main defences of 
why games are crucial in the preservation of his utopia: utopians don’t need to do 
anything in particular, but they still need to do something, or go mad (Suits 
1984b, pp. 8-9). That something turns out to be playing games-by-definition.60 
However, neither the logical necessity of fitting one’s utopian actions to a 
stipulated definition of ‘game’, nor the practical necessity of avoiding mental 
imbalance, capture anything comparable to activities that we would normally 
ascribe autotelic value to. Indeed, as Andrew Holowchak objects, “game playing, 
undertaken by default [as in utopia], winds up not being autotelic… It is activity 
with a very definite [instrumental] end—the elimination of boredom” (Holowchak 
2007, p. 93, emphasis and brackets mine). The autotelicly valuable gameplay that 
Suits holds in highest regard therefore turns out to be surprisingly absent in his 
utopia, on Holowchak’s reading. For playing good games is only valuable if one 
freely chooses to do so, and there is no such exercise of agency possible if games 
                                                          
96-97). This feature was not specifically mentioned in Suits’ The Grasshopper or elsewhere in his 
corpus, but if Bradford’s reading is considered a reasonable interpretation of his utopia, then 
games would no longer be the sine qua non of utopian life that Suits claims they are (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 194), because boredom—no longer considered inevitable—would no longer necessitate 
their play. Suits’ utopia would then appear to be a mere pharmatopia (wherein drugs are 
instrumentally used to solve all socio-political problems) rather than a ludotopia (wherein 
intrinsically valued games incidentally serve that function). 
60 Games-by-definition include all utopian activities, as according to Suits’ definition of the 
concept ‘game’, under conditions of post-instrumentality all human actions qualify as such due to 
being performed without instrumental intent. As a category, ‘games-by-definition’ thus 
encapsulates both ‘games-by-default’ (those activities which once had an instrumental purpose, 
but lack it in a materially superabundant utopia, and so are ‘played’ through as a kind of pseudo-
instrumental mimesis) and ‘games-by-design’ (those activities which have formal constitutive 
rules, and are designed to produce autotelic value when played according to those rules). 
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are a both logical and psychological necessity in his entirely post-instrumental, 
ludically-totalized utopia. 
To reiterate: if gameplay is necessary in Suits’ utopia, but his definition of 
‘gameplay’ requires that participation in gameplay be voluntary, then this would 
produce a seemingly fatal contradiction. For due to the restrictive stipulations of 
Suits’ utopian vision, wherein all activities are games-by-definition, the activity of 
gameplay cannot be freely chosen in utopia, on the grounds that games are 
universalized therein: nothing remains in utopia that is a non-game. But a 
defence against this seeming contradiction may be possible if we hold, as Suits 
does, that the mere choice between games is sufficient for a meaningful exercise 
of the will in utopia. His thought on this matter is: 
When work has been abolished people will be entirely free to pursue any life option 
available. The operative word, of course, is ‘available’. When Henry Ford marketed his 
Model-T he announced that it could be had in any color as long as it was black. My 
Utopians can pursue any life option they wish as long as it is a game. I would be 
vulnerable to Nozick’s critique of traditional utopias only if I were idiotically to insist that 
Utopia consisted exclusively in playing, for example, bridge (Suits 19--c, p. 81). 
 
So even if one must play games in utopia, Suits would argue that the choice of 
which game to play is open, free, and meaningful. Thus, there is sufficient agency 
in utopia to rule out the choice of which games to play as being a purely 
involuntary and instrumental consideration. Suits’ utopia thereby escapes the 
internal logical contradiction posed by Bradford and Holowchak’s instrumentalist 
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reading of utopian games; utopian games are not merely destroyers of boredom, 
if we choose to play them on their own merits. 
Indeed, any instrumentalist reading of gameplay practices would be an 
unfruitful analysis by Suits’ lights, for it turns the proper focus on autotelic value 
on its head: the autotelic value of gameplay may incidentally defeat boredom or 
generate meaning, but that is not essentially why we play games.61 
Instrumentalist readings also ignore the inefficiency principle in his definition of 
games, that to play a game is just to a make a voluntary choice to select less 
efficient means to achieving a prelusory goal than are possible: 
The queerness of radical instrumentalism becomes even more evident if we… consider 
conventional games from the viewpoint of that doctrine. Chess becomes essentially a 
procedure for acquiring chessmen, hockey essentially a procedure for getting rubber 
disks into nets, and foot racing essentially a procedure for breasting tapes. The 
queerness of the doctrine lies in the fact that if games are essentially procedures of this 
kind, then they are as unsuited to their purposes as they could possibly be. And an 
obvious corollary is that one of the worst ways to achieve some practical objective—
building a house, closing a business deal, gaining sympathetic attention—would be to 
make that objective the prelusory goal of a game (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 159). 
 
Foisting an instrumental reading into any purely autotelic activities thus 
results in absurdities. For Suits, the positive phenomenal experience, the fun or 
pleasure of playing and realizing one’s capacities, is the autotelic value of—what 
is good about—gameplay. This is why, in his materially superabundant utopia 
                                                          
61 Indeed, playing games instrumentally to defeat boredom might be inherently self-defeating 
behaviour, in the same sense that consciously seeking pleasure or happiness is thought to make 
those ends less likely to obtain, according to Henry Sidgwick’s ‘Paradox of Hedonism’: “that the 
impulse towards pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its own aim” (Sidgwick 1981 [1907], p. 48). 
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wherein all instrumental activity is eliminated, all that utopians would be left to 
do would be “those things whose only justification is that they justify everything 
else; or, as Aristotle puts it, those things for the sake of which we do other things, 
but which are not themselves done for the sake of anything else” (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 182). This ultimate and final value is found in gameplay, which for Suits 
is simultaneously both the “ideal of existence” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182) and a 
logical necessity if humans are going to be able to survive in utopia. For if “there 
is nothing to strive for precisely because everything has already been achieved… 
we must have obstacles which we can strive to overcome just so that we can 
possess the activity as a whole, namely, playing the game. Game playing makes it 
possible to retain enough effort in Utopia to make life worth living” (Suits 2014 
[1978], pp. 188-189). As has been noted previously, it bears reminding that Suits 
makes the full logical implication of this claim even more graphicly clear: “Utopia 
must consist in game-playing because unless people play games in Utopia there 
will be nothing whatever to do and everyone will die—or go mad—of boredom” 
(Suits 1984b, p. 8). He therefore offers us a stark choice between (to borrow a 
dichotomy from Buckminster Fuller) his utopia of gameplay, or oblivion. 
Thus, despite the fact that we can take the routes of bare autotelicity, the 
Aristotelian Principle, Kolnai’s syntelicity, Kretchmar’s gratuity, and Feezell’s 
more dramatic form of Sisyphean ludic alchemy to arrive at the conclusion that 
games have internal value, we might still argue against Suits’ position on the basis 
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that it ascribes too much value to games. Thomas Hurka does exactly this, and 
criticizes Suits’ position on the basis of its extremism. In the next section, I will 
give an account of the Hurkean line of objection, which is generally pro-Suits, but 
advocates that his position be somewhat moderated. 
 
6.3 Moderate Objections: Hurka, Suits, and the Goldilocks Principle 
Hurka’s reading of The Grasshopper is that Suits problematically “argues 
for the strong thesis that playing games is not just an intrinsic good but the 
supreme such good, since in the ideal conditions of utopia, where all 
instrumental goods are provided, it would be everyone’s primary pursuit” (Hurka 
2006, p. 220). Holowchak concurs that this ‘strong thesis’ is tendentious and 
difficult to defend, for “Suits argues that game playing is the ideal of human 
existence by ruling out other reasonable candidates through merely positing that, 
in a world where people could always do whatever they wanted to do, they 
would play games. Nowhere does he show the inadequacy of other suitable 
candidates... stipulation is not argument” (Holowchak 2007, p. 93).62 It must be 
conceded that Suits’ dismissals of other potential candidates for autotelic activity 
                                                          
62 Holowchak’s criticism of Suits here is not entirely fair, for Suits himself entertains doubts about 
the ultimate value of gameplay at the end of his ‘anxiety dream’, wherein utopians—upon 
realizing that they had spent their lives pursuing exclusively intralusory ends—“would believe 
themselves to be nothing at all, and one can imagine them, out of chagrin and mortification, 
simply vanishing on the spot, as though they had never been” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 196). 
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in his utopia, such as sex (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 187-188), art (Suits 2014 [1978], 
pp. 185-186), and tourism (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 191) are rather brief and 
generally unconvincing. 
Hurka instead favours the ‘weaker thesis’ that gameplay is simply one 
intrinsic good among others, as this claim is comparatively unobjectionable and 
does not jeopardize Suits’ overall position (Hurka 2006, p. 220). Hurka supports 
his weaker thesis by showing how the intrinsic good of achievement grounds the 
intrinsic good of difficulty, which in turn grounds the intrinsic good of gameplay: 
Many contemporary philosophers include among their intrinsic goods achievement, by 
which they mean not just moral but also non-moral achievement, for example, in 
business or the arts. But what exactly is achievement? It clearly involves realizing a goal, 
but not every such realization counts as an achievement; for example, tying one’s 
shoelace does not unless one has some disability. And among achievements some are 
more valuable than others; thus, starting a new business and making it successful is a 
greater achievement than making a single sale. If we ask what explains these 
differences—between achievements and non-achievements, and between greater and 
lesser achievements—the answer is surely in large part their difficulty: how complex or 
physically challenging they are, or how much skill and ingenuity they require. It is when a 
goal is hard to bring about that doing so is an achievement. So reflection on our intuitive 
understanding of the value of achievement suggests a first reason for holding that 
difficult activities as such are good (Hurka 2006, p. 221). 
 
Consequently, not all gameplay activities can instantiate the good of 
difficulty. Hurka identifies the class of games I have dubbed trivial games, which 
“lack all challenge” and have “too little difficulty” (Hurka 2006, p. 221). Trivial 
games are not difficult enough, and so playing them typically results in boredom. 
Thus, trivial games are lacking in overall autotelic value: for example, “rock, 
paper, scissors is not a challenging activity… not a very good game, and certainly 
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not one the playing of which has much intrinsic value” (Hurka 2006, p. 220). On 
the other end of the spectrum Hurka describes what I will here call punishing 
games, games “so difficult that no one can succeed at them”, which are likely to 
provoke feelings of anxiety (Hurka 2006, p. 221). Somewhere between trivial and 
punishing games lies the golden mean of good games, by which Hurka apparently 
means games that are well-designed (Hurka 2006, p. 221). Hurka’s position 
meshes perfectly with what I call Suits’ Goldilocks Principle of game design: 
The gamewright must avoid two extremes. If he draws his lines too loosely the game will 
be dull because winning will be too easy. As looseness is increased to the point of utter 
laxity the game simply falls apart, since there are then no rules proscribing available 
means… On the other hand, rules are lines that can be drawn too tightly, so that the 
game becomes too difficult. And if a line is drawn very tightly indeed the game is 
squeezed out of existence (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 32). 
 
The Goldilocks Principle is borne out in experimental psychology via the 
‘optimal experience’ state of flow. Flow is identified by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi as 
total engagement and joyful immersion in an activity, and is said to occur when 
one’s skill level is well-matched to the difficulty of that activity: e.g., when one is 
competently playing a well-designed game (Csikszentmihalyi 1991, p. 6). 
Moreover, Csikszentmihalyi prescribes the following course of action to ensure 
that the desirable flow state persists: when one experiences boredom, the 
correct response is to increase the difficulty of one’s chosen activity so that 
untapped skills are brought back into play; and when one experiences anxiety, 
the difficulty of the activity ought to be decreased so that overtaxed skills regain 
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their effectiveness and agency is restored (Csikszentmihalyi 1991, pp. 74-75). 
Here the good being sought is, as in the previous accounts under our 
consideration, located in the activity of gameplay itself, and the value of the 
game qua artifact is largely neglected. This asymmetrical split in focus fits with 
Thi Nguyen’s recent metadisciplinary commentary on academic work conducted 
in the philosophy of games: “For the philosophers of sports, the value of games is 
usually hashed out in terms of the desirability of the activity of playing the game, 
rather than in terms of the value of the game itself and the value of appreciating 
its inherent aesthetic qualities” (Nguyen 2017b, p. 12). Fittingly, this analysis of 
gameplay takes its approach from the philosophy of sport literature and does, 
indeed, largely ignore aesthetic considerations in favour of action theory, and 
puts more theoretical weight on the process of play, than on game as product. 
To sum up: if we take Suits’ and Hurka’s accounts to be persuasive, then 
of the set of all games, only the well-designed ones can unlock the good of 
difficulty, which gives their players opportunities to achieve, at minimum, an 
expression of their human capacities, which can be understood as being an 
autotelically valuable activity. And if Suits is correct, then games need to be 
carefully crafted in order to elicit the expression of unique capacities which 
cannot—or ordinarily would not, at least—be expressed outside of gameplay 
(Suits 2007 [1973]). Taken together, these premises—‘good gameplay is a 
uniquely and independently morally valuable activity’ and ‘good gameplay 
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causally depends on good game design’—imply that game design in line with the 
Goldilocks Principle is a morally valuable activity that deserves our further 
theoretical and practical attentions. 
Take jumping, for instance. As a matter of empirical fact, people jump. 
Some people jump because they have to (for some instrumental reason, like 
escaping a bear), and others for the sheer exuberant (autotelic) joy of it. And 
some people, as it turns out, can jump better than some others. Now we can 
plausibly speculate that, at some point in history, some jumpers or spectators or 
both wanted to devise a test to determine whom was the best jumper in their 
group. And after some trial and error, though the march of time this test ends up 
becoming the relatively stable institution of the sport we now know as the high 
jump. The fact that high jump exists, and has a wide following, incentivizes more 
and better jumping in the subset of the population that has an interest in such 
things. Moreover, we might reasonably assume that humans have jumped higher 
than we ever previously had (or ever would have) as a species, due to the 
existence of high jump and the arduous application of its various strategies and 
technologies. High jump, in this rather limited sense, is the ultimate realization of 
a certain human excellence, and is a species-achievement. But even this is not the 
end of the story, for high jump might in turn inspire the invention of new sports, 
which would call for the further refinement of our jumping capacities, or their 
application to other (potentially more difficult and interesting) ends than clearing 
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bars. And so might a similar story be told for every other conceivable skill, as they 
are perfected in the games which best isolate and catalyse them. 
Hurka’s appeal for moderation in Suits’ attribution of autotelic value to 
gameplay—that it be non-ultimate—leads us to a consideration of game design 
principles: that good games ought to conform to the Goldilocks Principle. This in 
turn reduces the scope of games that can generate autotelic valuable to those 
that are well-designed, which conceptually distinguishes a moderate Suitsian 
position from the extreme Suitsian position: the latter tolerates grass-counting as 
a worthwhile activity, while the former does not. We will now look at other 
possible constraints on games we might consider to be ‘good’. 
 
6.4 Well-Designed Games 
Complicating the quest to discover the principles of game design which 
result in the production of games capable of sustaining autotelic gameplay is the 
near-unlimited potential inclusiveness of the activity of gamewrighting. In the 
words of Scott Kretchmar: “according to Suits, any artificial problem can be a 
game. Anybody who manipulates means and ends to manufacture a problem 
could be called a gamewright; and anyone who intentionally pursues a goal under 
artificial constraints may be participating in a game” (Kretchmar 2008, p. 144). 
However, while it may conceptually be the case that anyone could design a game, 
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it is rarely the case in practice that many of us do, and it is likely that many of us 
would botch it up if we tried. Of the set of games that do get designed, 
presumably very few of these are well-designed in the relevant sense. But what—
other than conformity to the Goldilocks Principle—makes for a well-designed 
game? 
Feezell writes that “Play activities are purposive in so far as they are 
oriented toward the ends internal to the playworld, and these activities lead 
toward a consummation… This consummatory aspect of play gives meaning to 
the activities that lead toward the end in view” (Feezell 1984, p. 322). Since 
existential meaningfulness is the essential criteria for autotelically valuable 
gameplay, it seems that well-designed games ought to be consummatable as well 
as difficult. Suits calls such games, with an “inherent goal whose achievement 
ends the game: crossing a finish line, mating a king, and so on”, closed games 
(Suits 2014 [1978], p. 143). By contrast, open games like children’s make-believe 
play have no such goals, and as such their players “are simply committed to 
striving indefinitely” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 146). Open games are poorly-designed, 
since their lack of definite purpose insufficiently structures player behaviour and 
experience, meaning that “children soon abandon such pastimes in favour of 
standard closed games” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 149). 
Well-designed games are thus at minimum appropriately difficult closed 
games (therefore there can be no infinite rallies), with clear and terminable 
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prelusory goals. As Feezell notes, these goals orient and organize player 
behaviour and understanding: 
Within a game there is a telos at the center of all the activities associated with playing it. 
Activities take on a clear meaning by virtue of the rules internal to the game. A world of 
transparent meaning comes about (Feezell 1984, p. 322). 
 
Compared to the “muddled and, often, irreconcilable” disputes that frequently 
arise in the gameplay of open games due to their lack of structure (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 148), closed games by comparison are much more likely to generate 
positive psychological affect via their gameplay. In fact, if gameplay is indeed 
engaged in for its independent autotelic value, then games that generate 
negative psychological affect in their players are prima facie poor candidates to 
qualify as being well-designed. Thus, the interminable ping-pong rally has less of 
a chance to be a bearer of autotelic value for adult humans with a normal range 
of capacities, for “we prefer, other things equal, activities that depend upon a 
larger repertoire of realized capacities and that are more complex” (Rawls 1971, 
pp. 429-430). 
On a similar line, I argued that well-designed games must provide 
opportunities for, and be responsive to, the exercise of player autonomy: for 
engagement is necessary in order to make gameplay a meaningful activity and 
preclude the existential threat of boredom. For this reason, well-designed games 
cannot be soluble games of pure skill with known dominant strategies, which 
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leave no opportunity for the exercise of meaningful player agency. Neither could 
they be games of pure chance where skill has no impact on the outcome, because 
player agency is nil there, as well. Thus, the design of good games would either 
need to be insoluble games of pure skill, or incorporate a balanced mixture of skill 
and chance—ideally, in this case the player would not know exactly to what 
degree the outcome of any given game was a matter of either skill or chance. 
Moreover, if the psychological theory of positive situationism—that 
individual behaviour is significantly determined or affected by one’s situation 
(while remaining agnostic about the extent of influence exerted by character)—is 
correct, then prospective game designers ought to be mindful of the values they 
express in their game designs, and the kinds of behaviours they reward and elicit 
from their players. And, if games are behaviour-affecting situations in the 
relevant sense, we might therefore have good reason to exclude morally 
denigrating games–games which tend to cause their players to behave in a 
vicious fashion after a sufficient duration of gameplay—from the set of well-
designed games, even if these allow for a sufficient exercise of player agency, are 
phenomenologically engaging, aesthetically appealing, and have clear goals. 
Indeed, we might have good moral reasons for attempting to use sound 
psychological principles to design morally transcendent games: games which tend 
to cause their players to behave in a more virtuous fashion after a sufficient 
duration of gameplay. Nguyen has recently argued that game designers have 
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some responsibility to design games which function as “social technology, which, 
when played with the appropriate players and the right attitude in the right 
context, can enable something of a moral miracle”: channelling the aggressive 
impulses of the individual into cooperative social behaviour (Nguyen 2017a, p. 
136). While there is an obvious counterargument which could be made to 
Nguyen here, along the lines that intractably aggressive people are no more likely 
to obey the explicit rules of a game than they are the implicit rules of social 
intercourse, the concept of the morally transcendent game remains a tantalizing 
one, and is sure to motivate further discourse and analysis in the near future. 
In adding consummability, insolubility, and non-degradingness to the 
Goldilocks Principle to our list of desiderata for good game design, we have 
rounded out the picture of what moderately autotelicly valuable gameplay might 
look like, in both Suits’ utopia and our world as well. We have not, however, 
broached the subject of the institutions of games, and their relation to gameplay 
more generally. This is an oversight we must address, because it would intuitively 
be the case that a good game might not be well played if its institution were 
corrupt; thus foreclosing the possibility of autotelic gameplay for that game. 
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6.5 Good Game, Well Played: Suits and MacIntyre on Game Institutions 
Let us begin with Suits’ definition of game institutions, in order to better 
understand their relationship to gameplay practice. He writes: “The institution of 
game x is a body of diverse meanings and practices that have in common the fact 
that all derive their being (that is, they are what they are) by being related, in one 
way or another, to game x” (Suits 2006, p. 4). Suits clarifies this picture somewhat 
in the following passage, wherein it is concretized that “there are a number of 
things that are lusory not simply by being instances of games, but by being 
related to games in a variety of other ways, for example, by trifling with them, by 
cheating at them, by defining them, by isolating elements of them for 
examination (e.g., their prelusory goals), by teaching them, by training for them, 
and, of course, by playing them” (Suits 2006, p. 5). So for every well-designed 
game that is actually played, there will be an institution of that game, and all 
instances of its gameplay and related activities will fall within the rubric of that 
institution. 
By contrast, Alasdair MacIntyre parses the institution of a game as the 
sum of both its external and internal goods, considered in total. He writes of 
chess specifically (though any well-designed game would work equally well as an 
example), that there are “two kinds of good possibly to be gained by playing 
chess… goods externally and contingently attached to chess-playing and… goods 
internal to the practice of chess which cannot be had in any way but by playing 
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chess or some other game of that specific kind” (MacIntyre 2010 [1981], p. 188). 
What MacIntyre calls ‘external’ goods, like money and fame, are purely 
instrumental and therefore fall outside the locus of interest of autotelic 
gameplay. His ‘internal’ goods, on the other hand, prima facie seem to capture 
precisely the kind of intralusory value we are attempting to analyse. 
To realize the internal goods of a game, according to MacIntyre, is “to 
enter into a relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also 
with those who have preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose 
achievements extended the reach of the practice to its present point” (MacIntyre 
2010 [1981], p. 194). Therefore to play a good game, and to fully realize all the 
potential autotelic goods therein, is not only a matter of exploiting one’s 
capacities to the fullest, but also to appropriately situate oneself within the 
tradition of its institution: to understand one’s own achievements in an accurate 
relationship to those of one’s peers. This presumably constitutes a particular kind 
of epistemic achievement, which grounds one in a shared practice. And such an 
achievement seems equally possible in Suits’ utopia and the world of today. 
MacIntyre contends that while a novice may be able to access a limited 
amount of intra-lusory goods, only a player who is fully immersed in and self-
identified with the game’s practice will be able to realize the ultimate internal 
good—to play a truly great game, one that spills out over the ludic boundary and 
extends the reach of the practice. Indeed, this seems like the most difficult, and 
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the most valuable, kind of good that playing a game can provide. However, it 
appears at this very point that great gameplay arguably ceases to be purely 
autotelic, for it is here that MacIntyre makes specific reference to the effects of 
gameplay’s practice on the extra-lusory world, annexing territory that formerly 
belonged to the realm of the non-lusory. 
As Suits’ utopian thought experiment is a tool for isolating and analysing a 
purely autotelic conception of intralusory value, there is no non-lusory realm for 
great gameplay to spill over into there. Does this imply that great gameplay in 
MacIntyre’s sense, wherein “achievement is a good for the whole community 
who participate in the practice” (MacIntyre 2010 [1981], pp. 190-191), is 
impossible in Suits’ utopia, since the practice cannot be conceptually extended? 
Not necessarily, for as previously noted (in Chapter 5) not all utopians will be 
playing the same games. Therefore great gameplay in the practice of one game 
could easily extend into, and influence the institutions of, other games. 
MacIntyre’s practice-extension requirement can be satisfied even in Suits’ utopia, 
which entails that great gameplay is possible there. 
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter offers an account of Suits’ concept of autotelic gameplay. 
Suits’ thought-experimental utopian vision, wherein all possible instrumental 
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goods have already been acquired (or are immediately acquirable upon demand), 
is utilized to isolate and analyse the independent value of gameplay, the sole 
activity that remains logically possible therein. Games played in utopia must be 
chosen solely on the merits of their good game design—their ability to produce 
autotelic value for their players—for there are no other considerations to bear in 
mind. 
However, as Hurka and others point out, Suits provides insufficient 
grounds for promoting gameplay to a position of ultimate value; other varieties 
of autotelic activity may have equal appeal, even under utopian conditions. I have 
identified this as a moderate take on Suits’ position, though Suits himself 
confesses at the end of The Grasshopper that “game playing need not be the sole 
occupation of Utopia” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194) Thus, although gameplay 
cannot reasonably be argued to possess unique value, this does not threaten its 
autotelicity. 
In the process of describing autotelic gameplay, and how it is plausibly 
generated via various forms of ludic alchemy—by perceiving or willing value into 
an activity—we broached Suits’ and MacIntyre’s accounts of game institutions 
and their role in ensuring that good games are actually well played. Though the 
proof of a game’s autotelic value rests in the fact that it is chosen to be played, 
Suits would argue that the games that will naturally attract us the most are those 
that promise the best exercise of our natural human capacities, in line with Rawls’ 
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Aristotelian Principle. In the next chapter, I will analyse the set of those games by 
advancing implicit perfectionist premises throughout Suits’ oeuvre, culminating in 
what I call the utopian game design thesis: a Suitsian account of ideal game 
design practice, leading to a potentially more grounded expression of his ideal of 
existence. 
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Chapter 7: ‘Sports and Games Unthought of Today’: Suits on 
Capacities, Perfectionism, and the Utopian Game Design Thesis 
 
The notable institutions of Utopia… foster sport and other games. But sports and games 
unthought of today; sports and games that will require for their exploitation—that is, for 
their mastery and enjoyment—as much energy as is expended today in serving the 
institutions of scarcity (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). 
 
An essential and yet often neglected motivation of Bernard Suits’ 
elevation of gameplay to the ideal of human existence is his account of capacities 
along perfectionist lines and the function of games in eliciting them. In his work 
Suits treats the expression of these capacities as implicitly good and the purest 
expression of the human telos. Although it is a possible interpretation to take 
Suits’ utopian vision to mean that gameplay in his future utopia must consist of 
the logically inevitable replaying of activities we conduct in the present for 
instrumental reasons (playing games-by-default), because gameplay for Suits is 
identical with the expression of sets of capacities specifically elicited by game 
rules, it is much more likely that he intends utopian gameplay to be an endless 
series of carefully crafted opportunities for the elicitation of special capacities 
(playing games-by-design) and thus embody his ideal of existence. This chapter 
therefore provides a new lens for understanding both Suits’ definitional work on 
gameplay and its connection to his utopian vision in the last chapter of The 
Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia. 
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7.1 Suits and Hurka on Difficult Gameplay 
As previously established, Bernard Suits is a central figure in the field of 
the philosophy of sports chiefly due to his oft-invoked definition of gameplay, the 
‘portable’ version which we will remember reads: “playing a game is the 
voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 43). 
The ‘obstacle’ clause in the definition indicates that, for Suits, a player must 
encounter some minimal level of difficulty in playing for something to count as a 
game: consequently, overcoming this difficulty means passing the test posed by 
the game, by achieving its prelusory goal. What games test for are certain 
capacities, which ground the skills necessary for intralusory success. 
To find value in gameplay is to see value in the difficulty of overcoming 
unnecessary obstacles, as Thomas Hurka does, claiming that “difficult activities 
are as such good” (Hurka 2006, p. 221), in no small part because difficulty is a 
precondition for the further widely accepted good of achievement. On Hurka’s 
account, good (well-designed) games “cannot be so difficult that no one can 
succeed at them, but also cannot lack all challenge: they must strike a balance 
between too much and too little difficulty” (Hurka 2006, p. 221). Bad (poorly-
designed) games, on the other hand, are bad because they can fail in two ways to 
adequately test capacities: (1) ‘punishing’ games contain insurmountable 
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obstacles in their design, and therefore give us difficulty without achievement; 
and (2) ‘trivial’ games contain easily-overcome obstacles in their design, and 
therefore give us achievement without difficulty. Between these two extremes of 
punishing and trivial games, there is a Hurkean golden mean of good games, with 
an amount of difficulty suitable for the testing of human capacities, and thus 
producing achievement via gameplay. 
Hurka is solely concerned with only this set of good games “because they 
realize what seems like an internal goal of the design of games” (Hurka 2006, p. 
221), which is to say, they provide opportunities for testing—and in the case of 
achievements, realizing—players’ capacities through appropriately difficult 
gameplay. For Suits, similarly, capacities play a motivational role: “People play 
games so that they can realize in themselves capacities not realizable (or not 
readily so) in the pursuit of their ordinary activities” (Suits 2007 [1973], p. 12). So 
good games test our capacities through the creation of unnecessary obstacles, 
and we seek out and play good games in order to have a venue for expressing 
and testing those capacities: taken together, these form a virtuous circle. 
Suits makes a further claim that “games generate new skills by erecting 
artificial constraints just so those constraints can be overcome” (Suits 1988a, p. 
4). What he presumably means here is that some capacities can only be realized 
and tested in games—because there is no natural circumstance which calls for 
their expression—such as the capacity which sources skill in achieving a 
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checkmate in chess. These capacities are necessarily ones we cannot know we 
have in advance of playing a given game; but to say that that they are ‘generated’ 
by the game rather than ‘revealed’ through gameplay may be slightly misleading. 
To understand why this is so, we must define what we mean by the term 
‘capacity’. 
 
7.2 Perfectionism and the Definition of ‘Capacity’ 
Both Suits and Hurka operate from a perfectionist moral framework, 
traceable back to the Aristotelian ideas of telos (human purpose) and eudaimonia 
(human flourishing) (Aristotle 1969 [c. 350 B.C.E.]). The concept of ‘capacity’ plays 
a central role in this schema, for it is by realizing our capacities that we bring our 
existences in line with our purpose as a species and arrive at a state of 
flourishing. As Gwen Bradford explains:  
Knowledge, pleasure, achievement, loving relationships, and so on are valuable 
according to perfectionism because they are manifestations of special human features. 
Having these special features, and manifesting them, according to perfectionism, is 
having a good life. According to most perfectionist views, these features are certain 
capacities that are special to human beings. Developing these capacities to the most 
excellent degree possible is what perfectionism values (Bradford 2015, pp. 114-115). 
 
To simplify this picture, we might imagine that each capacity of a human 
being could be represented by a series of switches, each with a binary ‘on’ and 
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‘off’ position.63 Let us picture that all human capacities could be fully represented 
by 100 such switches for each individual person. The more switches that were in 
the ‘on’ position for any given person, the more fully realized that person would 
be, and the closer to the ideal of the good life that person could come. In terms 
of actualization, we could say it would be better to be a 30-switcher than a 10-
switcher, and much better to be an 80-switcher than either of those. Again, we 
must assume in this example that—for Suits, at least—some switches would 
always remain in the ‘off’ position unless certain games are played, for he claims 
that “if no one had ever used his feet before the invention of foot racing, then 
foot racing would require the invention of running” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 51). So 
gameplay for him either has the power to (a) create new human capacities, or (b) 
reveal latent ones. Let us for the moment call (a) the strong reading, and (b) the 
weak reading of Suits on his relationship between capacities and gameplay. We 
will return to these divergent readings shortly after offering a definition of 
‘capacity’. Suffice it to say for the moment that for Suits, the purpose of 
                                                          
63 I am using a ‘switch’ metaphor to represent capacities here as a prose-friendly expedient, but in 
actuality capacities are more akin to dials on my account. Dials can be completely turned off (0%), 
completely turned on (100%), or stand at some percentile of ‘on-ness’ between these two 
extremes. A ‘dial’ metaphor helps us explain why it makes more sense to say that there is one 
general capacity for all language use, instead of claiming that proficiency in each language should 
count as distinct expressions of separate capacities. Saying that a person who is fluent in both 
English and French is operating at 46% on the dial of their potential linguistic capacity would seem 
to make more sense than to say that ‘English language capacity’ and ‘French language capacity’ 
constitute distinct capacity ‘switches’ and that both are in the ‘on’ position for the bilingual 
person. More plausibly, being bilingual would count as two specific instantiations of the more 
general linguistic capacity, each of which nudge the ‘dial’ of realization of that capacity upwards. 
Thanks to Paul Gaffney for suggesting the comparison with language in this context. 
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gameplay is to help us become more fully realized humans, by turning on certain 
types of capacities that cannot be elicited in any other fashion. 
For the purposes of the argument at hand, I take capacities to be latent 
abilities to do, experience, or become something, which can be unlocked by 
fitting circumstances and thereby realized. More formally:  
An agent A has a capacity to X if and only if under condition set α, A can X. 
A realizes that capacity if A does X under α. 
 
The relation is one between an agent and an act, where that act issues from the 
agent after being evoked by a catalysing circumstance of a fitting kind. Without a 
triggering circumstance, therefore, a capacity will never find expression: for 
example, in a world without fungi there cannot be any mycologists, although 
being a mycologist is clearly within the potential capacities of a human being. 
However, whereas we can witness acts (the realizations of capacities), we cannot 
witness capacities themselves: we must instead intuit (or, more often, retrodict) 
capacities from acts. 
The preceding tentative account of capacities has been intentionally kept 
as metaphysically simple and transparent as possible, and it is my hope that this 
definition—wanting though it may be in some regards—will suffice to 
demonstrate what Suits means when he uses the term. Given what has been said 
so far, we can make a few further remarks about capacities. First, if we accept 
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that the realization of capacities is an essential feature of the good life, it 
becomes inconsistent to hold that metaphysical entities as evil, bad, or negative 
capacities can exist. If such capacities were possible, we ought to condemn, 
rather than praise, their realization. This is not to say, of course, that skills 
sources from capacities cannot be put to evil ends—for they very frequently are, 
as Bradford points out in her discussion of evil achievements (Bradford 2015, pp. 
21-24). It is just that, along perfectionist lines, we would want to assert that 
capacities (in their unrealized form) are a priori good. 
Secondly, because the realization of human capacities is the telos of our 
species, we can reasonably expect that the experience of doing so would be 
enjoyable, meaningful, and good in itself for individual members of our species. 
The most robust range of our possible capacities is given (and limited) by our 
species, though it is presumably reduced in scope by the influences of culture, 
social strata, and peer group, as well as our individual limitations. However, just 
as we were able to previously compare hypothetical individuals in terms of 
degrees of capacity realization, we could conceivably attempt a similar 
comparison between hypothetical cultures (or smaller groups). For instance, if 
the individuals that make up the population of culture C have 30% of their 
capacities realized on average at any given time, and the individuals who make up 
the population of culture D have only 10% of their capacities realized on average 
at any given time, then ceteris paribus we can non-controversially claim that 
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culture C is better than culture D in terms of its average rate of capacity 
realization across individuals. 
Thirdly, we might be tempted by extension to posit an ideal of a fully 
realized human as someone who is actively expressing all of their potential 
capacities. For without committing to a fixed number, we can say that the 
number of contingently realizable capacities will differ between individual 
members of the same species, and that the more capacities that are being 
expressed on a regular basis, the more fully realized an individual would be. But 
total (100%) capacity actualization in an individual—a full realization of all 
capacities at all times—is a conceptually impossible ideal. This is because there 
exists incommensurability between certain capacities—speed and skill for 
instance, or power and cunning—which make the fully realized individual an 
incoherent ideal. This objection mirrors Isaiah Berlin’s argument regarding the 
incompatibility of certain goods in “The Pursuit of the Ideal” (Berlin 2013 [1990]). 
Fourthly, we must acknowledge some epistemic issues in discussing 
capacities, for although we may attempt to enumerate the full range of possible 
human capacities, we cannot be confident that we have been utterly exhaustive. 
Nor, even in the case of capacities that are familiar to us and are generally 
acknowledged, can we glean precise percentiles of their realization in any given 
individual: the exact numbers, if such even exist, are hidden from us. Thus, since 
the realization of individual capacities is an epistemically inaccessible percentile, 
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we could not and would not know if and when we were to become optimally-
realized agents. 
 Finally, we must make a distinction between at least two types of 
capacities: innate and learned. Regarding innate capacities, it seems that at least 
some very basic capacities are present from birth, such as the capacity to 
breathe. But can we fairly call a skill or ability that is always ‘on’ the expression of 
a capacity? For capacities must prima facie be at least potentially latent—or, at 
the very least, potentially latent. Something that is always ‘on’—like the power to 
breathe oxygen—looks like it must count as something else; though perhaps if we 
are transported into an oxygen-free atmosphere (like deep space) without a 
breathing apparatus, it might make more intuitive sense to say in that case that 
we do indeed have a capacity to breathe oxygen-rich gases, but circumstances do 
not allow for the realization of that capacity. Thus, it appears that we can 
conclude that all living humans must have at least one or two of their 
metaphorical switches (representing innate capacities) in the ‘on’ position at any 
given time in order to exist. Further, an entity which is not actively expressing any 
innate capacity at all would not appear to be a human being on this account. 
Regarding learned capacities, we might wonder: is learning itself a 
capacity—perhaps even a capacity by way of which we can acquire other 
capacities? This recalls our previous question: can a capacity be created, or are 
they always present and merely revealed? The quick and dirty answer would be 
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to say that a human being can only do what human beings already have the 
capacities to do (just as a tree cannot grow from an egg, nor a chicken from a 
nut). If new capacities could be created (as in the strong reading of Suits given 
above), this would require changing the ‘hardware’ of the human body and brain. 
This view of capacities might make sense from an intergenerational or 
transhumanist standpoint, with some finessing, as we will discuss below. 
However, standard accounts of perfectionism only advocate developing human 
capacities, not superhuman or posthuman ones. But if learning is simply a matter 
of revealing pre-existing capacities (as in the weak reading of Suits given above), 
then doing so requires nothing more extreme than changing the ‘software’ of our 
individual thoughts and habits, or perhaps our cultural outlook, which is well 
within the remit of perfectionist ideology. 
 
7.3 Suits on Utopian Capacities and Utopian Gameplay 
Despite the enduring central focus on Suits’ definition of games, his 
‘utopian vision’ regarding the form and nature of a utopian existence consisting 
solely of gameplay has also recently risen to relative prominence and critical 
analysis (McLaughlin 2008, Vossen 2016, Yorke 2017). However, his concept of 
‘capacities’ in relation to this subject has to date received insufficient attention. 
In this section I will endeavour to draw these threads together. 
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In Suits’ utopian thought experiment, all human needs and wants are 
immediately met by telepathically-controlled supercomputers. Humanity has 
access to the logical equivalent of an infinite number of wish-granting magical 
lamps, each capable of granting infinite wishes (Suits 2014 [1978], pp. 182-183). 
So we must assume that if Suits’ utopians want to modify their bodies, or even 
transfer their consciousnesses to other bodies, this is within the realm of utopian 
possibility for them—physics goes on holiday. Thus, radical changes to the human 
body itself may allow for the creation of new human capacities in utopia, in 
addition to those which could be facilitated by the introduction of novel sports 
equipment, which creates a hypothetical set of ‘utopian sports’ which would 
differ considerably from our contemporary sports: these are, arguably, Suits’ 
famous “sports and games unthought of today” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194). This 
line of interpretation clearly favors the strong reading of Suits on capacities. 
There is an aspirational dimension to our choice of games for Suits, for 
“with the invention of games far removed from the pursuits of ordinary life, quite 
new capacities emerge, and hitherto unknown skills are developed” (Suits 2007 
[1973], p. 12). Pedalling, in other words, can be thought of as a capacity that has 
little opportunity for meaningful expression prior to the invention of the pedal; 
and we can imagine, by extension, that with the invention of new pieces of 
sporting equipment, new parts of the body might come into play. Imagine, for 
instance, a new sport wherein a player’s moves were controlled solely through 
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the fine-tuned flexing of their back muscles via an electronic interface: this would 
valorize a human capacity that has had few other relevant arenas of expression 
up to this point. 
Thus, when Suits writes of “sports and games that will require for their 
exploitation—that is, for their mastery and enjoyment—as much energy as is 
expended today in serving the institutions of scarcity” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194) 
with regard to utopian games, what he is seemingly referring to is creating as-yet-
undiscovered new capacities expressed in new forms of gameplay, and thus a 
more fully realized kind of being that would be playing them: a utopian. I argued 
in Chapter 5 that such utopians on a strong reading are unrelatable entities; that 
they are, at best, a successor species, a placeholder for the beings who will play 
games in Suits’ utopia, and that their values and mode of existence are 
necessarily obscured from our understanding, hidden behind an unbridgeable 
cultural gap between us and them. 
 I also acknowledged that this strong interpretation, while defensible in 
light of Suits’ more hyperbolic statements, is perhaps not the most charitable or 
productive way to understand his utopian vision. The weak reading of capacities 
for Suits must be closer to what he intended. His utopians must therefore either 
be ‘soft’ utopians, or serve as a regulative ideal (like the ideally virtuous agent)—
i.e., they must be us, or be relatable to us—if his utopian thesis is to be 
rehabilitated to a state of plausibility. 
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Schematically, Suits can be read as implying that games, as voluntary 
efforts to overcome unnecessary obstacles, provide the required circumstances 
for the expression of pre-existing latent capacities. Conceptually distinct games 
typically elicit different capacities by design, and a utopia of gameplay would 
need to be replete with games specially designed to promote human flourishing 
through the expression of as many capacities as possible (especially due to the 
fact that the instrumental pressures and demands which previously provided the 
circumstances for their expression would be extinguished, via the advent of 
utopian material superabundance). 
The ‘duty to design’ utopian games which Suits states we have (Suits 2014 
[1978], p. 194) is a task to be completed in the present, to begin the work of 
establishing a soft utopian culture, and can be parsed in such a way as to fit with 
the weak reading on capacities. Let us call his argument for this duty the utopian 
game design thesis, which can be briefly summarized as follows: (1) Certain 
capacities can only be expressed via gameplay; (2) the expression of those game-
exclusive capacities is essential to the project of realizing our best selves; (3) 
these capacities are not generally being routinely expressed in the present (which 
may in part explain why many contemporary games have the low reputations 
they currently suffer from); but (4) these capacities could and should be being 
expressed via gameplay, because (5) we ought to try to become our best selves if 
such is possible; thus (6) we need to design a set of utopian games which 
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correctly identify and elicit the expression of these crucial game-exclusive 
capacities. This aspirational model of game design fully employs the cultural 
technology of games and gameplay in a new way—not as a pastime, but as a 
means for individual (and ultimately cultural) transformation—the Suitsian 
variety of ludic alchemy. The right kind of gameplay, for Suits, terraforms Earth 
into Utopia. 
 
7.4 Objections to the Utopian Game Design Thesis 
Against the weak reading of Suits on capacities and its relation to utopian 
gameplay, and specifically against the utopian game design thesis as laid out 
above, several axes of criticism can be levied. It could be claimed that we simply 
do not know enough about the scope and nature of human capacities to be able 
to design games adequate to the task of consistently uncovering or eliciting them. 
Alternately, it could be claimed that we do not know enough about the science or 
art of game design to be able to design games which are sufficiently compelling 
to realize the latent capacities that we do understand and non-controversially 
acknowledge we have. Perhaps most troublingly, there is an additional 
theoretical worry that if there is no essentially stable utopian body, then there 
can be no such thing as a utopian sport to be designed. 
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Counter to the first objection that we are insufficiently acquainted with 
human capacities to design games to elicit them, Suits argues that: “Rules are the 
crux of games because it is the rules of any particular game that generate the 
skills appropriate to that game” (Suits 1988a, p. 5). In other words, for Suits we 
needn’t worry about having an insufficient grasp of human capacities, because 
designers can more or less retrodict these through good game design. Jon Pike 
has recently written a nice reductio ad absurdum of this position, stating: 
It is the skills that generate the rules, not the other way around. We have no rules to 
cover contests of unaided flying, and constructing some rules to cover such putative 
sports would not allow us to develop the skills to enact them. For unaided flying to be a 
sport, we do not need rules; we need wings (Pike 2018, p. 328). 
 
While this criticism does apply to the sloppy wording of Suits’ formulation 
quoted above, I believe that the intention behind the text can still be rescued. 
Suits obviously did not believe that a game rulebook would produce the miracle 
of unaided flight in human beings: but he did believe that what human capacities 
do exist would be developed, when and where they were properly elicited, under 
the circumstances of gameplay. This seems to generally be the case in practice, at 
least where the game is good (well designed) in Hurka’s sense. Pike’s game, by 
comparison, is just bad, not in the sense that it is punishing (too difficult) or trivial 
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(too easy), but in the sense that it is impossible and as such cannot even be 
attempted.64 
Yet, even if contingently impossible games like Pike’s sport of unaided 
flight might never get played, its ruleset might yet display the values of 
consistency and clarity, and sit on a shelf ready for use in the highly unlikely 
circumstance of a viable bird-human genetic hybrid being produced—and, in that 
odd hypothetical case, rules-appropriate skills would still have to be learned and 
developed by the game’s participants. Indeed, the only class of games for which 
skills could never under any circumstances be developed in line with its ruleset 
would be conceptually impossible games—for instance, those that require their 
players to draw squared circles. In any other case, it seems like game designers 
could potentially work something out with regard to fitting their rulesets to those 
capacities which they have some reason to think exist (or at least could exist in a 
nearby possible world). 
Game design is nevertheless somewhat philosophically undertheorized, 
which could leave Suits open to the second objection: that we do not understand 
the principles of game design well enough to reliably elicit human capacities with 
it. While it is true that philosophers have not yet produced a definitive answer to 
the question of exactly what role game design should have in producing human 
                                                          
64 Ignoring, for the moment, the speculative evolutionary perspective from which we might argue 
that ‘arms are latent wings’. 
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well-being, it will be evident from our preceding discussion that at least Suits and 
Hurka, among others, coordinate on the position that it does have a role to 
play.65 But even if they are correct, the question remains as to whether we ought 
to regard game design as a hard science that we could hypothetically completely 
understand and eventually master, or as a soft art, whose forms and norms shift 
according to time, place, and custom. 
From a Suitsian perspective, it seems we must treat game design like a 
science, for its task in his schema is to provide a universal source of 
entertainment for all utopians, protecting them from boredom-induced madness 
and thus vouchsafing the stability of his utopia. If anything, game design in this 
context looks like a modest expression of positive situationism, the psychological 
theory that certain environmental features can have an overriding influence on 
the moral actions of the agents inhabiting them. In line with Suits’ utopian game 
design thesis, it appears that playing good games could conceivably condition us 
to be good people. 
Thus, on Suits’ capacity model of gameplay, a science of game design 
could help pre-utopians like ourselves become better people by providing greater 
and better-calibrated obstacles for them to overcome and thus unlocking greater 
                                                          
65 Thi Nguyen believes that games have a morally transformative function in turning competitive 
urges into competitive behavior, and that good game design plays a central role in enabling this 
transformation (Nguyen 2017a). 
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and greater capacities. For if the definition of gameplay is identical with the 
expression of human capacities, then what is the utopia of continuous, endless 
gameplay except an unending expression of the range of all latent human 
capacities? The utopian game design thesis thus stated fits with Suits’ overall 
schema, but yields the odd result that designers of well-designed games are 
already de facto involved in a project of moral perfectionism, whether or not they 
are aware of it (and most, presumably, are not). 
Arguably, the principles of game design are sufficiently developed to tell 
us which kinds of games are adequate for testing human capacities and which are 
not, and to what extent. Tic-tac-toe, for instance, requires only the understanding 
of one simple strategy in order to fully master it, so we can safely conclude that 
few important human capabilities are tested or unlocked in playing it. Slot 
machines are even worse, in that even less cognition and dexterity are required 
in their operation, and so there is even less room for the exercise of player 
agency. More complex games, by comparison, produce more intense and difficult 
challenges for their players, thus enabling the realization of their players’ 
capacities, and so correspondingly producing more high-value achievements via 
their gameplay. The more we develop our account of the theory and practice of 
how game design identifies, isolates, and elicits various capacities, the safer Suits 
looks to be from the criticism that our understanding of games is too primitive to 
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reliably elicit capacities through erecting obstacles of properly-calibrated 
difficulty. 
Difficulty is, however, agent-relative: what is hard (or even impossible) for 
me to achieve might be easy for you to achieve, and vice versa; so the game that 
you find trivial I may find to be punishing, and the game you find punishing I may 
find to be trivial. In this way, intralusory achievements must be understood as 
subjective. This is why there must be a plurality of games in Suits’ utopia: there 
can be no ‘one game to amuse them all’. His utopians, like us, would seek the 
kind of games which would provide the best fit in terms of challenge (maxing out 
their capacities), based on age, ability, and bodily build (assuming, for the 
moment, that these parameters are fixed for the purpose of playing utopian 
games). 
However, following the lines of Suits’ utopian thought experiment we can 
plainly see that having omniscient, omnipotent players is a live possibility, and 
that the realization of this state would eliminate all potential sources of difficulty. 
For if utopian players of any sport wished themselves into wildly different bodily 
configurations from each other prior to a match (via their wish-granting 
supercomputers), then nothing could stop them from doing so. From this fact we 
can infer that there is no essential utopian body, and thus there can be no 
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utopian sports.66 This is because the capacity of landing a three-pointer in a game 
of basketball relies on having human arms within a certain range of lengths, the 
court being bounded by a certain set of measurements based on the average rate 
of locomotion for an average-sized human, and the net being set far enough off 
the ground that making the shot is not trivial (say, not lower than three feet 
above the average human’s height), but not so far off the ground as to make it 
punishing for the majority of human beings (say, not higher than a two-story 
building). Thus the goodness of basketball’s game design directly relies on the 
relative phenotypical stability, and so the predictable capacities, of our species. In 
order to protect the logical possibility of good utopian sports existing, Suits would 
either be forced to add the caveat that the telepathically-controlled 
supercomputers of his techno-Cockaygne could not be used to transmogrify the 
human subject, or—more plausibly—require that utopian players coordinate on 
game rules circumscribing their unrestricted intralusory use, and have them 
unfailingly observe these restrictions. 
 
7.5 Summary 
Suits’ utopian vision is attained under conditions wherein instrumental 
activity is made redundant by technological advances, and everything which can 
                                                          
66 This line of argument comes from a long-running discussion with Jon Pike. 
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be known in theory is in fact known in practice. Humans would then be free to 
pursue an unfettered life of intrinsically valuable game-playing, which in Suits’ 
view best fits the human telos, and thus opens up the most promising available 
avenue to his version of eudaimonia. This is the ‘ideal of existence’. It is also, 
from the pre-utopian human perspective, an unrelatable state of being. 
In order to rehabilitate the utopian thesis, Suits must subscribe to 
something like the utopian game design thesis, which is the logical extension of 
his capacity model of games—by designing better games, which allow for the 
expression of the greatest range of human capacities and the widest range of 
human experience, we allow for the possibility of making better people through 
gameplay: both in the circumstances of utopia, and in the here and now. The best 
games are utopian games, and playing these utopian games shapes the best 
people, who are either utopians or those able to reasonably emulate them. This 
regulative ideal is a more reasonable projection of what Suits called the “ideal of 
existence” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 182) when his capacity model is taken into 
account; and the perfectionist backdrop helps make better sense of his urging 
contemporary game designers “to begin the immense work of devising these 
wonderful [utopian] games now” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194), for the realization of 
our human capacities in the present is a moral imperative which demands our 
philosophical attention much more urgently than an empty and disconnected 
abstraction. 
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Conclusion: Suits’ Utopia of Gameplay, Revised and Refined 
 
Bernard Suits’ utopian thesis is the philosophical position that the ‘ideal of 
existence’ for humankind is a utopia of gameplay. Suits supports his utopian 
thesis by means of his thought-experimental utopian vision, better described as a 
techno-Cockaygne, wherein all instrumental needs are immediately satisfied or 
eliminated via technological means. This leaves human beings free to realize their 
species-purpose, realizing their capacities and living flourishing lives, through the 
playing of utopian games. 
In this dissertation, I have shown how the parameters of Suits’ utopian 
vision would challenge many of our contemporary moral intuitions, and argued 
that while its realization would narrow the scope for virtuous action, it would not 
altogether extinguish it. I have also argued that Suits’ claims that his utopians 
would suffer from a crisis of leisure and an existential boredom so great that they 
would commit suicide is an overstatement, based on a ambiguity which can be 
easily resolved by applying my distinctions between two types of utopians (at 
times U1 and U2), and two different types of utopian games—games-by-default 
and games-by-design—which have very different functions. Games-by-default 
would act as a kind of occupational methadone for U1 utopians, to help them 
transition into a post-instrumental utopian lifestyle; while games-by-design 
would constitute meaning-generative life projects for U2 utopians. 
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However, due to the unbridgeable cultural gap between Suits’ utopians 
and ourselves, we cannot determine the content of utopian games-by-design, but 
only identify what they cannot be. If we cannot accurately imagine what it is like 
to be a post-instrumental utopian, then we cannot have a duty to design utopian 
games in the present, as Suits claims we do. In other words, the plausibility of his 
utopian thesis rests on the speculative existence of a set of ‘really magnificent 
games’ which, if not describable (and he does not do so), make his utopian thesis 
no more rationally compelling than any other article of faith. 
In an attempt to rehabilitate Suits’ utopian thesis in light of these 
objections, I analysed various principles of good game design and identified a set 
of potential methods for the design of utopian games, without committing to a 
specific prototype. This project culminated in my articulation of the utopian game 
design thesis, the idea that games should be designed with the goal of helping 
their players to realize better, and more of, their human capacities, which would 
have the result of producing a renaissance of good, meaningful gameplay in the 
present. My proposal has the benefit of remaining consistent with Suits’ 
underlying perfectionist theoretical orientation, and returns his utopian thesis to 
its appropriate function as a regulative ideal, rather than merely viewing it as a 
‘logical inevitability’. I conclude that Suits’ utopian vision, thus refined and 
revised, is a valuable end to contemplate and pursue, even if it cannot constitute 
the kind of ultimate value that Suits intended it to.  
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